Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Two brothers were affiliated with a group engaged in ongoing gun violence with a rival group in Abbeville, Louisiana. About a year and a half after two shooting incidents involving one brother, a drive-by shooting occurred in a parking lot, resulting in the death of Jazaylon Levy. Video surveillance, witness testimony, vehicle measurements, and forensic evidence linked the brothers to a silver Mercedes-Benz seen at the scene and leaving shortly after the shooting. The evidence suggested the brothers intended to target a rival group associate and that one acted as the driver while the other fired the shots, causing Levy’s death.The case was tried in the District Court for the Parish of Vermilion, where a unanimous jury convicted both brothers of second degree murder. The trial judge imposed life sentences at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. After post-verdict motions were denied, the defendants appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. That court reversed the convictions, finding the evidence insufficient, particularly because the State had not excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and misidentification, and the jury’s verdict was based on speculation.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case on writ of certiorari. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the State had excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The court found the appellate court erred by substituting its judgment for the jury’s and reinstated the convictions and sentences, remanding the case to the appellate court to consider the defendants’ remaining assignments of error. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. BRIGGS" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A married couple, Richard and Penny, entered into a separate property regime through an antenuptial agreement. Richard had two sons from a prior marriage. Upon his death, his son Bruce was named executor, and Penny was granted a usufruct over certain properties and a share in a partnership interest. After Richard’s death, Bruce, as executor, sought reimbursement from Penny for (1) Richard’s funds used to purchase a townhouse where both were listed as co-owners, (2) costs of improvements made to the townhouse, (3) a $1,000,000 check Richard gave Penny shortly before his death that she deposited into her separate account, and (4) a tax overpayment made by Richard that Penny used to pay her tax liabilities.The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson denied most of Bruce’s reimbursement claims, finding that the Civil Code did not authorize reimbursement for the initial property purchase price and that Bruce had not met his burden to prove the value of improvements. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit affirmed. Bruce then sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court held that, although Richard and Penny were equal co-owners for title purposes, Bruce was entitled to claim reimbursement for Richard’s initial purchase price contribution to the townhouse because the Civil Code does not prohibit such reimbursement and principles of equity prevent unjust enrichment. The Court also ruled that the estate was entitled to reimbursement for the $1,000,000 check, finding Penny failed to prove donative intent by clear and convincing evidence, and for the tax overpayment, since it was paid solely from Richard’s funds. The Court affirmed the denial of reimbursement for alleged improvements, finding no manifest error in the lower courts’ factual determination that Bruce had not sufficiently proved the value of improvements. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "O'KREPKI VS. O'KREPKI" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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A garbage truck driver was injured when his vehicle was struck by a train at a railroad crossing in Baldwin, Louisiana. The collision occurred after the left front tire of the garbage truck became stuck in a hole next to the wooden planks of the railroad crossing, which was maintained by the railroad company. The driver was delayed in maneuvering his truck out of the hole and, as he attempted to cross, was hit by an oncoming train. Evidence showed that the crossing was narrower than the adjacent roadway and did not meet industry or the railroad company's own safety standards.A jury in the 16th Judicial District Court found the railroad company negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, and also found the driver negligent but determined his negligence was not a proximate cause, yet assigned him 15% of the fault and the railroad 85%. The trial court entered judgment on this verdict. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found the jury's verdict inconsistent and ordered a new trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated that order, holding that the driver’s acceptance of partial fault resolved the inconsistency, and remanded for review of other issues. On remand, the appellate court found the evidence supported the jury’s findings and damages award.The Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently granted review to consider the allocation of fault. The court found manifest error in the jury’s allocation of 85% fault to the railroad and 15% to the driver. It held that the lowest reasonable allocation of fault to the driver was 75%, with 25% to the railroad, and amended the judgment accordingly. The amended judgment was affirmed. View "THOMAS VS. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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A woman was indicted for first degree murder and obstruction of justice following the death of her two-year-old son. She pleaded not guilty, and after the state withdrew its intent to seek the death penalty, she moved for expert funding to support a change of venue motion, arguing that expert analysis was necessary to present her case. Her requests for funding from the Office of the State Public Defender were denied, prompting her to seek judicial intervention. The district court found that the expert was necessary under the prevailing legal standard but determined it was barred by La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) from ordering payment of public defender funds for expert witnesses.After several hearings and testimony from the state public defender, the 32nd Judicial District Court declared La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the statute infringed upon its exclusive original jurisdiction over felony cases granted by the Louisiana Constitution and stripped indigent defendants of the ability to seek judicial review of funding decisions. Relying on precedents such as State v. Craig and State v. Citizen, the court concluded that the statute impermissibly impeded the judiciary’s inherent authority to ensure effective assistance of counsel for indigent defendants. The State of Louisiana appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, as required when a statute is declared unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3), which bars courts from ordering payment of public defender funds for expert witnesses or other purposes, is unconstitutional. The statute impermissibly infringed on the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction and inherent power to ensure indigent defendants receive necessary resources for an effective defense. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. JONES" on Justia Law

