Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A public port authority sought to acquire approximately twenty-nine acres of private, unimproved land owned by an individual in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The expropriation was initiated as part of a larger project to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) and container port complex. The authority intended to lease the acquired property to a private LNG company, Venture Global, for its exclusive development and use, including construction of LNG facilities and docks. The port authority asserted that the expropriation would serve public interests such as economic growth, job creation, energy security, and environmental stewardship, and advanced its mission of expanding port operations.After the port authority deposited the alleged just compensation in court, the landowner filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation, arguing that the taking lacked a public purpose under Louisiana law because its sole intent was to lease the land for private use. The Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines held a contradictory hearing and granted the motion, finding the expropriation unconstitutional since the property would be used exclusively by Venture Global and not by the public port. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reviewed the decision and affirmed, concluding the port authority did not meet the public purpose requirement set by the Louisiana Constitution.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to address whether a public port authority may lawfully expropriate property for leasing to a private entity. The court held that such a taking, when the property is to be used predominantly by a private company, does not constitute a public purpose as defined in the Louisiana Constitution. The court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, finding the expropriation prohibited and the motion to dismiss properly granted. View "PLAQUEMINES PORT HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Esplanade Properties Corporation, a subsidiary of R.H. Macy & Co., owned the Macy’s Parcel in Kenner, Louisiana. In 1992, while Esplanade Properties was under bankruptcy protection and subject to an automatic stay, Jefferson Parish assessed ad valorem taxes for that year. In 1993, the Sheriff conducted a tax sale for nonpayment of those taxes, but the sale was later nullified because it occurred during the bankruptcy stay. For nearly two decades, the Parish took no action to collect the 1992 taxes. After subsequent transfers, the property was acquired by Esplanade Mall Realty Holding, LLC, which in 2018 received notice of a large sum due for past taxes, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs. The company disputed the collectibility of the old taxes, citing a statutory three-year limitation on tax sales.The 24th Judicial District Court initially dismissed the suit on procedural grounds, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded. While proceedings continued, the property was sold to Pacifica Kenner, LLC, which was substituted as plaintiff. The trial court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 47:2131—which prohibits tax sales for taxes more than three years overdue—was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Louisiana constitutional provisions regarding tax collection and prescription. The trial court denied declaratory relief to the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and chose to avoid the constitutional issue, finding it unnecessary to resolve the dispute. Interpreting the relevant statutes, the court concluded that the Sheriff was required to include all statutory impositions, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs, in the 2020 tax sale price. The court held that the redemption price for the property must likewise include these amounts. The judgment was reversed, rendered, and remanded to the trial court to calculate the redemption price consistent with this interpretation. View "ESPLANADE MALL REALTY HOLDINGS, LLC VS. LOPINTO" on Justia Law

A married couple formed a business, Outkast Environmental, LLC, during their marriage, which was classified as community property. After their divorce was finalized in October 2019, Mr. Reis formed a new company, Outkast Industrial Group, LLC, in February 2020, which operated in a similar field. Disputes arose during the partition of their community property, with Ms. Reis claiming that Outkast Industrial should also be considered community property. She alleged that community funds were used to start the new business and that resources from the original company were diverted to the new entity. There was conflicting testimony regarding the source of funds and use of business assets.The 34th Judicial District Court (St. Bernard Parish) first found that Outkast Industrial was community property, relying on prior appellate decisions that treated new businesses as “substitute corporations” for former community businesses when a spouse transfers value or operations. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed this classification, finding no manifest error in the trial court’s assessment of credibility and the facts surrounding the formation and funding of Outkast Industrial.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred by applying the concept of a “substitute corporation,” which the Supreme Court found has no basis in Louisiana law. The Supreme Court held that property classification is fixed at the time of acquisition; since Outkast Industrial was formed after termination of the community regime, it is Mr. Reis’s separate property. The Court distinguished between classification issues and potential claims for mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty, which may entitle Ms. Reis to other remedies but do not change the classification of the new company. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REIS VS. REIS" on Justia Law

Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana on August 29, 2021, causing damage to property insured by Capitol Preferred Insurance Company, which had merged with Southern Fidelity Insurance Company (SFIC). The named insured was Emma Bryan, and the plaintiffs—Cynthia Bryan, Aubry Bryan, Jr., Aunya Bryan, and Glenda Bryan—sought policy proceeds. The insurance policy required that any action be brought within two years of the date of loss. SFIC made an unconditional payment to the plaintiffs on March 1, 2022. On June 15, 2022, SFIC was placed into receivership and declared insolvent. Plaintiffs initially sued Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (LCPIC) but amended their petition on October 24, 2023, to substitute the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) as the defendant.The trial court denied LIGA’s peremptory exception of prescription. LIGA then sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. The appellate court held, in a four-to-one decision, that the two-year limitation for suit against LIGA began on the date of SFIC’s insolvency, not the date of loss, and denied LIGA relief. One judge dissented, maintaining that prescription should run from the date of loss.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the matter. It held that LIGA is entitled to the benefit of the policy’s two-year prescriptive period, but this period is subject to interruption by an unconditional payment. The Court found that SFIC’s unconditional payment on March 1, 2022, interrupted prescription, and the plaintiffs’ amended petition was timely. The Court clarified that only unconditional payments—those made without qualifications or reservation of rights—interrupt prescription. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the denial of LIGA’s exception of prescription and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "BRYAN VS. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A biological father filed a petition to establish paternity and seek custody of a minor child born to the mother approximately 100 days after the termination of her marriage. Due to the timing, the child was legally presumed to be the offspring of the former husband. The biological father asserted he had acted as the child’s parent since birth, providing financial support, living with the child, and being named on the birth certificate. The mother challenged his petition by claiming it was time-barred under Louisiana Civil Code article 198, which restricts actions to establish paternity when a presumed father exists to within one year of the child's birth. The presumed father filed a petition to disavow paternity, stating he was not involved with the mother at the relevant time and had no relationship with the child.The Juvenile Court for the Parish of Lafayette held a hearing on the mother's exceptions and ruled that Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts, finding that its application would sever an existing parental relationship and deprive the child of a father. The court denied the mother's exceptions and ruled the biological father had a right to proceed. The mother sought supervisory review, which the Court of Appeal denied. She then filed a writ application to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the constitutionality of Article 198 de novo. It held that, under these particular circumstances, the biological father had established a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parenting his child, and Article 198’s one-year limitation, as applied here, violated his due process rights under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, declaring Article 198 unconstitutional as applied to this case. View "DAVIDSON VS. HARDY" on Justia Law

After the death of Laurie Maria Brocato, her nephew submitted a 2019 olographic testament for probate, which left most of her estate to him. The district court ordered that this will be recorded, filed, and executed, and he was named executor. Later, Brocato’s surviving spouse, Lisa Vickers, contested the 2019 testament and presented a new four-page olographic testament, dated across three consecutive days in 2021 and written in a bound notebook, which revoked previous wills and left the estate primarily to Vickers.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans found that the 2021 testament met the requirements for an olographic will under Louisiana law, including being entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. The court annulled the probate of the 2019 will, removed the nephew as executor, and admitted the 2021 testament to probate. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the testament’s multiple dates and the location of the signature did not invalidate it, especially in light of legislative amendments intended to relax formal requirements and prioritize testamentary intent.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case after granting writs to address whether the 2021 testament satisfied the statutory form requirements, especially considering the 2025 amendment to La. C.C. art. 1575, which applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 testament was valid under the amended statute. The court found the document was entirely written, dated, and signed by the decedent, even though the signature was at the top of the second page and dates appeared throughout. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the 2021 testament’s probate, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SUCCESSION OF BROCATO" on Justia Law

