Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in a jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to plaintiff Henry Pete who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Intertwined with this issue was the fundamental question of the manner by which appellate courts were to review damage awards for excessiveness; necessarily, the same rules would apply in determining whether an award was too low. Louisiana jurisprudence had a long-standing general principle that, in reviewing a general damage award, the “initial inquiry . . . is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.” Thereafter, and only when a determination has been made that the “trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion,’” will a court “resort to prior awards . . . and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Such determinations are not subject to mathematical exactitude or scientific precision. The Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion. Applying this principle to this case, the Court found the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9,800,00.00 in general damages. "The evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we find $5,000,000.00 to be the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded." View "Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co, LLC et al." on Justia Law

In Louisiana v. Bartie, 14th Judicial District Court Case Number 12615-16, Div. G, Judge Michael Canaday presided over multiple hearings relating to the defendant’s indigency and his request for ancillary funding for defense experts. Because the hearings involved the disclosure of defense strategy, they were conducted without the district attorney, and the transcripts were sealed. Judge Canaday found the defendant was not indigent and denied his request for funding. The defense filed a writ application with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal challenging the indigency ruling. To facilitate filing the application, Judge Canaday granted defense counsel’s request for transcripts of the hearings. After defense counsel moved to obtain a missing transcript, Judge Canaday ordered the transcript be given to defense counsel and handwrote that it be “release[d] from seal.” Judge Canaday then received an email from the district attorney’s office asking whether his order gave the district attorney’s office access to the transcripts, or only defense counsel and the Third Circuit. Defense counsel was not copied with this email. Judge Canaday replied: “Since I don’t believe the state could appeal my granting relief to the defense on funding, I don’t think they can support the courts [sic] position to deny. The courts [sic] reasons will be sufficient for the 3rd to review. If the 3rd requests a states [sic] response obviously they could access the record.” Defense counsel was not included in these communications. The district attorney’s office then filed a “Motion to Unseal All Documents and Transcripts in Regards to Determining Indigency of the Defendant.” This motion was styled neither ex parte nor unopposed. Without a hearing, Judge Canaday signed an order granting the district attorney’s office the requested relief. Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to respond. The materials released by Judge Canaday included a transcript of a closed hearing where defense strategy specific to Bartie was discussed, including experts and their expected testimony. Defense counsel successfully argued for Judge Canaday’s recusal from the Bartie case. Writ applications seeking reversal of the recusal were denied by both the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court. The recusal and subsequent related writ applications resulted in the expenditure of significant time, effort, and funds by both the state and defense counsel. There were negative media reports concerning Judge Canaday’s actions. Media reports prompted a Judiciary Commission investigation. The Commission found Judge Canaday engaged in improper ex parte communications and inappropriately granted a state motion to release documents from seal without holding a hearing or otherwise allowing defense counsel the opportunity to respond. The Commission recommended that he be publicly censured and pay costs. The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred with the censure recommendation. View "In re: JUDGE G. Michael Canaday" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this medical malpractice matter in order to consider whether the gross negligence standard of La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) was to be considered by a medical review panel when the medical treatment occurred during a declared state of public health emergency pursuant to La.R.S. 29:766(A). To this, the Court found the trial court did not err in declaring that La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) should not be considered or applied in medical review panel proceedings and, therefore, did not err in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the court of appeal did not err in its affirmation. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sebble v. St. Luke's #2, LLC d/b/a St. Luke's Living Center, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review involved the constitutionality a part of the Louisiana Ethics Code, La. R.S. 42:1113(B). Specifically, the Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs-respondents, The Cartesian Company, Inc. (“Cartesian”) and Greg Gachassin (collectively “Plaintiffs”). The trial court ruled that the words “in any way interested in” contained in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) “are hereby struck down, and declared of no effect, as violating both the Federal and State Constitutions because these words . . . are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad . . . as interpreted and applied” to Plaintiffs. The trial court also denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants-respondents, Division of Administration Law Ethics Adjudicatory Board (Panel A) (“EAB”) and the Louisiana Board of Ethics (“BOE”)(collectively “BOE”). Defendants appealed, and the matter was transferred by the appellate court as a direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 5(D). The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the phrase “in any way