Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lake Charles Rubber and Gasket Co., L.L.C. ("Lake") and its sole owner, Vesta Balay Johnston (collectively, Plaintiffs), and Gulf Coast Rubber and Gasket, L.L.C. ("Gulf') and Bryan Vincent (collectively, Defendants), both appealed certain court of appeal rulings. Defendants asserted the court of appeal failed to correctly apply the manifest error standard of review in reversing the district court's findings that certain Lake information in Gulf's possession did not constitute "trade secrets" or that their misappropriation was not otherwise a violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Secrets Act ("LUTSA"). They further argued the court of appeal erred in increasing the damages award from $700,000 to $19,574,884, i.e., a multiple of nearly 28, where ample evidence in the record supported the district court's judgment as to damages. Plaintiffs argued the court of appeal erred on rehearing by eliminating the treble damages applied to its award for unjust enrichment and dismissing Johnston's claim for diminution in value of her ownership interest in Lake. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in part as to its finding that Lake's parts numbering system and descriptions constituted a trade secret under LUTSA. Furthermore, the Court reversed the court of appeal as to the increase in the amount of lost profit damages. The case was remanded to the district court for a recalculation of lost profit damages giving consideration to the violations of LUTSA related to Gulf's misappropriation of Lake's customer lists and inventory usage history with respect to the Sasol customer contract. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson, et al. v. Vincent, et al." on Justia Law

The Pineville City Court was fully funded by the City of Pineville. This funding included amounts for the salaries of three clerk positions and accompanying human resources services. In turn, the City Court reimbursed the City for forty-percent of those expenses. In November 2020, the Pineville City Court informed the City that it would no longer reimburse the forty- percent as it had done in the past. Thereafter, the City sent notice that it would reduce payments of the clerks’ salaries by forty-percent, cease providing payroll and human resources services, pay only sixty-percent of the clerks’ retirement contributions, and discontinue the clerks’ participation in the city’s Blue Cross health plan. In this mandamus action the issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment that granted the City's exception of no cause of action. The plain language of La. R.S. 13:1888 A mandated only a minimum salary amount that must be paid to the city court clerk and deputy clerks. "The governing authorities have discretion to pay more than the mandated minimum salary. A mandamus action is an incorrect vehicle for the demand asserted by Pineville City Court because the underlying duty is not purely ministerial in nature." Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly granted the exception of no cause of action. View "Pineville City Court, et al. v. City of Pineville, et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose from a 2006 class action suit instituted by Steve Crooks and Era Lee Crooks (“Class Plaintiffs”) against the State through the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) concerning the ownership of riverbanks in the Catahoula Basin and subsequent mineral royalty payments. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to address whether mandamus may lie to compel the State to pay a judgment rendered against it for mineral royalty payments. Finding that the payment of a judgment concerning the return of mineral royalties received by the State required legislative appropriation, an act that is discretionary in nature, the appellate court erred in issuing the writ of mandamus. View "Crooks, et al. v. Louisiana, Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

