Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

According to her Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, plaintiff Kasha LaPointe was employed as a tenured public school teacher by defendant Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB or the Board”). Jerome Puyau, the Superintendent of Schools for VPSB advised LaPointe that a “due process hearing” would be held in his office to address charges of alleged “willful neglect of duty” and “dishonesty.” According to the Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, this letter, also called the “charge letter” by the parties, advised LaPointe that she would be “afforded an opportunity to respond” to the allegations but that “[n]o witnesses [would] be heard….” However, LaPointe did appear with her counsel in the office of the superintendent and did present, with counsel's assistance, her explanations and responses to the allegations in the “charge letter.” After that hearing, the Board elected to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe challenged the termination, asking for a Tenure Hearing Panel. The Tenure Hearing Panel was convened. The hearing officer and the panel proceeded to take evidence and hear testimony, all of which was preserved. Thereafter, the panel made its recommendation, voting 2-1 to concur with the superintendent‟s action to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 17:443(B)(2), requesting judicial review of her termination. No judicial review of the termination itself had been conducted at this point, owing to a constitutional challenge. As to the constitutional challenge, LaPointe requested a judicial declaration that Act 1 of 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was unconstitutional in its entirety and further declaring Act 1 to be null, void, and of no legal effect whatsoever. She alleged the hearing provisions of Act 1 deprived her of her vested property right to continued employment without due process of law as required by Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2, and of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Because the constitutionality of Act 1 was challenged, the Attorney General later intervened as a defendant in the matter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the lower court erred in declaring unconstitutional on its face Act 1 of the 2012 Legislative Session as codified in La. Rev. Stat. 17:443(B)(1) and (2). Upon de novo review, the Court found the court of appeal erred in declaring La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 unconstitutional on its face because it did not afford a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to termination. Instead, the Court found La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 provided sufficient due process to protect the tenured teacher's vested employment rights. View "LaPointe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2007, the City of New Orleans (CNO) enacted a group of ordinances, codified as Sections 154-1701 through 15-1704 of its Code of Ordinances, which created the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”). In 2011, plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” alleging the administrative hearing procedure set out in these ordinances violated Louisiana State Constitution Article I, section 2 due process rights and Article I, section 22 access to courts rights. Following an adversarial hearing, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction “enjoining, prohibiting, and restraining the City of New Orleans from conducting any administrative hearings authorized by the enabling ordinance section 154-1701 et seq.” The trial court further ordered that its ruling would be stayed “pending final resolution of a writ application to the 4th Circuit Court of appeals [sic] by the City of New Orleans.” In its written reasons for judgment, the District Court found that the enforcement procedure for the CNO's Automated Traffic Enforcement System gave the CNO administrative authority to adjudicate violations. The CNO, therefore, had a financial stake in the outcome of the cases adjudicated by hearing officers in their employ and/or paid by them, raising due process considerations. Thereafter, the City filed a supervisory writ application with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial court's assessment of the due process problems inherent in the ATES administrative adjudication procedure and finding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the Plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence that they are entitled to the preliminary injunction and may prevail on the merits.” The City filed a supervisory writ application with the Supreme Court seeking review of the District Court's judgment granting the plaintiffs' the preliminary injunction. The Court unanimously denied the City's writ. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and they are entitled to summary judgment granting a permanent injunction as a matter of law based solely “on the affidavits attached and the opinion of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals [sic] and the concurring opinion of Judge Belsom [sic].” Attached to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were: (1) the affidavits of plaintiffs, Keisha Guichard, Edmond Harris, Lee Rand, and Jeremy Boyce; (2) the District Court's judgment granting plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, along with the court's written reasons for judgment; (3) the Fourth Circuit's opinion affirming the judgment granting the preliminary injunction; and (4) the Supreme Court's action sheet, denying the City's application for supervisory review of the preliminary injunction. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The City appealed. Finding that plaintiffs failed to follow the strictures of motion for summary judgment procedure, the Supreme Court declined to address the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Due to the fatal flaws present in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment granting the permanent injunction, reinstated the preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from undertaking any hearings based on this ordinance, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Rand v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Relator’s convictions stemmed from unrelated attacks on two different women in the 1990s: a 1991 attack on a victim identified as K.T.; and a 1994 attack on a victim identified as A.R. In both cases, the investigations went cold. More than a decade later, Orleans Parish law enforcement authorities began DNA testing of its voluminous stored evidence in an effort to resolve cold cases, and a Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) search identified relator as a match for biological evidence collected in both attacks. The district court sentenced him to three terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, 50 years imprisonment at hard labor, 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor, all to be served consecutively to one another. The district court also sentenced relator to undergo the administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (“chemical castration”) pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 and R.S. 15:538. Relator appealed his convictions and sentences, and additionally filed a separate writ application seeking review of the chemical castration order. In an opinion consolidating relator’s appeal and writ application, the Fourth Circuit affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences and denied his application for review of the district court’s judgment ordering relator to undergo chemical castration. Aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping were punishable by life imprisonment and as such are not subject to a prescriptive period per La.C.Cr.P. art. 571; consequently the Supreme Court affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences on those counts. However, the portion of the trial court’s sentence requiring that relator undergo chemical castration pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 (enacted in by the legislature in 2008) was vacated. "Although some remedial regulations may be applied retroactively without violating the constitution, the chemical castration requirements of the new statute are expressly part of the punishment that a court may impose for the sex crimes enumerated in La.R.S. 14:43.6. Because the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of new laws that increase the penalty for which the crime is punishable, and because we find no clearly expressed legislative intent to apply this substantive change in the law retroactively, the portion of the court’s sentence requiring that relator submit to chemical castration is vacated." View "Louisiana ex rel. Nicholson v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendant David Koederitz stood accused of second degree battery and false imprisonment. He filed a motion to exclude certain portions of the medical records from Ochsner Hospital in New Orleans, that documented the victim's treatment for a broken nose and black eye from the spring of 2013. According to those records, the victim, defendant’s estranged girlfriend and mother of his child, appeared in the emergency room at Ochsner on February 23, 2013 and “report[ed] physical altercation with boyfriend.” The state alleged that her injuries occurred on February 19, 2013, when the victim paid defendant a visit, and he kept her confined in the following days to allow her injuries to heal. The victim’s initial report and treatment of her physical injuries led to a follow-up session in the hospital with a psychiatrist on February 25, 2013, in which she again identified defendant as her assailant and informed the doctor that “this isn’t the first time he hit me.” Defendant also moved to exclude three letters ostensibly written by the victim, one before the incident that formed the basis of the instant prosecution, and two written months afterwards. The state alleged that the victim subsequently committed suicide in the spring of 2014. Given the unavailability of the victim, the state intended to introduce the medical records and letters in lieu of her live testimony at trial. The trial court granted the defense motions on grounds that introduction of the documentary evidence in substitution of the victim’s live testimony would constitute hearsay in violation of Louisiana’s evidentiary rules and would deny defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The court specifically found that the victim’s statements to the medical personnel at Ochsner were not reasonably related to the treatment and diagnosis of her injuries and were therefore inadmissible as a matter of the hearsay exception. The court further ruled that the letters constituted inadmissible other crimes evidence, even assuming they were properly authenticated and sufficiently connected defendant to the alleged incidents. The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review because it found that the statements made by the victim to her treating physicians identifying the person who struck her repeatedly in the face and broke her nose, as recorded in the certified records from Ochsner Hospital, were admissible under the hearsay exception. The rulings of the courts below were reversed in part and this case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Koederitz" on Justia Law

