Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged that an infection developed after negligent medical treatment was provided by the defendants. Accordingly, they filed a Request for Medical Review Panel and, subsequently, a lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ writ application to determine whether the medical review panel complaint was sufficient to survive an exception of prematurity. After review, the Court found the brief descriptions of malpractice contained in the complaint were broad enough to encompass the specific allegations contained in the petition for damages. Thus, the Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of the exception of prematurity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coulon v. Endurance Risk Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

This medical malpractice case arose from the death of Lyric Pitts, seven month old daughter of plaintiffs David Pitts, Jr. and Kenyetta Gurley. A jury found in favor of defendant Dr. Rhoda Jones. Plaintiffs moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), or alternatively for a new trial. The district court granted the JNOV and conditionally granted the new trial. The court of appeal reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' writ application to review the correctness of the lower courts' rulings on the JNOV and new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's ruling reversing the district court's grant of the JNOV. However, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal relative to the new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's grant of a new trial. View "Pitts v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Alexandria Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board properly excluded a firefighter’s alleged failed breath alcohol test results, resulting in the firefighter’s reinstatement to employment after the City of Alexandria had terminated him. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, finding the Board should have considered the breath alcohol test results. The court of appeal overturned the trial court, reinstating the firefighter’s employment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Board’s exclusion of the breath test results was incorrect and further, the court of appeal was in error in reversing the trial court’s ruling that the breath alcohol test results were admissible. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment reversing the Board’s decision was reinstated, and the case was remanded back to the Board for proper consideration of the breath alcohol test results. View "City of Alexandria v. Dixon" on Justia Law

