Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 2009, defendant Daniel Marshall ended a love triangle by repeatedly shooting Ronald Hodges, Jr., as Hodges ran toward Marshall, jumping off the porch of a residence. The residence belonged to Ebony Gastinell, the mother of his three children. In all, Hodges sustained five gunshot wounds: two to the back, and projectile fragment abrasions on his right shoulder, arm and hand. The police found nine spent casings scattered on the ground but did not find any firearms discarded on the scene. Following defendant’s second degree murder trial and his conviction and sentence for the lesser verdict of manslaughter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence upon finding that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s post-arrest silence was not harmless because it undercut his plausible self-defense claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s writ application, and, after reviewing the record and the applicable law, reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

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After he was convicted, defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The state challenged the claim presented on both procedural and substantive grounds. No evidence was submitted at the hearing on the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court granted the defendant a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence and the ends of justice would be served by ordering a new trial. In a split-panel decision, the court of appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in granting the defendant’s motion. After its review, however, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the defendant failed to show a valid ground for new trial and held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the defendant’s motion. The court of appeal erred in affirming the district court’s decision. View "Louisiana v. McKinnies, Jr." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Cynthia Holliday alleged she was unlawfully terminated from her employment with the State while on leave in 2009, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993's (FMLA) “self-care” provision. The State filed an Exception of No Cause of Action on the basis of sovereign immunity, which the district court denied. The Fourth Circuit denied Supervisory Writs. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred as matter of law in denying the State’s Exception of No Cause of Action. "While Louisiana may have waived sovereign immunity with respect to some claims, La. Const. art. 1 section 26 makes it clear the State has not waived its sovereignty within the federal system." The Louisiana Supreme Court found the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining the State had elected to waive its sovereign immunity for purposes of the FMLA. View "Holliday v. Board of Supervisors of LSU Agricultural & Mechanical College" on Justia Law

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The issue on appeal in this case was whether defendant Paul Massey was eligible to receive “good time” credits when the law changed after the offenses were committed, eliminating Massey’s eligibility to earn early release. In 2006, the Legislature amended the statute that gave inmates the capacity to earn early release from their prison sentence in exchange for good behavior and the performance of work or self-improvement activities. The amendment significantly narrowed the class of inmates qualified to receive good time credits, excluding from eligibility, as pertinent here, those convicted of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile or molestation of a juvenile. Massey committed both felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and attempted molestation of a juvenile in 1994. His victims, however, did not report his crimes to the authorities until 2004, and a jury did not convict Massey of these offenses until 2007. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which version of the good time statute applied to Massey - the law in effect at the time he committed his crimes or the law in effect at the time of his conviction, which would have denied him early release regardless of his demonstrated good behavior. Because the rescission of good time eligibility creates a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration and increases the severity of Massey’s sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which he must serve his penalty, the Supreme Court found application of the amended law would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Applying the law in effect at the time the offenses were committed, the Court found Massey was eligible to receive good time credits and is entitled to have his time recomputed under the statute before it was amended. View "Massey v. Louisiana Dept. of Safety & Corrections" on Justia Law

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The district court found that House Bill 974 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (Act 1), violated the single object requirement for legislative bills as provided for in La. Const. art. III, section 15(A). Act 1 of 2012 amended, reenacted and repealed various statutes in Title 17. Looking first at the title, and then to the body of Act 1, the Supreme Court concluded that the subject of the act is elementary and secondary education, and the object of the act was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness. After examining the numerous provisions of Act 1, the Court determined that "they all have a natural connection and are incidental and germane to that one object." In order to overturn a legislative enactment pursuant to the one-object rule, “the objections must be grave and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” In this case, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Foundation of Teachers, Nellie Joyce Meriman, and Kevin Joseph DeHart, failed to establish that such a grave and palpable conflict existed between Act 1 and the one-object rule of La. Const. art. III, section 15. Because the district court pretermitted consideration of the other constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs, i.e., that Act 1 violated due process rights pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 2, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the case was remanded for consideration of those issues. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