interested in” facially unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, it reversed this portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Court found the trial court correctly determined the phrase was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs and unconstitutionally vague on its face as to all of its applications. As a result, the phrase “or be in any way interested in” was hereby struck from La. R.S. 42:1113(B). The remainder of the statute remained viable and could stand. Accordingly, this portion of the trial court’s judgment was affirmed, amended in part, and affirmed as amended. View "The Cartesian Company, inc. v. Div. of Admin. Law Ethics Adj. Bd. Panel, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Oris Latour was injured after he tripped and fell at Steamboat Bill’s restaurant (“Steamboat”) in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Latour alleged he tripped on a concrete ledge that ran perpendicular to the end of a row of dining tables. Contending the ledge was disguised and dangerous, he filed a negligence suit against the restaurant owner. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Latour, finding Steamboat 80 percent at fault and awarding Latour damages totaling $675,053. On appeal, the court found the district court committed reversible error related to two pretrial evidentiary rulings which affected the outcome of the case. The court of appeal conducted a de novo review of the entire record and found Latour met his burden of proving negligence. The appellate court then assessed Steamboat with 85 percent of the fault and Latour with 15 percent fault. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether the court of appeal erred in finding Latour met his burden of proving Steamboat was negligent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.6; and (2) whether, after finding prejudicial error, the court of appeal erred in increasing Steamboat’s percentage of fault on de novo review, although Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Supreme Court found Latour met his burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:2800.6. The Court also found consistent with statutory law and secondarily, jurisprudence, Steamboat could not be assessed with a greater percentage of fault than the 80 percent assigned by the jury. Because Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal, the 20 percent of fault allocated to him cannot be reduced. Therefore, on de novo review, the Supreme Court allocated fault at 80 percent to Steamboat and 20 percent to Latour. View "Latour v. Steamboats, LLC" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to address the manner in which the proponent of a notarial testament must prove conformity with its statutory form requirements; specifically, whether an unsigned copy of a lost notarial testament could be probated with extrinsic evidence only. This matter arose out of a petition to open the small succession of the decedent, Diana Bartlett Morgan, filed by her daughter, Diana Lynn Ford. The petition alleged the decedent died intestate as an executed Last Will and Testament could not be located or produced by the surviving spouse, James William Morgan. Mr. Morgan subsequently petitioned to probate a lost will alleging that the decedent executed a proper one-page notarial testament on June 22, 2016. Mr. Morgan sought to remove Ms. Ford as administratrix, to be named as independent executor, and for the issuance of letters of independent administration arguing that Ms. Ford failed to advise the court of the existence of a copy of decedent’s will. He further alleged that the original notarial testament was believed to have been deposited into a safety deposit box belonging to Lawrence Dupre, the drafting attorney. After a search of the box, the notarial testament could not be located. In support of his petition, Mr. Morgan submitted an unsigned copy of the lost notarial testament. Finding that the evidence presented failed to meet the requirements, the Court held the purported testament was absolutely null. View "In re: Succession of Diana Bartlett Morgan" on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish School Board and Jefferson Parish Sheriff (collectively, “defendants”) challenged the constitutionality of a trial court judgment ordering the defendants to remit into the trial court’s registry $2,780,232.02. The disputed funds were collected through the enforcement of Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36- 320, et seq., titled “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”). The Louisiana Supreme Court previously affirmed the trial court’s initial decision that found the SBSEP unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5 (G) and Article VII, Section 10 (A) of the Louisiana Constitution. The class action petitioners, William Mellor, et al., then moved for summary judgment seeking “the immediate return of their property in the possession of these two government entities... .” The trial court granted their summary judgment and ordered the defendants to remit the aforementioned funds into the registry of the court. Defendants sought an appeal and challenged the trial court’s authority to order them to remit the funds into the court’s registry. The court of appeal found that defendants improperly sought an appeal of an interlocutory judgment. The defendants’ later attempts to seek supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment and order were denied as untimely. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s order was the issue this case presented for review. The Supreme Court found that while it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s order, it did authority to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article V, Section 5 (A) of the Louisiana Constitution. "Even if the petitioners are entitled to a judgment in their favor, the trial court overstepped its authority in ordering defendants to remit funds into the court’s registry, as this unconstitutionally intrudes upon their delegated responsibility to appropriate funds, pursuant to Article XII, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5109 B (2)." The Court affirmed those lower court judgments properly before it. However, in exercising its plenary supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court further found the trial court’s order to remit funds into its registry violated the aforementioned constitutional provisions. The Court vacated that order. View "Mellor, et al. v. Jefferson Parish, et al." on Justia Law

