Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A creditor obtained a judgment against an individual debtor and later sought to collect on that judgment by garnishing the debtor’s alleged employer, a company. The creditor, as successor in interest to the original plaintiff, filed a petition for garnishment against the company, asserting it employed or was otherwise indebted to the debtor. The company was served with the petition and interrogatories but did not timely file answers in court. However, before a hearing on the creditor’s motion for judgment pro confesso, the company provided sworn answers directly to the creditor, stating it never employed or owed anything to the debtor and identifying the debtor’s actual employer. The company did not file these answers into the court record. At the hearing, the court was not informed of the company’s responses and, based on the lack of record answers, rendered a judgment against the company for the full amount owed by the debtor.Subsequently, the company moved to reopen the garnishment proceedings and set aside the judgment, arguing it had provided the necessary information to the creditor before the hearing. The city court granted the motion and vacated its prior judgment, finding it had not been made aware of the company’s responses. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed and reinstated the original judgment against the company, holding that the relevant statute did not permit reopening a judgment pro confesso under these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine whether La.R.S. 13:3923, as amended, allows a trial court discretion to reopen and reconsider a judgment pro confesso against a garnishee. The court held that, although the statute is clear and unambiguous, its application in this case would lead to absurd results because the trial court’s original judgment was based on an omission of material information. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the city court’s judgment vacating the original garnishment judgment, allowing the company an opportunity to prove it was not the debtor’s employer. View "FIRST PAY, INC. VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

A company acquired a tax title to certain immovable property in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, after the original owners failed to pay property taxes. Following the expiration of the redemptive period, the company mailed post-tax sale notice to the executrix of the former owner’s succession at the address listed in the succession proceedings. The company then filed a petition to quiet title, and the executrix was personally served. In response, she filed a reconventional demand seeking to annul the tax sale, alleging she had not received adequate pre-tax and post-tax sale notice. The City, which had previously held a small interest in the property, was also named as a third-party defendant.The 16th Judicial District Court sustained exceptions of prescription raised by the company and the City, dismissing the executrix’s claims as untimely. On appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, finding the reconventional demand was timely because it was filed within six months of service of the petition to quiet title, as required by La. R.S. 47:2266. The appellate court also held that the failure to provide pre-tax sale notice could render the tax sale absolutely null, and that the company and the City bore the burden of proving the reconventional demand was prescribed.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that, following the 2008 revision to Louisiana’s tax sale statutes, failure to provide pre-tax sale notice for tax sales occurring after January 1, 2009, no longer results in an absolute nullity. Instead, such defects are relative nullities, subject to specific prescriptive periods under La. R.S. 47:2287. The Court further held that a nullity action brought as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action must also comply with the six-month limitation in La. R.S. 47:2266. The Court affirmed the appellate ruling regarding prescription but reversed on the issue of absolute nullity, remanding for further proceedings. View "BELAIRE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, LLC VS. SUCCESSION OF SHELTON" on Justia Law

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder while working as a handyman in New Orleans. His family sued Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and New Werner Holding Co., Inc., alleging that the ladder was unreasonably dangerous under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and that the defendants failed to warn about a 2018 recall. The ladder in question was manufactured in 1991 by Werner Co., a Pennsylvania corporation (later renamed Old Ladder), which filed for bankruptcy in 2006. The defendants had purchased certain assets, including the Werner name and trademark, from Old Ladder in 2007, but did not manufacture or sell the specific ladder model involved in the accident.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on a verdict finding the defendants to be manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, apportioning fault equally between the defendants and Old Ladder. The defendants’ post-trial motions were denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the jury could reasonably find the defendants to be manufacturers under the LPLA’s apparent manufacturer doctrine.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the defendants were not manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The court found no evidence that the defendants labeled the ladder as their own, held themselves out as its manufacturer, or exercised control over its design, construction, or quality. The court concluded that merely acquiring the Werner name and trademark did not make the defendants manufacturers of the subject ladder. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "PELLECER VS. WERNER CO." on Justia Law