In 2020, an accident, fire, and explosion occurred in the hydrocracker unit at a Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC refinery in Meraux, Louisiana. No significant levels of chemicals were detected as a result of the explosion. Multiple residents in the vicinity of the refinery filed suit for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff Brittany Spencer and her two minor children, Chloe LaFrance and Lanny LaFrance III, were at home sleeping when the explosion occurred. Their residence was approximately 2,000 feet from the epicenter of the explosion. Spencer and Chloe were unexpectedly awakened by a loud sound of unknown origin and a significant shockwave and vibration of unknown origin. Lanny was not awakened. The sound and/or shockwave shook Spencer’s bedroom window. Spencer went outside and observed a large flame of the fire coming from the refinery, and the sky was lit up. Almost immediately after the explosion, Spencer began to hear police vehicles, fire trucks, and ambulances as part of the emergency response that lasted for several hours. Spencer went back inside, and she and Chloe went back to sleep. On the morning of the explosion, Spencer and her children left their residence out of an abundance of caution and did not return until two days later. Spencer eventually returned to her normal sleep schedule, albeit with some trouble; she did not allow her children to play outside due to concerns for their safety. Thereafter, Spencer and her children began staying at their residence less and later moved away from the refinery in June 2020. Spencer, individually and on behalf of her minor children, and Lanny LaFrance, Jr. on behalf of his minor children, filed suit against Valero alleging damages for emotional distress, but did not allege physical injury, property damage, or financial loss. Valero appealed when a trial court awarded damages to plaintiffs for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no Plaintiff met their burden of proving they were entitled to such an award, and reversed the trial court. View "Spencer v. Valero Refining Meraux, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute regarding the excavation of lots located in the The Grove Subdivision between plaintiff Hidden Grove LLC (“Hidden Grove”), the developer of The Grove, and homeowner defendants Richard and Lisa Brauns (the Braunses). In 2011, the Braunses purchased a home located on Lot 14 of The Grove from a third party not involved in this litigation. The next day, the Braunses purchased Lot 15 from Hidden Grove for $100,000. They also acquired a right of first refusal to purchase Lots 16 and 17. The surface elevations of Lots 16 and 17 were eight feet higher than that of Lot 15. Because the Braunses intended to add on to their home and build a swimming pool on Lot 15, they sought to lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17 to match the elevation of the lots previously purchased. Hidden Grove agreed the Braunses could lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17, at their own expense. Before the parties executed a written agreement setting forth the engineering specifications for the excavation, work began in January 2013 on oral permission of Hidden Grove. In June 2013, after the excavation was near completion, disputes arose between the parties, specifically as to whether the Braunses were required to extend the retaining wall onto Lots 16 and 17. When Richard Brauns told Hidden Grove that the wall would terminate at the boundary of Lot 15 and 16, Hidden Grove ordered the Braunses to stop work and “get off the property.” Hidden Grove filed suit against the Braunses alleging breach of contract and requesting specific performance of concluding the excavation and construction of a retaining wall through the backs of Lots 16 and 17. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this matter to review the court of appeal’s determination that Hidden Grove could not assert a claim for enrichment without cause under Civil Code article 2298 for failure to establish the “no other remedy at law” element of the claim. The Court concluded the court of appeal erred and remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of pretermitted issues. View "Hidden Grove, LLC v. Brauns" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Walter George was standing at the roadside of his home in Houma, Louisiana, at the same time defendant Progressive Waste Solutions of La., Inc. (“Progressive”) was picking up garbage on plaintiff’s street. While plaintiff was picking remnants of garbage left behind, he was struck by the hydraulic arm of a garbage truck and sustained injuries. Plaintiff and his wife Janie petitioned for damages against Progressive and ABC Insurance Company. Champion Medical Center entered into a “Professional Service Agreement” (“agreement”) with Ascendant Healthcare (“company”), which identified itself in this agreement as being in “the business of arranging for the provision of professional medical services to persons whose health care costs are paid by liability insurance companies and/or attorneys that enter into arrangements with [Ascendant] for the provision of such services....” The agreement also stated that “[p]rovider agrees and hereby appoints Company as its agent for purposes of filing a medical lien for the services rendered by Provider. Plaintiff’s former counsel at the law firm of Spagnoletti & Company executed a “Letter of Guaranty and Protection.” The document, signed by Marcus Spagnoletti only, identified “the undersigned attorney and law firm” as the “GUARANTOR,” “ASCENDANT HEALTHCARE, LLC” as the “Company,” and the patient as Walter George (who received medical treatment resulting from an “ACCIDENT” in 2015). After the parties engaged in initial discovery, defendant Progressive filed a Motion in Limine on March 10, 2020, seeking to exclude or strike the medical bills related to plaintiff’s surgery and charged to Ascendant Healthcare. Defendant asserted the collateral source rule did not apply for these charges because they were "simply amounts charged," and plaintiff has not diminished his patrimony in order to receive his medical care. The motion was ultimately granted, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. "In the absence of any evidence that plaintiff is not liable for the full billed medical charges in this matter, defendant cannot benefit from any reduction as a result of the subject medical factoring agreement." The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "George v. Progressive Waste Solutions of Louisiana, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was an action to quiet title following the tax sale of a parcel of immovable property. Although the district court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff NAR Solutions, Inc., the appellate court held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that proper notice of sale was provided to some of the defendant/property owner’ Brian Kuhn's ancestors-in-title, and the district court’s default judgment against the defendant was vacated. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Kuhn took no action within the prescribed time period to annul the tax sale, that failure was determinative under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, and the judgment of default rendered by the district court in favor of NARS and against Bryan Kuhn was proper. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court ruling and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "NAR Solutions, Inc. v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