David Caballero filed a Petition for Partition of Property against his former wife, Teresa Caballero seeking to partition the community property acquired during the marriage. The Family Court amended its judgment to award Teresa over $1.5 million, which included her claim to have of David's alleged underpaid income from Home Servicing, LLC (Home). David filed a devolutive appeal from the amended judgment which pending. Because David did not file a suspensive appeal, Teresa sought to enforce the judgment against him. Teresa requested issuance of a writ of fieri fascias seizing David’s alleged membership interest in Home. Teresa asserted that 56.8% of Home’s membership interests were owned by Prime Acquisitions, L.L.C. (“Prime”), which was wholly owned by David. Teresa further asserted that prior to the court’s amended judgment, David caused Prime to donate its interest in Home to himself via an Act of Distribution and then formally dissolved Prime. Thus, according to Teresa, all of Prime’s remaining assets and liabilities devolved to David pursuant to the laws governing dissolution of limited liability companies. Teresa filed a notice of a corporate and records deposition, and issued a subpoena duces tecum seeking certain business records from Home. Following limited, unsuccessful settlement discussions regarding the scope of documents to be produced pursuant to the subpoena, Home filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, arguing the Family Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a third party in a garnishment proceeding. After a hearing, the Family Court overruled the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and deferred ruling on the motion to quash. The court of appeal reversed the Family Court’s ruling and sustained Home’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Teresa then sought certiorari review from the Supreme Court. Finding that the Family Court had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Caballero v. Caballero" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, could be applied retroactively to defendant’s criminal misconduct which occurred prior to the effective dates of these statutes. Defendant Lynn Foret, a medical doctor who specialized in orthopedic surgery, pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud, for criminal acts that occurred between 2003 and 2009. The trial court granted Dr. Foret’s declinatory exceptions, dismissing with prejudice, the State's action for penalties under the Sledge Jeansonne Act and dismissed with prejudice causes of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the conduct regulated by the substantive statute was the underlying fraud, rather than the subsequent guilty plea. Therefore, even though the State's cause of action could not have accrued until Dr. Foret pled guilty, application of the Acts nonetheless attached new consequences to his criminal misconduct, which occurred before the Acts became effective. One judge on the appellate panel dissented, reasoning the plain language of the Sledge Jeansonne Act demonstrated it was the guilty plea that gave the State Attorney General the authority to act, not the criminal activity, and because the guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the statute, its application herein would be prospective, not retroactive. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sledge Jeansonne Act was not an impermissible retroactive application of the law. After review, the Supreme Court held that both the Sledge Jeansonne Act and Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act operated prospectively only, applying to causes of action arising after the effective date of each Act. The Court affirmed the court ofappeal ruling finding that the statutes at issue could not be retroactively applied to this defendant’s past criminal conduct. View "Louisiana v. Foret" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, alleging to be putative class members of multiple class actions, have filed their own individual suits against the defendant, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens). Plaintiffs were residents of, and owned homes in, St. Bernard Parish at the time Hurricane Katrina. Their properties were insured under policies of all-risk or homeowners insurance by defendant. Plaintiffs originally filed suit against Citizens on December 3, 2009, seeking contractual and bad faith damages arising out of Citizens’ handling of their property damage claims related to Hurricane Katrina. Citizens excepted on grounds of prescription and lis pendens. At issue is whether the doctrine of lis pendens barred plaintiffs’ suits where the plaintiffs were not named parties in the first-filed class actions. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s exception of lis pendens. View "Aisola v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The issue this matter presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on the “amount in dispute” which determined subject matter jurisdiction of a city court with a jurisdictional limit of $30,000. After filing suit, plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer for $25,000, plaintiff’s claim against her uninsured motorist insurer was the only claim left. The issue to be determined was whether following the dismissal of the settling defendants, the city court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim against her uninsured motorist insurer to the full extent of that court’s $30,000 jurisdictional limit. Put another way, the issue in this case was whether the settlement amount counted toward the city court’s jurisdictional limit. The Court held that it did not: because the $25,000 settlement amount no longer constituted part of the “amount in dispute,” the city court’s jurisdiction over the uninsured motorist claim was to the full extent of its $30,000 jurisdictional limit. Therefore, the appellate court’s decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeal for further consideration. View "Swayze v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, the City of New Orleans (CNO) enacted a group of ordinances, codified as Sections 154-1701 through 15-1704 of its Code of Ordinances, which created the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”). In 2011, plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” alleging the administrative hearing procedure set out in these ordinances violated Louisiana State Constitution Article I, section 2 due process rights and Article I, section 22 access to courts rights. Following an adversarial hearing, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction “enjoining, prohibiting, and restraining the City of New Orleans from conducting any administrative hearings authorized by the enabling ordinance section 154-1701 et seq.” The trial court further ordered that its ruling would be stayed “pending final resolution of a writ application to the 4th Circuit Court of appeals [sic] by the City of New Orleans.” In its written reasons for judgment, the District Court found that the enforcement procedure for the CNO's Automated Traffic Enforcement System gave the CNO administrative authority to adjudicate violations. The CNO, therefore, had a financial stake in the outcome of the cases adjudicated by hearing officers in their employ and/or paid by them, raising due process considerations. Thereafter, the City filed a supervisory writ application with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial court's assessment of the due process problems inherent in the ATES administrative adjudication procedure and finding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the Plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence that they are entitled to the preliminary injunction and may prevail on the merits.” The City filed a supervisory writ application with the Supreme Court seeking review of the District Court's judgment granting the plaintiffs' the preliminary injunction. The Court unanimously denied the City's writ. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and they are entitled to summary judgment granting a permanent injunction as a matter of law based solely “on the affidavits attached and the opinion of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals [sic] and the concurring opinion of Judge Belsom [sic].” Attached to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were: (1) the affidavits of plaintiffs, Keisha Guichard, Edmond Harris, Lee Rand, and Jeremy Boyce; (2) the District Court's judgment granting plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, along with the court's written reasons for judgment; (3) the Fourth Circuit's opinion affirming the judgment granting the preliminary injunction; and (4) the Supreme Court's action sheet, denying the City's application for supervisory review of the preliminary injunction. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The City appealed. Finding that plaintiffs failed to follow the strictures of motion for summary judgment procedure, the Supreme Court declined to address the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Due to the fatal flaws present in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment granting the permanent injunction, reinstated the preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from undertaking any hearings based on this ordinance, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Rand v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

In 2007, Clyde Snider, Jr. was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. He would later get surgery and be given a pacemaker. Following up on an unrelated issue, Snider's treating doctors found infection at the site of the pacemaker. The doctor who recommended implantation of the pacemaker was found to have rushed the decision to give Snider the pacemaker. "Except for the relatively minor complication of a hematoma, and the surgical scar after pacemaker extraction," a medical review panel found no evidence of any long term, major injury to Snider. Snider sued the treating doctor and his liability insurer for damages arising out of the doctor's alleged negligence in the implantation of the pacemaker. A jury later found that the doctor did not breach the appropriate standard of care in Snider's medical negligence action, which Snider appealed. Finding that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and was not clearly wrong, the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict. View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs Byron and Margo Guillory filed suit against several defendants, including Pelican Real Estate, Inc. and its professional liability insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. Essentially, plaintiffs alleged the home they purchased contained a redhibitory defect. At issue in these consolidated applications was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the judgment of the district court which dismissed plaintiffs’ suit as abandoned. For the reasons that follow, the Supreme Court concluded the suit was abandoned, and therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. View "Guillory v. Pelican Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law