On March 10, 2010, the Plaquemines Parish Government (PPG) acquired ownership of the state school located at 251 F. Edward Hebert Blvd. in Plaquemines Parish from the Department of Health and Hospitals. In January 2011, contractors working at the site reported that the power was off and that copper wire had been removed from one or more of the buildings over the weekend. A detective responded to the report and determined that the copper wire to three buildings grouped together in one of the complexes on the grounds had been pulled out “from the breakers, all the way through the walls and through the ceiling.” It appeared that a vehicle had been used to pull the wire out of the three buildings. Less than a month later, a second incident also involving the massive loss of electrical copper wiring occurred at the site in one of the five buildings comprising the Beech Grove complex at the back of the sprawling grounds and farthest away from the entrance on F. Edward Hebert Blvd. Left behind was some sort of remote vehicle key pad access device. Also left behind were spots of blood on the otherwise clean linoleum floor inside the building and samples were taken. The DNA found in the sample was matched to defendant’s DNA profile in CODIS and a warrant for his arrest issued on the basis of the two preliminary DNA matches. Defendant was charged with two counts of simple burglary. After trial before a six-person jury in August 2012, he was found guilty of unauthorized entry of a place of business on count one and not guilty on count two. The trial court sentenced him to six years at hard labor. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit pretermitted other assignments of error and reversed defendant’s conviction and sentence on grounds of insufficient evidence. Finding, however, that the evidence was indeed sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and defendant's conviction and sentence were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Louisiana Law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: did the dismissal of Scott Lemoine's criminal stalking prosecution (pursuant to the state Code of Criminal Procedure article 691) constitute a bona fide termination in his favor for the purposes of the malicious prosecution suit before the federal appellate court? The Louisiana Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: "a dismissal of a criminal prosecution pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 691 will constitute a bona fide termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff unless the charge is dismissed pursuant to an agreement of compromise, because of misconduct on the part of the accused, or in his behalf for the purpose of preventing trial, out of mercy requested or accepted by the accused, because new proceedings for the same offense have been instituted and have not been terminated favorably to the accused, or when the dismissal is due to the impossibility or impracticality of bringing the accused to trial." View "Lemoine v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