In an issue of first impression for the Louisiana Supreme Court, was what prescriptive period, if any, was applicable to a citizen suit for injunctive relief pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16 suit. Justin Tureau instituted a citizen suit pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16, alleging that defendants drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells on his property, or on adjacent property, as well as constructed and used unlined earthen pits. Specifically, Tureau alleged that said unlined pits were either never closed, or were not closed in conformance with environmental rules and regulations, including Statewide Order 29-B, L.A.C. 43:XIX.101, et seq, which, among other things, requires the registration and closure of existing unlined oilfield pits, as well as the remediation of various enumerated contaminants in the soil to certain minimum standards. The Supreme Court held that a LSA-R.S. 30:16 citizen suit was not subject to liberative prescription. The Court further found that, insofar as the petition alleges that defendants violated conservation laws, rules, regulations, or orders, the allegations were sufficient to defeat an exception of no cause of action. The Court therefore affirmed the appeals court ruling, which overruled defendants’ exceptions of prescription, overruled the exceptions of no cause of action, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Pilcher" on Justia Law

Certiorari was granted in this case to resolve a split in the decisions of the Louisiana courts of appeal regarding the relationship between La. C.C.P. art. 425 and the res judicata statutes, La. R.S. 13:4231 and 13:4232. Particularly, the Supreme Court considered whether Article 425 was an independent claim preclusion provision apart from res judicata such that identity of parties was not required to preclude a subsequent suit, or whether Article 425 merely referenced the requirements of res judicata and thus a claim could not be precluded unless it was between the same parties as a prior suit. After reviewing the law and the arguments of the parties, the Louisiana Supreme Court found Article 425 functioned simply as a measure that put litigants on notice at the outset and, during the course of litigation, all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation must be asserted. "Rather than have independent enforcement effect, Article 425 operates in tandem with and is enforced through the exception of res judicata. Because Article 425 is enforced through res judicata, all elements of res judicata–including identity of parties–must be satisfied for a second suit to be precluded." View "Carollo v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Development" on Justia Law

Adrian Perkins, the then-current mayor of Shreveport, Louisiana, sought reelection to that office. On July 22, 2022, Perkins signed and filed a notice of candidacy form, as required by La. R.S. 18:461 to become a candidate in a primary election. The requirements for the notice of candidacy set forth in La. R.S. 18:463 include a requirement that the candidate certify nine items. It was undisputed Perkins signed the form certifying all required statements and that his certification as to Item 8 on the notice of candidacy form, was incorrect. Perkins has two residences–Stratmore Circle and Marshall Street– both within the city of Shreveport. Although Perkins was registered to vote at the Stratmore Circle address at the time of his qualification, it was undisputed he maintained a homestead exemption at the Marshall Street residence. The two residences were in different voting precincts. Francis Deal, a qualified elector, filed a “Petition in Objection to Candidacy” asserting Perkins’ false certification on the notice of candidacy form disqualified him from being a candidate for mayor pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492. Deal also asserted that pursuant to La. R.S. 18:101(B), Perkins was required to be registered to vote in the precinct where he claimed his homestead exemption, and his failure to do so caused him to be an unqualified elector and candidate. After considering the evidence, the district court disqualified Perkins as a candidate in the primary election for the office of the Mayor of the city of Shreveport. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that only those false certifications specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5) through (7) constituted grounds for objecting to a candidate. Because the certification at issue in this case was not specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492, it could not serve as a basis to disqualify the candidate here. View "Deal v. Perkins et al." on Justia Law