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After Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana in August 2021, Terrebonne Parish, which operates Houma’s electric system, requested help from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to restore power. LUS, in turn, sought assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, leading to mutual aid agreements signed by Terrebonne Parish, LUS, and the City of Wilson. As a result, thirteen City of Wilson employees, including Kevin Ray Worrell, traveled to Louisiana to assist with power restoration. These workers stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily to Houma. On September 10, 2021, while driving a City of Wilson vehicle back to the hotel after work, Worrell was involved in an accident, injuring the plaintiffs.The plaintiffs initially filed tort actions in the St. Mary Parish district court, which were consolidated and removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Worrell was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The district court agreed, finding that Worrell acted as a “representative” of Terrebonne Parish under the statute and thus was immune from liability. The district court also determined that commuting from the work site fell within emergency preparedness activities covered by the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding the definition of “representative” under the LHSEADA. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Worrell, as an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, working pursuant to mutual aid agreements that explicitly preserved his status as a City of Wilson employee and independent contractor, was not a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or its subdivisions for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Therefore, he was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second certified question. View "BREAUX VS. WORRELL" on Justia Law

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A public port authority sought to acquire approximately twenty-nine acres of private, unimproved land owned by an individual in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The expropriation was initiated as part of a larger project to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) and container port complex. The authority intended to lease the acquired property to a private LNG company, Venture Global, for its exclusive development and use, including construction of LNG facilities and docks. The port authority asserted that the expropriation would serve public interests such as economic growth, job creation, energy security, and environmental stewardship, and advanced its mission of expanding port operations.After the port authority deposited the alleged just compensation in court, the landowner filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation, arguing that the taking lacked a public purpose under Louisiana law because its sole intent was to lease the land for private use. The Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines held a contradictory hearing and granted the motion, finding the expropriation unconstitutional since the property would be used exclusively by Venture Global and not by the public port. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reviewed the decision and affirmed, concluding the port authority did not meet the public purpose requirement set by the Louisiana Constitution.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to address whether a public port authority may lawfully expropriate property for leasing to a private entity. The court held that such a taking, when the property is to be used predominantly by a private company, does not constitute a public purpose as defined in the Louisiana Constitution. The court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, finding the expropriation prohibited and the motion to dismiss properly granted. View "PLAQUEMINES PORT HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. NGUYEN" on Justia Law

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Esplanade Properties Corporation, a subsidiary of R.H. Macy & Co., owned the Macy’s Parcel in Kenner, Louisiana. In 1992, while Esplanade Properties was under bankruptcy protection and subject to an automatic stay, Jefferson Parish assessed ad valorem taxes for that year. In 1993, the Sheriff conducted a tax sale for nonpayment of those taxes, but the sale was later nullified because it occurred during the bankruptcy stay. For nearly two decades, the Parish took no action to collect the 1992 taxes. After subsequent transfers, the property was acquired by Esplanade Mall Realty Holding, LLC, which in 2018 received notice of a large sum due for past taxes, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs. The company disputed the collectibility of the old taxes, citing a statutory three-year limitation on tax sales.The 24th Judicial District Court initially dismissed the suit on procedural grounds, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded. While proceedings continued, the property was sold to Pacifica Kenner, LLC, which was substituted as plaintiff. The trial court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 47:2131—which prohibits tax sales for taxes more than three years overdue—was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Louisiana constitutional provisions regarding tax collection and prescription. The trial court denied declaratory relief to the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and chose to avoid the constitutional issue, finding it unnecessary to resolve the dispute. Interpreting the relevant statutes, the court concluded that the Sheriff was required to include all statutory impositions, including the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs, in the 2020 tax sale price. The court held that the redemption price for the property must likewise include these amounts. The judgment was reversed, rendered, and remanded to the trial court to calculate the redemption price consistent with this interpretation. View "ESPLANADE MALL REALTY HOLDINGS, LLC VS. LOPINTO" on Justia Law

