Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing defendant Derek Dotson’s conviction for aggravated rape, finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a challenge for cause of a prospective juror. During voir dire, the prospective juror gave an equivocal answer as to whether she could be impartial after indicating her mother had been the victim of a violent crime. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined the record of the voir dire proceeding was “bereft of any information that would clarify the prospective juror’s response, and the remainder of her responses during voir dire indicate that she would be impartial.” As such, deference should have been afforded by the appellate court to the trial court’s ruling on the challenge. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, and the matter was remanded to the appellate court for determination of the remaining issue raised on appeal by defendant. View "Louisiana v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The underlying issue in this case concerns centered on the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence conducted by a multi-agency law enforcement task force. Two officers from the New Orleans District of the Louisiana Department of Probation and Parole conducted a “compliance check” at defendant Avery Julien’s home in conjunction with the New Orleans Police Department and the U.S. Marshals Gulf Coast Criminal Fugitive Task Force. A search of the residence netted ammunition and two guns, which were found to have been stolen. Specifically, the issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review was whether the search violated Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 895(A)(13)(a). After review of the law and record, and considering the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court held the warrantless search of defendant’s residence violated the provisions of Article 895(A)(13)(a) because the search was not conducted by the probation officer assigned to him. Furthermore, the Court found violation of this statute constituted an unconstitutional search under Louisiana Constitution Article I, section 5, requiring exclusion of the evidence pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703(C). Thus, the Court affirmed the ruling of the district court which granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. View "Louisiana v. Julien" on Justia Law

The underlying issue in this case concerned the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence by multi-agency state and federal law enforcement personnel. Two officers from the New Orleans District of Probation and Parole were conducting a “residence check” because the department received information from another law enforcement agency that defendant Kayla Brignac may have been involved in the sale of narcotics. During the search, officer found Brignac in a bedroom with what appeared to be a burned marijuana cigarette in plain view. A search of the remainder of the residence netted miscellaneous pills and drug paraphernalia. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review was whether the search violated Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 895(A)(13)(a). After review of the law and record, and considering the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court held the warrantless search of defendant’s residence violated the provisions of Article 895(A)(13)(a) because the search was not conducted by the probation officer assigned to her. Furthermore, the Court found that violation of this statute constituted an unconstitutional search under Louisiana Constitution Article I, section5, requiring exclusion of the evidence pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703(C). Thus, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the ruling of the district court which granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. View "Louisiana v. Brignac" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin King was tried by jury and convicted of second degree murder and armed robbery following the 2007 death of Javier Sanchez. The issue this case presented involved the trial court’s grant of a motion for new trial on the basis that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 851(1). Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which focused on inconsistencies in the evidence presented to the jury, arguing that the testimony of the one eyewitness contained internal inconsistencies and was at least partially irreconcilable with the physical evidence. The trial court granted the motion, ordering a new trial for the defendant. The appellate court reversed. When a motion for a new trial is granted pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 851(1), the Louisiana Supreme Court held there is no threshold requirement that the trial court make a finding that an injustice has been done to the defendant that is reviewable as a matter of law. Nor may the court of appeal or the Supreme Court review the findings of fact of the trial court in granting such a motion based on the constitutional prohibition of the appellate courts reviewing factual findings in a criminal case. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and the trial court judgment granting defendant’s motion for a new trial was reinstated. View "Louisiana v. King" on Justia Law