A railway employee, while working as a carman responsible for inspecting and repairing railcars, suffered injuries after the ballast beneath the tracks gave way, causing him to fall. He alleged that his employer failed to properly maintain the ballast under Tracks 46 and 47, despite prior complaints and a previous injury in the same area. The employer denied negligence and argued that federal regulations governing ballast, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 213.103 under the Federal Railroads Safety Act (FRSA), precluded the employee’s claim under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).The District Court for the Parish of Caddo granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that the FRSA precluded the FELA claim. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed, agreeing that federal regulation subsumed the field and thus barred the employee’s suit. The employee then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case de novo and held that the FRSA does not preclude a FELA action. Relying on the reasoning in Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., the court found that the two federal statutes are complementary, not in irreconcilable conflict, and that Congress had not intended for the FRSA to preclude FELA claims. The court also determined that the employee presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding negligence, making summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "VAN BUREN VS. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil action against two business entities, seeking relief in the Parish of Orleans. When initiating the lawsuit, the plaintiff requested service of citation on the defendants and paid all fees required by the clerk of court at the time of filing. Subsequently, the sheriff’s office sent an additional invoice for service fees, which the plaintiff paid after the ninety-day period prescribed by law for requesting service. The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to properly request service within the statutory period because not all service-related fees were paid within ninety days.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ exception of insufficiency of service of process and their motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that the plaintiff’s timely request for service, accompanied by payment of the initial fees, satisfied the statutory requirement. The defendants appealed, and the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1201(C) does not require payment of all service fees within the ninety-day period, only that service be requested.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to resolve conflicting appellate decisions on this issue. The court held that Article 1201(C) requires only that a plaintiff “request” service of citation within ninety days of filing the petition, and does not mandate that all service-related fees be paid within that period. The court reasoned that the statutory language is unambiguous and that payment requirements are addressed elsewhere in Louisiana law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in favor of the plaintiff. View "DAROUSE VS. P.J.'S COFFEE OF NEW ORLEANS, LLC" on Justia Law

Reginald Brown, who was serving as interim police chief in Monroe, Louisiana, was dismissed from the Monroe Police Department following his handling of an excessive force complaint against officers. The incident involved a body camera recording showing an officer kicking a suspect, Timothy Williams, during an arrest. Brown was informed of the complaint and took immediate steps, including placing officers on administrative leave and notifying city officials. However, questions arose regarding the timing of Brown’s decision to request the Louisiana State Police to conduct the criminal investigation, particularly whether the delay was influenced by an upcoming mayoral election. Subsequent internal reviews included an interrogation and a polygraph examination, which Brown was found to have failed, leading to allegations of dishonesty and improper delay for personal benefit.Brown appealed his termination to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, which, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found cause for discipline but determined that termination was excessive. The board reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The City of Monroe appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, which reinstated Brown’s termination, finding his conduct egregious and the board’s reduction arbitrary. Brown then appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which reversed the district court and reinstated the board’s ninety-day suspension, holding that the district court lacked authority to modify the board’s disciplinary decision once it found the board acted in good faith for cause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. The court clarified that judicial review of the board’s disciplinary decisions is limited to determining whether the board acted in good faith for cause, and courts may not modify the board’s chosen discipline if that standard is met. The Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to reduce Brown’s discipline was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "MONROE MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD VS. BROWN" on Justia Law