In October 2003, the state charged defendant William Lee, Jr. with one count of second degree murder. In 2007, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In October 2021, defendant and the District Attorney filed a “Joint Motion to Amend Conviction and Sentence Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.10.” In the motion, the parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the cause of the victim’s death: they agreed that new evidence obtained in May 2020 would have bolstered defendant’s case at trial by supporting the defense theory that the victim’s fatal injuries were caused by her falling on her own accord. Based on this new evidence, the parties agreed that “a fair and just resolution” of the case would be to amend defendant’s conviction from second degree murder to manslaughter, and for the court to vacate the life without parole sentence and impose a sentence of 35 years imprisonment at hard labor. The district court granted the joint motion, vacated defendant’s second degree murder conviction and the previously-imposed life without parole sentence, accepted defendant’s guilty plea to manslaughter, and imposed the agreed-upon 35-year sentence with credit for time served. In March 2022, the Louisiana Attorney General filed a pleading entitled, “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Vacate Post-Conviction Plea Agreement as Unconstitutional.” The Attorney General argued that Article 930.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutionally permitted courts to grant clemency to criminal defendants, a power that was expressly and exclusively granted to the governor. To this the Louisiana Supreme Court concurred, and reversed the district court and reinstated defendant's second degree murder conviction. View "Louisiana v. Lee" on Justia Law

In April 2019, plaintiff Zach Bellard petitioned for damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when a defective attic/ceiling joist broke and caused him to fall while working as a plumber on a construction project (the “Project”) involving renovations to a building located on the campus of The University of Louisiana at Lafayette (“ULL”). Plaintiff named as defendants: ATK Construction, LLC (“ATK”), Bernard, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System, Garden City Construction Co., Inc., United Fire & Indemnity Company, and American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were due to the fault and negligence of the Defendants and that, as a result of their fault and/or obligation to insure, Defendants were individually and jointly liable. Plaintiff did not allege any contractual privity with the Defendants, including Bernard, or any other source of liability beyond negligence. Over one year after Plaintiff filed his petition, Bernard filed a third party demand against Doug Ashy, alleging it entered into a contract with ULL in 2017 to furnish all labor, materials, equipment, transportation, supervision, permits, etc., necessary to complete “Phase I” renovations to the Project. Doug Ashy filed an Exception of Prematurity and an Exception of Prescription, asserting: (1) the tort indemnity claim was premature because Bernard had not suffered a compensable loss; and (2) the claims for redhibition and products liability were prescribed because Bernard failed to file its third party demand within 90 days of Plaintiff’s demand pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1041. Doug Ashy also filed an Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action. The district court granted the Exception of Prematurity and Exception of Prescription and found the Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action to be moot as a result of its ruling. While both Doug Ashy and Bernard focused their arguments to the Louisiana Supreme Court on prematurity and prescription of Bernard’s third party claims, the Court observed it was questionable whether the facts alleged in the petition could ever support a third party claim for tort indemnity. The Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of Plaintiff's exceptions: "a suit alleging liability of a defendant arising solely as a result of its own fault cannot support a defendant’s claim for tort indemnity." View "Bellard v. ATK Construction, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Baker Sales, Inc. (“BSI”) obtained two loans from Newtek Small Business Finance, Inc. (“Newtek”) which were secured by mortgages on BSI’s commercial property. Robert and Elsa Baker (collectively “the Bakers”) executed agreements unconditionally guaranteeing payment of all amounts owed on the loans. These agreements were secured by conventional mortgages on the Bakers’ home. BSI filed for bankruptcy approximately two years later. Newtek filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the total amount of the outstanding balance of the loans. The bankruptcy court granted Newtek’s motion to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay. Newtek then filed a petition for executory process in state court against BSI and the Bakers requesting seizure and sale of BSI’s commercial property without the benefit of appraisal. Newtek purchased the seized property at a sheriff’s sale; the bankruptcy case was subsequently closed. Newtek filed the suit at issue here, seeking to foreclose on the Bakers’ home. The trial court issued a judgment preliminarily enjoining the sale of the Bakers’ home and converted the proceeding from executory to ordinary. The Bakers filed a petition seeking a declaration under the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act (“LDJA”) that as the underlying debt was extinguished, Newtek could no longer pursue them as sureties. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether a creditor’s recovery in a deficiency judgment action was barred against a surety when a creditor forecloses on property through a judicial sale without appraisal. Harmonizing the LDJA with the law of suretyship, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that such recovery was barred. View "Newtek Small Business Finance, LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law