Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis. View "KLING VS. HEBERT" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in a jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to plaintiff Henry Pete who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Intertwined with this issue was the fundamental question of the manner by which appellate courts were to review damage awards for excessiveness; necessarily, the same rules would apply in determining whether an award was too low. Louisiana jurisprudence had a long-standing general principle that, in reviewing a general damage award, the “initial inquiry . . . is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.” Thereafter, and only when a determination has been made that the “trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion,’” will a court “resort to prior awards . . . and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Such determinations are not subject to mathematical exactitude or scientific precision. The Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion. Applying this principle to this case, the Court found the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9,800,00.00 in general damages. "The evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we find $5,000,000.00 to be the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded." View "Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co, LLC et al." on Justia Law

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The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this medical malpractice matter in order to consider whether the gross negligence standard of La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) was to be considered by a medical review panel when the medical treatment occurred during a declared state of public health emergency pursuant to La.R.S. 29:766(A). To this, the Court found the trial court did not err in declaring that La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) should not be considered or applied in medical review panel proceedings and, therefore, did not err in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the court of appeal did not err in its affirmation. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sebble v. St. Luke's #2, LLC d/b/a St. Luke's Living Center, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Oris Latour was injured after he tripped and fell at Steamboat Bill’s restaurant (“Steamboat”) in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Latour alleged he tripped on a concrete ledge that ran perpendicular to the end of a row of dining tables. Contending the ledge was disguised and dangerous, he filed a negligence suit against the restaurant owner. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Latour, finding Steamboat 80 percent at fault and awarding Latour damages totaling $675,053. On appeal, the court found the district court committed reversible error related to two pretrial evidentiary rulings which affected the outcome of the case. The court of appeal conducted a de novo review of the entire record and found Latour met his burden of proving negligence. The appellate court then assessed Steamboat with 85 percent of the fault and Latour with 15 percent fault. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether the court of appeal erred in finding Latour met his burden of proving Steamboat was negligent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.6; and (2) whether, after finding prejudicial error, the court of appeal erred in increasing Steamboat’s percentage of fault on de novo review, although Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Supreme Court found Latour met his burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:2800.6. The Court also found consistent with statutory law and secondarily, jurisprudence, Steamboat could not be assessed with a greater percentage of fault than the 80 percent assigned by the jury. Because Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal, the 20 percent of fault allocated to him cannot be reduced. Therefore, on de novo review, the Supreme Court allocated fault at 80 percent to Steamboat and 20 percent to Latour. View "Latour v. Steamboats, LLC" on Justia Law

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Baker Sales, Inc. (“BSI”) obtained two loans from Newtek Small Business Finance, Inc. (“Newtek”) which were secured by mortgages on BSI’s commercial property. Robert and Elsa Baker (collectively “the Bakers”) executed agreements unconditionally guaranteeing payment of all amounts owed on the loans. These agreements were secured by conventional mortgages on the Bakers’ home. BSI filed for bankruptcy approximately two years later. Newtek filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the total amount of the outstanding balance of the loans. The bankruptcy court granted Newtek’s motion to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay. Newtek then filed a petition for executory process in state court against BSI and the Bakers requesting seizure and sale of BSI’s commercial property without the benefit of appraisal. Newtek purchased the seized property at a sheriff’s sale; the bankruptcy case was subsequently closed. Newtek filed the suit at issue here, seeking to foreclose on the Bakers’ home. The trial court issued a judgment preliminarily enjoining the sale of the Bakers’ home and converted the proceeding from executory to ordinary. The Bakers filed a petition seeking a declaration under the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act (“LDJA”) that as the underlying debt was extinguished, Newtek could no longer pursue them as sureties. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether a creditor’s recovery in a deficiency judgment action was barred against a surety when a creditor forecloses on property through a judicial sale without appraisal. Harmonizing the LDJA with the law of suretyship, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that such recovery was barred. View "Newtek Small Business Finance, LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law