The state filed a petition alleging A.C., at the age of 14 years, committed the felony-grade delinquent acts of aggravated rape of a victim under the age of 13 years, and indecent behavior with a juvenile. Pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 877(B), the state had 90 days to commence the adjudication hearing, which was until Monday, June 6, 2016. The juvenile court set the adjudication hearing for Friday, June 3, 2016. On that date, the state made a motion to continue the hearing alleging that the prosecutor and the family of the victims had been out of town and witnesses had not been subpoenaed. Counsel for A.C. objected and indicated that, as soon as the 90-day limit passed, counsel would file a motion to dismiss the delinquency petition. The juvenile court found there was not good cause to extend the 90-day period and additionally dismissed the delinquency petition at that time. The state objected and gave notice of its intent to seek supervisory review in the court of appeal. The court of appeal granted the state’s writ application and reversed. On October 13, 2016, A.C. moved again to dismiss the delinquency petition, contending that the 90-day time limit had run, and argued in the alternative that the time was not suspended when the state sought supervisory review or, if the time was suspended, it began to run again after the court of appeal’s ruling on October 7, 2016, and had now run out. After the juvenile court denied A.C.’s motion to dismiss, A.C. gave notice of his intent to seek supervisory review from the court of appeal. The court of appeal granted A.C.’s writ application and dismissed the delinquency petition for failure to timely commence the adjudication hearing. The state asserted that there was good cause on day 88, and the court of appeal previously found the juvenile court acted prematurely in dismissing the petition. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed the juvenile court’s dismissal was premature. While it would have been a better practice for the state to seek a stay from the juvenile court, or obtaining none from that court, seek a stay from the court of appeal, the Supreme Court found the state’s failure to obtain a stay was not fatal under the circumstances. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana in the Interest of A.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Chadwick McGhee was found guilty as a principal to the simple kidnapping of Jessica Guillot, in response to a charge of second degree kidnapping. Guillot disappeared in September 2013 after she was last seen being dragged out of one vehicle by Donnie Edwards and Willie Price and forced into a second vehicle in which Asa Bentley was waiting. Bentley then choked and threatened the victim, who begged for her life, as Edwards drove off with them, following Price and defendant in the first vehicle. The court of appeal found that, although the evidence showed co-perpetrators Bentley, Edwards, and Price kidnapped the victim, the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant was anything other than an unwitting bystander to the crime. Because the court of appeal erred in its application of the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the state’s application to reverse the court of appeal’s ruling and remanded for consideration of the pretermitted assignments of error. View "Louisiana v. McGhee" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Moultrie was found guilty as charged of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, based on approximately two ounces of crack cocaine found by officers in a barbeque grill in a driveway between two trailers, one of which belonged to defendant’s mother. Officers noticed defendant standing in the street in front of the trailer at approximately 11 p.m. in a high crime neighborhood. Defendant quickly retreated out of view into the driveway when he saw the officers before returning to the street. One officer approached defendant while two others entered the driveway to see if defendant had discarded drugs or a weapon. They noticed that there were torn baggies on the ground that appeared to have cocaine and marijuana residue. At the end of the driveway farthest from the street, one officer also noticed a grill whose lid was slightly askew with dew that had been disturbed on the handle. Inside the grill was the large quantity of cocaine. When arrested, defendant claimed he lived in the trailer, the grill belonged to his family, and he disavowed any knowledge of the cocaine. On appeal, defendant contended the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Although the state ultimately bears the burden of establishing the validity of a warrantless search, in challenging the search a defendant bears an initial threshold burden of showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Defendant thus was in the difficult position of having to both distance himself from the barbeque grill, if he hoped to be found not guilty of possession of the cocaine found inside it, and tie himself more closely to the grill, if he hoped to obtain a favorable ruling on the motion to suppress. The Louisiana Supreme Court found, after review, that ownership of the grill was never established: it was never seized as evidence and never identified from any photograph as the grill belonging to defendant’s mother. Although defendant’s sister testified that her mother used a grill, her testimony did not establish that the grill in which the drugs were found belonged to defendant’s mother. Because defendant failed at the threshold to make a showing of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the barbeque grill, the inquiry ended. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and remanded for consideration of defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. View "Louisiana v. Moultrie" on Justia Law

This case presents the res nova issue of whether an attorney, representing an incarcerated felon, is subject to the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1, when making a public records request to obtain information relative to a potential post-conviction relief application. Both the district court and the appellate court in this case held that the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1 were applicable to the public records request of petitioner, attorney James Boren, reasoning, in essence, that Mr. Boren stood in the shoes of his client, Stephan Bergeron, an incarcerated felon who had exhausted his appellate remedies. Therefore, the lower courts ruled that Boren was required to satisfy the necessary inquiries of the custodian (here, the St. Landry Parish District Attorney) to ascertain “if the request of any such individual in custody for a felony conviction is limited to grounds upon which such individual may file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3,” as provided by La. R.S. 44:31.1. Because the defendant/custodian denied Boren’s public records request in this case on the basis of La. R.S. 44:31.1, for his failure to answer an inquiry as to “the grounds for post-conviction relief” to be put forth on behalf of Bergeron, the denial was improper. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boren v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged “agreement not to prosecute,” under which the defense claimed that in exchange for the defense providing the names of witnesses who would testify before the grand jury, the sharing of defense attorney work product, and the waiving of the spousal privilege as to the grand jury testimony of the defendant’s wife, the prosecution agreed to abide by the grand jury indictment, whether manslaughter or second degree murder. When the grand jury returned a manslaughter indictment, the State nevertheless presented the case to the grand jury again, approximately seven-and-one-half months after the first indictment, and procured an indictment for second degree murder. The defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging the prosecution failed to abide by the agreement. The district court granted the motion, quashing the second degree murder indictment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed. Finding that the prosecution did not prove it had a valid justification to withdraw from its agreement not to prosecute during the hearing on the motion to quash held in this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that, since there was no factual or legal error in the district court ruling, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash the second degree murder indictment, and the appellate court erred in reversing the district court decision. View "Louisiana v. Karey" on Justia Law

Defendant Thayer Green was adjudicated a third felony offender and sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law to a term of life in prison without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, for a home invasion committed as a juvenile. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) applied to an enhanced single sentence of life in prison without parole under the habitual offender statute. The Louisiana Court held Graham was, indeed, applicable to a defendant who was adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole for an offense committed as a juvenile. Therefore, the Court amended defendant’s life sentence under the Habitual Offender Law to delete the restriction on parole eligibility and directed the Department of Corrections to revise defendant’s prison masters according to the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4(D) to reflect an eligibility date for consideration by the Board of Parole. View "Louisiana v. Green" on Justia Law