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L.D. was charged with the commission of a felony-grade delinquent act of unauthorized use of a movable. Although La.Ch.C. art. 854(A) required in this instance that L.D. appear to answer the delinquency petition within five days of filing because he was continued in custody, the district court set the answer hearing for the next available court date dedicated to juvenile matters, 27 days later. L.D. appeared at that time, objected to the untimeliness of the hearing, and asked for his release from custody and for dismissal of the delinquency petition. The juvenile judge found, consistent with a policy of that court, that the court’s scheduling constraints constituted "good cause" for the delay under La.Ch.C. art. 854(C). The court therefore declined to dismiss the petition and release L.D. from custody, and the juvenile did not seek immediate review of that ruling. The court adjudicated L.D. delinquent 21 days later, within the 30 days from the answer hearing afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877(A). On appeal, L.D. contended that his adjudication hearing was nevertheless untimely and that the petition should therefore have been dismissed because each step in delinquency adjudication process "should be seen as carefully and closely placed, like dominoes in a row, and that by wrongly delaying the answer hearing, the juvenile court judge triggered a cascade, a rippling effect, that ended in an adjudication that should be viewed as untimely as well." The court of appeal found that the juvenile judge erred in denying L.D.’s motion for release based on failure to timely hold the answer hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e [. . .] agree with the court of appeal majority that the legislature did not subscribe to the rippling effect advocated by L.D., such that the slightest perturbation in the steady march of various time limits through the process results inexorably in the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The court of appeal noted, and all parties agree, that La.Ch.C. art. 854 specifies no remedy when the time afforded for an answer hearing is exceeded without good cause. The provisions of the Children’s Code governing delinquency proceedings otherwise contain several explicit time limits. [. . .] Only when the time afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877 to commence the delinquency adjudication following the answer hearing is exceeded must the court dismiss the petition at the request of the juvenile." View "Louisiana in the Interest of L.D." on Justia Law

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Maurice Hawley was charged with driving under the influence after a breath test demonstrated his blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the state’s introduction into evidence of the certification form attesting to the inspection and maintenance of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, and the certification form attesting to the qualifications of the maintenance technician who inspected, maintained and certified the machine, without producing the testimony of the technician, violated Hawley’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Finding these we hold these forms nontestimonial, and thus not subject to Confrontation Clause requirements, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court's conviction. View "Louisiana v. Hawley" on Justia Law

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Defendant Joseph Perkins argued on appeal of his conviction for possession of a "shank" by a convicted felon, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that ultimately convicted him. The district court sentenced defendant to fifteen years of hard labor, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the district court erred in its jury instructions. The State appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable laws implicated by the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the district court and by vacating defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Perkins" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted the defendant Eric Mickelson, of one count of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. In his direct appeal, defendant raised numerous assignments of error, including the failure of the district court to sustain his challenge for cause of a venire member and the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence. However, "constrained by statutory requirements," the Court found the district court erred in failing to excuse a prospective juror for cause. Thus, the Court reversed and vacated the conviction and death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

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The State charged defendant with one count of simple burglary of a vehicle. The issue on appeal, presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the District Court's failure to observe the strictures of a rule jurisprudentially created by the Fourth Circuit in "Louisiana v. Knighten," (609 So.2d 950 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), constituted a violation of the defendant's equal protection and due process rights under "Batson v. Kentucky," (106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986)), requiring a reversal of the jury's guilty verdict. Following voir dire, defendant raised Batson challenges relative to three of the State's peremptory strikes. After hearing the State's proffered race-neutral reasons, the District Court denied defendant's Batson challenges. Citing the State's failure to follow the so-called "Knighten rule," the Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the "Knighten rule" undermined the well-established Batson framework the Louisiana Court adopted and repeatedly applied. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal, reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence, and overruled Knighten insofar as it establishes the "Knighten rule." View "Louisiana v. Bender" on Justia Law