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In April 2019, plaintiff Zach Bellard petitioned for damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when a defective attic/ceiling joist broke and caused him to fall while working as a plumber on a construction project (the “Project”) involving renovations to a building located on the campus of The University of Louisiana at Lafayette (“ULL”). Plaintiff named as defendants: ATK Construction, LLC (“ATK”), Bernard, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System, Garden City Construction Co., Inc., United Fire & Indemnity Company, and American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were due to the fault and negligence of the Defendants and that, as a result of their fault and/or obligation to insure, Defendants were individually and jointly liable. Plaintiff did not allege any contractual privity with the Defendants, including Bernard, or any other source of liability beyond negligence. Over one year after Plaintiff filed his petition, Bernard filed a third party demand against Doug Ashy, alleging it entered into a contract with ULL in 2017 to furnish all labor, materials, equipment, transportation, supervision, permits, etc., necessary to complete “Phase I” renovations to the Project. Doug Ashy filed an Exception of Prematurity and an Exception of Prescription, asserting: (1) the tort indemnity claim was premature because Bernard had not suffered a compensable loss; and (2) the claims for redhibition and products liability were prescribed because Bernard failed to file its third party demand within 90 days of Plaintiff’s demand pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1041. Doug Ashy also filed an Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action. The district court granted the Exception of Prematurity and Exception of Prescription and found the Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action to be moot as a result of its ruling. While both Doug Ashy and Bernard focused their arguments to the Louisiana Supreme Court on prematurity and prescription of Bernard’s third party claims, the Court observed it was questionable whether the facts alleged in the petition could ever support a third party claim for tort indemnity. The Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of Plaintiff's exceptions: "a suit alleging liability of a defendant arising solely as a result of its own fault cannot support a defendant’s claim for tort indemnity." View "Bellard v. ATK Construction, LLC et al." on Justia Law

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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions related to claims made by Kirk Menard, who worked as an environmental, safety, and health specialist at Targa Resources, LLC’s Venice, Louisiana plant. His job duties included ensuring Targa complied with various state and federal environmental and safety standards. Menard reported to two individuals: his “official supervisor,” David Smith, who resided at another facility, and an “indirect supervisor,” Ted Keller, who served as an area manager for the Venice plant. Menard’s indirect supervisor, in turn, reported to Perry Berthelot, a Targa District Manager. In a conference call, Menard reported that the total suspended solids in certain recent water samples exceeded regulatory limits. At the end of the call, Berthelot told Menard to call him back to discuss the plan for rectifying these exceedances. Menard obliged, and he alleged Berthelot told him he should dilute the sewage samples with bottled water. Menard claimed that in response he nervously laughed and said, “no, we’re going to correct it the right way.” The federal appellate court asked the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether refusals to engage in illegal or environmentally damaging activities were “disclosures” under the current version of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute ("LEWS"); and (2) whether LEWS afforded protection to an employee who reports to his supervisor an activity, policy, or practice of an employer which he reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, where reporting violations of environmental law, rules, or regulations, is a part of the employee’s normal job responsibilities. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative to both questions. View "Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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The district court awarded damages to plaintiff Lashondra Jones who was allegedly injured when she stepped on a wooden pallet with an attached pallet guard, holding a bulk watermelon bin, to reach a watermelon in the bottom of the bin, and the pallet guard collapsed. Defendant Market Basket Stores, Inc. appealed, and the appellate court reversed the award, finding manifest error in the factual findings of the district court requiring de novo review and concluding that the watermelon display did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded there was no manifest error in the district court’s finding of negligence on the part of the defendant; therefore, the appellate court erred in its ruling. View "Jones v. Market Basket Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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Matthew Morgan, an inmate assigned to the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility and under the supervision of the Sheriff of Concordia Parish, escaped from his trustee work assignment at the Concordia Parish courthouse. Morgan walked to a nearby Wal-Mart parking lot where he attempted to carjack and kidnap Sharon Tisdale. Tisdale was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the incident, and filed suit against Morgan and the Sheriff. Following a trial, the district court found both defendants liable, apportioning 90 percent of the fault to the Sheriff and 10 percent to Morgan. The district court awarded Tisdale $250,000 in general damages. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the district court erred in its apportionment of fault, and whether the court abused its discretion in awarding damages. The Supreme Court determined fault should have been reallocated, decreasing the Sheriff’s fault to 50 percent and increasing Morgan’s fault to 50 percent. However, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the award for general damages. View "Tisdale v. Hedrick, et al." on Justia Law