Deputies from the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office responded to a late-night call reporting suspicious activity at a local automotive business. On arrival, they found Michael Steven White at the scene, with several vehicle doors and hoods open. White admitted to opening some of the vehicles, explaining he was either looking for parts to sell or searching for a car for his mother. He was subsequently charged with six counts of simple burglary. At trial, the jury was instructed verbally that they could find White guilty of simple burglary, guilty of attempted simple burglary, or not guilty on each count. However, the written verdict form given to the jury omitted “not guilty” as an option and instead listed only guilty-related verdicts.White was convicted on all six counts, adjudicated as a fourth-felony offender, and sentenced to twenty years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient and that the omission of a “not guilty” option on the written verdict form constituted reversible error. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found the evidence sufficient and, relying on State v. Craddock, determined the omission did not amount to reversible error, especially since the trial court gave correct oral instructions and there was no timely objection.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed whether the failure to include a “not guilty” option on the written verdict form was reversible error. The court held that this omission was a patent error touching on the fundamental right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, and that it was not harmless under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the error could have caused juror confusion, undermined the fairness of the proceedings, and was not subject to harmless error analysis. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. WHITE" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. He later filed a collateral attack on his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and claiming that his defense attorney prevented him from testifying at trial. In support of his post-conviction claims, the defendant submitted several affidavits, but did not provide testimony or an affidavit from his trial counsel to substantiate his allegations.The trial court granted the defendant’s application for post-conviction relief, finding that defense counsel’s prevention of the defendant's testimony constituted structural error, which required automatic reversal of his conviction. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed this decision, relying on State v. Hampton and concluding that such collateral attacks must be supported by testimony or an affidavit from defense counsel acknowledging they prevented the defendant from testifying. The defendant sought review by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed whether the trial court properly granted post-conviction relief. The court held that, on collateral review, a claim that defense counsel prevented a defendant from testifying is reviewed under the Strickland v. Washington standard, requiring the defendant to show both constitutionally deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court overruled Hampton to the extent it required automatic reversal for such claims on collateral review and to the extent it required substantiating evidence exclusively from defense counsel. The court found the record insufficient to determine whether the Strickland standard was met and remanded to the trial court for a hearing to make such findings. The disposition was reversed and remanded. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. TURNER" on Justia Law

Two attorneys verbally agreed to jointly propose providing legal services to a public entity for Hurricane Katrina-related insurance claims on a contingency fee basis. After a meeting with the entity’s officials, they submitted several joint proposals, all based on a contingency fee arrangement. The entity, however, offered only an hourly fee contract, which one attorney accepted and the other declined to participate in. Subsequently, the accepting attorney was retained alone and performed all legal work. Over a year later, the entity entered a contingency fee agreement with the accepting attorney and another law firm. The attorney who had declined the hourly arrangement was not included in this contract and performed no work for the entity.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans held a bench trial and found that a valid oral joint venture existed between the two attorneys when the contingency fee contract was executed. It concluded that the accepting attorney breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the other of the opportunity to participate, awarding damages equal to half the contingency fee. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the contract breach—not attorney fee rules—was controlling, and upheld the damages award.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found clear legal errors in the lower courts’ analysis. The Court held that the initial joint venture terminated when the entity refused the proposed contingency fee arrangement, and no enforceable joint venture or other contractual relationship existed thereafter. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct govern such relationships and preclude fee-sharing without written client consent and meaningful legal services by all lawyers involved. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any portion of the contingency fee. View "SPEARS VS. HALL" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree rape and aggravated crime against nature, with allegations that he sexually abused his eight-year-old son while giving him a bath. The child was taken to the hospital on the night of the alleged incident, but no physical evidence of abuse was found. About a month later, the child was evaluated by a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner at a children’s hospital, who subsequently diagnosed the child with “child sexual abuse.” The State gave notice of its intent to offer the nurse practitioner as an expert witness at trial.After a Daubert hearing, the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans found the nurse practitioner qualified as an expert in pediatric child abuse medicine and ruled that she could testify about her diagnosis at trial. The defendant sought supervisory review, but the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied the writ. The appellate court cited prior precedent permitting such expert testimony, reasoning that a nurse practitioner’s diagnosis did not usurp the jury’s role in determining the defendant’s guilt.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify regarding her diagnosis of child sexual abuse. The court found the methodology underlying the diagnosis insufficiently reliable under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A), particularly because the diagnosis was based almost entirely on the child’s statements, which the jury would be able to hear and assess directly. The Supreme Court also determined that such expert testimony would improperly bolster the credibility of the complaining witness, potentially prejudicing the defendant. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that under these circumstances, the expert’s diagnosis was inadmissible. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. CLOUDIE" on Justia Law