Louisiana in the Interest of L.D.

L.D. was charged with the commission of a felony-grade delinquent act of unauthorized use of a movable. Although La.Ch.C. art. 854(A) required in this instance that L.D. appear to answer the delinquency petition within five days of filing because he was continued in custody, the district court set the answer hearing for the next available court date dedicated to juvenile matters, 27 days later. L.D. appeared at that time, objected to the untimeliness of the hearing, and asked for his release from custody and for dismissal of the delinquency petition. The juvenile judge found, consistent with a policy of that court, that the court’s scheduling constraints constituted "good cause" for the delay under La.Ch.C. art. 854(C). The court therefore declined to dismiss the petition and release L.D. from custody, and the juvenile did not seek immediate review of that ruling. The court adjudicated L.D. delinquent 21 days later, within the 30 days from the answer hearing afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877(A). On appeal, L.D. contended that his adjudication hearing was nevertheless untimely and that the petition should therefore have been dismissed because each step in delinquency adjudication process "should be seen as carefully and closely placed, like dominoes in a row, and that by wrongly delaying the answer hearing, the juvenile court judge triggered a cascade, a rippling effect, that ended in an adjudication that should be viewed as untimely as well." The court of appeal found that the juvenile judge erred in denying L.D.’s motion for release based on failure to timely hold the answer hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e [. . .] agree with the court of appeal majority that the legislature did not subscribe to the rippling effect advocated by L.D., such that the slightest perturbation in the steady march of various time limits through the process results inexorably in the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The court of appeal noted, and all parties agree, that La.Ch.C. art. 854 specifies no remedy when the time afforded for an answer hearing is exceeded without good cause. The provisions of the Children’s Code governing delinquency proceedings otherwise contain several explicit time limits. [. . .] Only when the time afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877 to commence the delinquency adjudication following the answer hearing is exceeded must the court dismiss the petition at the request of the juvenile." View "Louisiana in the Interest of L.D." on Justia Law