Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case in question concerns the defendant, Sharrieff M. Kent, who was convicted by a Plaquemines Parish jury of two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, and one count of illegal discharge of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Kent fired several shots at a pickup truck containing law enforcement officers as they were fleeing his property during an investigation. Kent claimed he was protecting his family from unknown intruders on his property.The Court of Appeal had reversed Kent's convictions, determining that the State violated Kent's right to due process by introducing evidence of other crimes and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Court of Appeal also found that the State violated Kent’s right to remain silent by referencing his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the Court of Appeal's determinations. It concluded that the references made to the officers conducting the trash pull as part of a narcotics investigation do not constitute impermissible references to other crimes or misconduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the State did not violate the Fifth Amendment as the circumstances presented align more with the exceptions and non-application of Doyle than with Doyle itself.While the Supreme Court agreed that the State introduced the facts underlying Kent's prior conviction without first satisfying necessary prerequisites to their admission, it did not believe this error warranted a reversal of Kent's conviction. Considering the overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence showing Kent fired his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in the street, the Supreme Court concluded that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and reinstated Kent's convictions and sentences. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. KENT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether an architect and contract administrator had duty of care towards an employee of a subcontractor under the terms of a construction contract. The employee, Gustavo Bonilla, had been injured during a demolition job and filed a suit alleging negligence against Verges Rome Architects (VRA) and Morphy Makofsky, Inc. (MMI). VRA had been hired as a consultant for design and contract administration services. The trial court ruled in favor of VRA, but the court of appeal reversed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the contract terms were clear and unambiguous, and did not impose a duty on VRA to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site or Mr. Bonilla’s safety. VRA was required to make weekly site visits to ensure work was progressing according to specifications. However, the contract specifically stated that these visits should not be construed as supervision of actual construction. Responsibility for site safety and construction methods was allocated to the contractor.The Court concluded that VRA could not be held liable for failing to perform duties it was not contractually obligated to undertake. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of VRA. View "BONILLA VS. VERGES ROME ARCHITECTS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to decide if the Council of the City of New Orleans ("Council") had the legal standing to institute a lawsuit against various parties, including the Mayor of New Orleans, relating to the assets of the Edward Wisner Trust. The Council had challenged a 2020 agreement, which it alleged illegally disposed of public property and modified the trust without its oversight or input. The issue arose when the defendants filed an exception of lack of procedural capacity, arguing that the Council did not have the authority to institute the lawsuit. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the Council did have the procedural capacity to bring the lawsuit. The court based its decision on its interpretation of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans ("HRC"), which indicated that the Council, as an independent entity distinct from the executive branch, had the legal capacity to function independently and to institute suits as necessary for the protection of the city's rights and interests. The court also considered the longstanding custom of the Council participating in litigation both as plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Council had the legal standing to bring the lawsuit, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. View "THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS VS. EDWARD WISNER DONATION" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis. View "KLING VS. HEBERT" on Justia Law

In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. View "LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Darrell J. Robinson was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Robinson appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, arguing that the state suppressed material evidence that violated his due process rights. The evidence in question included undisclosed deals with jailhouse informant Leroy Goodspeed, serology reports and notes, other forensic evidence, and eyewitness accounts inconsistent with trial testimony.The court found that the state did suppress evidence and this evidence was favorable to the defense. The court further found that the undisclosed evidence was material and its suppression undermined confidence in the verdict. Consequently, the court decided that Robinson did not receive a fair trial, resulting in a verdict unworthy of confidence. The court reversed Robinson's conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "STATE EX REL. ROBINSON VS. VANNOY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed a conviction for domestic abuse battery involving strangulation. The defendant, Jose Sagastume, was found guilty by a unanimous jury and sentenced to three years imprisonment with two years suspended, followed by two years of probation. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against two potential jurors: a retired police officer and a former assistant district attorney. However, the defense counsel did not object when the trial court denied these challenges.The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, stating that despite the lack of formal objection, the defense counsel's reasons for the challenges and subsequent use of peremptory challenges to remove the jurors were sufficient to preserve the issue for review.The Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed, ruling that according to the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 800(A), a defendant must object contemporaneously to a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause in order to assign it as an error on appeal. The court found that the defense counsel's acquiescence without objection did not meet this requirement. Therefore, it reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal, reinstated the conviction and sentence, and affirmed them. The court emphasized that the legislature's language in Article 800(A) was clear: an objection must be made at the time of the ruling, and the nature and grounds for the objection must be stated at that time. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. JOSE M. SAGASTUME" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to clarify the statutory funding obligations of the City of Shreveport (“the City”) to the Shreveport City Marshal (“the Marshal”). Based on the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions, the Court found find La. R.S. 13:1889 required only that the City fund the operation and maintenance expenses of the physical offices of the Marshal. View "Caldwell v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to review the court of appeal’s determination that the State failed to prove that 16-year-old D.W. was the person who entered a sheriff’s vehicle and stole firearms from inside it, and therefore that the evidence was insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication for burglary involving a firearm, La. R.S. 14:62, and theft of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:67.15. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the State presented sufficient evidence that D.W. was a principal, in accordance with La. R.S. 14:24, to these felony-grade delinquent acts regardless of whether he personally entered the vehicle and took the firearms that were inside it himself. Therefore, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the delinquency adjudication and dispositions imposed by the juvenile court, which were then affirmed. View "Louisiana in the interest of D.W." on Justia Law