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A married couple formed a business, Outkast Environmental, LLC, during their marriage, which was classified as community property. After their divorce was finalized in October 2019, Mr. Reis formed a new company, Outkast Industrial Group, LLC, in February 2020, which operated in a similar field. Disputes arose during the partition of their community property, with Ms. Reis claiming that Outkast Industrial should also be considered community property. She alleged that community funds were used to start the new business and that resources from the original company were diverted to the new entity. There was conflicting testimony regarding the source of funds and use of business assets.The 34th Judicial District Court (St. Bernard Parish) first found that Outkast Industrial was community property, relying on prior appellate decisions that treated new businesses as “substitute corporations” for former community businesses when a spouse transfers value or operations. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed this classification, finding no manifest error in the trial court’s assessment of credibility and the facts surrounding the formation and funding of Outkast Industrial.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred by applying the concept of a “substitute corporation,” which the Supreme Court found has no basis in Louisiana law. The Supreme Court held that property classification is fixed at the time of acquisition; since Outkast Industrial was formed after termination of the community regime, it is Mr. Reis’s separate property. The Court distinguished between classification issues and potential claims for mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty, which may entitle Ms. Reis to other remedies but do not change the classification of the new company. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REIS VS. REIS" on Justia Law

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Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana on August 29, 2021, causing damage to property insured by Capitol Preferred Insurance Company, which had merged with Southern Fidelity Insurance Company (SFIC). The named insured was Emma Bryan, and the plaintiffs—Cynthia Bryan, Aubry Bryan, Jr., Aunya Bryan, and Glenda Bryan—sought policy proceeds. The insurance policy required that any action be brought within two years of the date of loss. SFIC made an unconditional payment to the plaintiffs on March 1, 2022. On June 15, 2022, SFIC was placed into receivership and declared insolvent. Plaintiffs initially sued Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (LCPIC) but amended their petition on October 24, 2023, to substitute the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) as the defendant.The trial court denied LIGA’s peremptory exception of prescription. LIGA then sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. The appellate court held, in a four-to-one decision, that the two-year limitation for suit against LIGA began on the date of SFIC’s insolvency, not the date of loss, and denied LIGA relief. One judge dissented, maintaining that prescription should run from the date of loss.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the matter. It held that LIGA is entitled to the benefit of the policy’s two-year prescriptive period, but this period is subject to interruption by an unconditional payment. The Court found that SFIC’s unconditional payment on March 1, 2022, interrupted prescription, and the plaintiffs’ amended petition was timely. The Court clarified that only unconditional payments—those made without qualifications or reservation of rights—interrupt prescription. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the denial of LIGA’s exception of prescription and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "BRYAN VS. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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A biological father filed a petition to establish paternity and seek custody of a minor child born to the mother approximately 100 days after the termination of her marriage. Due to the timing, the child was legally presumed to be the offspring of the former husband. The biological father asserted he had acted as the child’s parent since birth, providing financial support, living with the child, and being named on the birth certificate. The mother challenged his petition by claiming it was time-barred under Louisiana Civil Code article 198, which restricts actions to establish paternity when a presumed father exists to within one year of the child's birth. The presumed father filed a petition to disavow paternity, stating he was not involved with the mother at the relevant time and had no relationship with the child.The Juvenile Court for the Parish of Lafayette held a hearing on the mother's exceptions and ruled that Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts, finding that its application would sever an existing parental relationship and deprive the child of a father. The court denied the mother's exceptions and ruled the biological father had a right to proceed. The mother sought supervisory review, which the Court of Appeal denied. She then filed a writ application to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the constitutionality of Article 198 de novo. It held that, under these particular circumstances, the biological father had established a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parenting his child, and Article 198’s one-year limitation, as applied here, violated his due process rights under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, declaring Article 198 unconstitutional as applied to this case. View "DAVIDSON VS. HARDY" on Justia Law