At a pretrial hearing on the State’s motion to introduce evidence of defendant Gary Layton's 1997 "sexually assaultive behavior," the trial court ruled the evidence was inadmissible because defendant’s alleged conduct did not meet the "elements of a sexual battery" as defined by state law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Trial Court and denied supervisory writs. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that Louisiana law does not strictly limit evidence of past "sexually assaultive behavior" to sexual offenses. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Layton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a claim for punitive damages after having settled such claims relating to fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer in a prior suit, albeit with a reservation of rights as to a claim for damages related to future cancer diagnosed after the effective date of the settlement agreement. The trial court found res judicata barred the plaintiff’s subsequent claim for punitive damages relating to the diagnosis of cancer where the same alleged misconduct had given rise to the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in the earlier litigation asserting fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer. The court of appeal granted writs and summarily reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding the plaintiff had established an exception to res judicata under La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A)(3), because he had reserved his right to bring another action based on the future diagnosis of cancer. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the punitive damages related to conduct and were separate from compensatory damages for injury. Because the plaintiff in this case specifically released all punitive and exemplary damages arising out of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, his subsequent claim for punitive damages was barred by res judicata. View "Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

In 2009, defendant Daniel Marshall ended a love triangle by repeatedly shooting Ronald Hodges, Jr., as Hodges ran toward Marshall, jumping off the porch of a residence. The residence belonged to Ebony Gastinell, the mother of his three children. In all, Hodges sustained five gunshot wounds: two to the back, and projectile fragment abrasions on his right shoulder, arm and hand. The police found nine spent casings scattered on the ground but did not find any firearms discarded on the scene. Following defendant’s second degree murder trial and his conviction and sentence for the lesser verdict of manslaughter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence upon finding that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s post-arrest silence was not harmless because it undercut his plausible self-defense claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s writ application, and, after reviewing the record and the applicable law, reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

After he was convicted, defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The state challenged the claim presented on both procedural and substantive grounds. No evidence was submitted at the hearing on the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court granted the defendant a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence and the ends of justice would be served by ordering a new trial. In a split-panel decision, the court of appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in granting the defendant’s motion. After its review, however, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the defendant failed to show a valid ground for new trial and held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the defendant’s motion. The court of appeal erred in affirming the district court’s decision. View "Louisiana v. McKinnies, Jr." on Justia Law