The applicant was convicted of second-degree murder by a Lafourche Parish jury for the shooting death of Deeric Raymond during a confrontation outside the applicant’s home. The incident occurred when Deeric and his brother Javonnie arrived to collect a debt and exchange custody of a child. A physical altercation ensued, resulting in Deeric’s death from a gunshot wound. The central issue at trial was whether the applicant acted in self-defense or was the initial aggressor. The jury rejected the self-defense claim and found the applicant guilty.The trial court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of the self-defense claim. The applicant then filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief, stating no new evidence was presented that would have changed the jury’s verdict. The Court of Appeal denied writs without explanation, leading the applicant to seek review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found merit in some of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court determined that the applicant’s trial attorney failed to use available evidence to impeach the testimony of Javonnie, did not consult a forensic expert, and advised the applicant not to testify. These errors were deemed unreasonable and prejudicial, undermining confidence in the trial’s outcome. The court held that the applicant’s counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for these errors. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Gerald Williams, an inmate in Louisiana, filed a suit for judicial review after the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole. Williams was originally convicted of armed robbery in 1985 and sentenced to 99 years without parole. After serving 28 years, he was released on parole in 2013. In 2021, Williams was arrested for aggravated assault, pleaded guilty to simple assault, and subsequently had his parole revoked. He later claimed his waivers of the revocation hearings were not knowing and voluntary and argued that his parole violation should be considered a "technical violation."The district court dismissed Williams' suit with prejudice, based on a recommendation from a commissioner, for failure to state a claim and because it was perempted under La. R.S. 15:574.11(D). The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and addressed three main issues: whether Williams' petition was perempted, whether his procedural due process rights were violated, and whether his parole violation could be classified as a "technical violation." The court found that Williams' petition was perempted as it was filed 507 days after the parole revocation, well beyond the 90-day period allowed by law. The court also determined that Williams' waiver of his revocation hearings was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as he had signed and acknowledged the waiver in writing. Lastly, the court held that Williams' parole violation could not be classified as a "technical violation" due to his original conviction for a violent crime and his guilty plea to an intentional misdemeanor directly affecting a person.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision to dismiss Williams' petition with prejudice. View "Williams v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees and independent contractors of White Oak Radiator Service, Inc., were injured while performing work at Enable Midstream Partners, LP's natural gas processing plant. The work involved removing and replacing amine and glycol coolers. During the work, a glycol surge tank ruptured, causing injuries. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking damages for their injuries.The trial court found that the claims of Joey Miller and Davy Dowdy against Enable sounded in tort rather than workers' compensation. The court awarded damages to Mr. Dowdy for injuries to his cervical spine and hearing loss, but found that White Oak bore a greater percentage of fault than assigned by the trial court. The trial court assigned 90 percent fault to Enable and 10 percent to White Oak. Enable appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the Louisiana workers' compensation laws and challenging the allocation of fault and damages.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that the manual labor exception under La. R.S. 23:1021 (7) does not apply to the employees and independent contractors of an independent contractor. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Enable sound in tort. The court found no manifest error in the trial court's award of damages to Mr. Dowdy for his cervical spine injuries and hearing loss. However, the court found that the trial court erred in the apportionment of fault and amended the judgment to assign 70 percent fault to Enable and 30 percent fault to White Oak. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as amended. View "McBride v. Old Republic Insurance Co." on Justia Law

23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C. entered into a four-year contract with the Madison Parish Police Jury on July 14, 2014, to collect and dispose of residential waste. The contract was extended for an additional three years, set to expire on July 14, 2021. However, due to fiscal concerns, the Police Jury rebid the contract in June 2020 and awarded it to another contractor, effective January 1, 2021. Psalm Trucking sued for breach of contract and unfair trade practices, claiming an estimated loss of $385,235.50.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Police Jury, finding the contract null and void under La. R.S. 39:1410.60 (A) because it was not approved by the State Bond Commission. The court also rejected Psalm Trucking’s detrimental reliance claim, noting the company did not seek legal advice before contracting. The Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the Bond Commission’s approval was required for multi-year contracts without a non-appropriation clause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that La. R.S. 33:4169.1 and La. R.S. 39:1410.60 must be read together, requiring Bond Commission approval for contracts that constitute debt. The court found the four-year contract constituted debt and was null and void without the Bond Commission’s approval. The court also agreed that Psalm Trucking failed to prove detrimental reliance against a governmental agency. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. View "23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C. v. Madison Parish Police Jury" on Justia Law