Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, could be applied retroactively to defendant’s criminal misconduct which occurred prior to the effective dates of these statutes. Defendant Lynn Foret, a medical doctor who specialized in orthopedic surgery, pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud, for criminal acts that occurred between 2003 and 2009. The trial court granted Dr. Foret’s declinatory exceptions, dismissing with prejudice, the State's action for penalties under the Sledge Jeansonne Act and dismissed with prejudice causes of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the conduct regulated by the substantive statute was the underlying fraud, rather than the subsequent guilty plea. Therefore, even though the State's cause of action could not have accrued until Dr. Foret pled guilty, application of the Acts nonetheless attached new consequences to his criminal misconduct, which occurred before the Acts became effective. One judge on the appellate panel dissented, reasoning the plain language of the Sledge Jeansonne Act demonstrated it was the guilty plea that gave the State Attorney General the authority to act, not the criminal activity, and because the guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the statute, its application herein would be prospective, not retroactive. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sledge Jeansonne Act was not an impermissible retroactive application of the law. After review, the Supreme Court held that both the Sledge Jeansonne Act and Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act operated prospectively only, applying to causes of action arising after the effective date of each Act. The Court affirmed the court ofappeal ruling finding that the statutes at issue could not be retroactively applied to this defendant’s past criminal conduct. View "Louisiana v. Foret" on Justia Law

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Defendant Christopher Wells was convicted of manslaughter in the 2008 shooting death of Brandon McCue. Defendant met with McCue to purchase marijuana. The two argued when McCue told defendant he had nothing to sell. According to defendant, the victim then pointed a handgun at him and instructed him to leave. Defendant returned to his own vehicle, retrieved his own handgun, then shot and killed McCue because he saw him "messing with the slide of his weapon." Defendant appealed contending, among other claims, that the jury was incorrectly instructed as to what constituted justifiable homicide. The court of appeal found the error in the instruction was not harmless and reversed. The State appealed, and finding that the court of appeal erred in its judgment, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Wells" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the email communications of an employee of a public agency, via the public agency's email system, on private political matters with private individuals, were subject to disclosure under Louisiana's Public Records Law, when those emails have been referenced in audits of the public agency. William Shane, a private citizen, exchanged emails related to political matters in 2010 with Lucien Gunter, who was then the Executive Director of the Jefferson Parish Economic Development Commission (“JEDCO”). In June of 2012, the results of an audit on JEDCO operations were released by outside auditing company, which noted that there had been some “de minimis use” of JEDCO's email systems by “certain JEDCO employees” to engage in “political campaign activities” during 2010. Subsequently, in October, The Times-Picayune reporter Drew Broach transmitted a public records request via email to JEDCO seeking to inspect the emails. JEDCO's then-public records custodian denied the public records request, stating that the emails at issue were not subject to disclosure because they were “purely personal in nature” and had “no relation to the public business of JEDCO,” and, even if considered public records, they were exempted from disclosure under LSA-Const. Art. I, Sec. 5's right to privacy. Upon a balancing of the public and private interests, the Supreme Court concluded that constitutional rights of privacy and association asserted by the plaintiff/private email correspondent were adequately protected by the release of the emails with redaction of all references to the private individuals, as ordered by the district court. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision and reinstated the district court decision. View "Shane v. Jefferson Parish" on Justia Law

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In 1998, an Orleans Parish jury found respondent Ronald Marshall guilty of armed robbery. Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated respondent a second felony offender and sentenced him to 49 and a half years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In 2010, respondent filed a second application for post conviction relief, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeal granted respondent's writ, in part, and denied, in part, concluding the trial court erred by summarily dismissing respondent's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover his attorney's time sheets and to convey the plea offer. The court remanded those claims for consideration at an evidentiary hearing, concluding they were substantively different from respondent's earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, neither repetitive nor successive. The court of appeal also ordered the trial court to grant respondent's motion to issue the subpoena duces tecum to obtain the time sheets. The state filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's ruling, which was the subject of this opinion. Finding that respondent exhausted his right to state collateral review, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of claims for post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permitted the district attorney and sheriff to impose costs of prosecution and costs of investigation on convicted criminal defendants where those costs were not extraordinary or special costs unique to a particular case. After review, the Court found that these articles did permit the recovery of such costs, and further found that the costs imposed by the district court were fair, reasonable, and not excessive. View "Louisiana v. Griffin" on Justia Law

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Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. By agreement with the state, defendant admitted the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information and was sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as a second felony offender to 22 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal reversed the conviction because it found the state presented insufficient evidence to prove defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. The court of appeal noted that a guest in defendant’s home, rather than defendant, was found in possession of two small rocks of crack cocaine. The court of appeal acknowledged that defendant admitted to police that he sold cocaine in small quantities but nonetheless determined that a jury could not reasonably infer defendant’s intent to sell those particular "rocks" from the evidence presented by the state. Finding that the evidence presented at trial indeed supported the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ellis" on Justia Law

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Defendant William Graham was indicted with one count of aggravated incest. After defendant rested his case at trial and it became apparent that the State had failed to carry its burden of proof on this charge, the District Court permitted the State to add as a responsive verdict a different offense (molestation of a juvenile) than the one which had been the focus of trial and which contained an element not necessarily required by the original charge. Although neither the State nor the defendant presented any evidence concerning this new element, the jury found the defendant guilty of one of count of molestation of a juvenile, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 50 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first 25 years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found that molestation of a juvenile was not a lesser included offense of the charge of aggravated incest and because defendant‘s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the District Court permitted the State to add "guilty of molestation of a juvenile" as a responsive verdict even though defendant had no opportunity to mount a defense concerning an additional essential element of this offense, the Court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. View "Lousiana v. Graham" on Justia Law

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Defendant Toby Fruge was charged with the forcible rape of two women, R.A. (count 1) and J.H. (count 2), in two separate incidents that occurred approximately two years apart. The State’s petitioned the Supreme Court for review of those portions of the appellate court's decision that reversed the district court’s imposition of the maximum sentence for defendant’s simple rape conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for resentencing. Upon review of the appellate court record, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, in part, reinstated defendant’s simple rape sentence, and remanded to the district court for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Fruge" on Justia Law

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Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

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In November 2008, a grand jury indicted defendant Lamondre Tucker for the first degree murder of Tavia Sills. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of death, finding aggravating circumstances that: (1) the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second degree kidnaping; and (2) the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death in accordance with the jury's determination. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising 55 assignments of error, combined into 21 arguments. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Tucker" on Justia Law