Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a recent constitutional amendment involving a fundamental right to bear arms found in La. Const. art. I, section 11 rendered a criminal statute related to the possession of a firearm while possessing illegal drugs, facially unconstitutional. According to the defendant, because the right to bear arms has been recently enshrined as a fundamental constitutional right, notwithstanding the fact the defendant was allegedly carrying illegal drugs while in possession of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:95(E) was facially unconstitutional. Defendant argued that, even assuming he possessed illegal drugs, because La. R.S. 14:95(E) dealt not only with illegal drugs but with firearms, the firearm aspect of the statute cannot survive strict judicial scrutiny, and the entire statute must be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court disagreed: "Nothing in the recent constitutional amendment regarding firearms requires dismissal of the criminal charges against the defendant for carrying a firearm while in possession of illegal drugs. The legislature’s criminalization of the possession of illegal drugs with the illicit possession of a firearm, therefore, passes strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, on its face, there is nothing in La. R.S. 14:95(E) that requires this court to declare that statute to be unconstitutional." View "Louisiana v. Webb" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether a defendant having been tried once, may nevertheless be ordered to stand trial a second time when the trial judge in the first proceeding, acting without authority, grants a motion for acquittal in a jury trial, dismisses the jury and subsequently orders a mistrial. After review, the Court found the trial judge had no constitutional or statutory authority to grant the acquittal under Louisiana law, which distinguished this case from the federal jurisprudence relied upon by the court of appeal to reverse. Finding the trial judge’s verdict of acquittal was without legal authority or effect, the Court held the mistrial was properly granted and retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. View "Louisiana v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with DWI-3rd offense. The trial judge granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with a traffic stop by a police officer who was outside his jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Although the Supreme Court found the factors set forth in the appellate court’s test should be considered in connection with the totality of the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, the Court held there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the specific requirements relied upon by the trial court and court of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable, vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Gates" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether someone could form an out-of-state limited liability company (LLC) for the purpose of avoiding payment of Louisiana sales tax. The Louisiana Department of Revenue assessed a sales tax against plaintiff Robert Thomas, who is a Louisiana resident and admitted he formed a Montana LLC solely to avoid the Louisiana sales tax for the purchase of a recreational vehicle. Although the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the assessment against Thomas, the District Court reversed the assessment. The Court of Appeal upheld the reversal, finding Thomas’s appeal met the Department’s procedural requirements, and the Department failed to show the veil of the Montana LLC should be pierced and further failed to show Thomas should be held individually liable. The Supreme found this issue involved policy considerations that should be addressed by the Louisiana Legislature rather than resolved by the Court. "Our function is to merely interpret the laws passed by the legislature, not to make laws." View "Thomas v. Bridges " on Justia Law

The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge sought injunctive relief against defendant Stephen Myers to compel him to cease his alleged violation of the City-Parish’s Unified Development Code (the “UDC”), Title 7, Chapter 8, Section 8.201, Appendix H, entitled “Permissible Uses.” The City-Parish alleged that more than two unrelated persons were residing in a home owned by the defendant in an area zoned “A1” and restricted to “single-family dwellings.” The defendant answered the petition, admitting that he was the owner, but denying that he occupied the premises, as he had leased the property to other occupants. The defendant sought dismissal of the action for injunctive relief and asserted, both as an affirmative defense and as the basis for his reconventional demand for declaratory judgment: that the UDC zoning law’s restrictive definition of “family” was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, violating his state and federal constitutional rights of freedom of association; deprived him of his property without due process of law; denied him an economically viable use of his property; and violated his equal protection rights, contending the ordinance “impose[d] greater limitations on owners who choose to rent their homes . . . than it does on owners who choose not to rent their homes” and also by prohibiting “foster children and non-adopted stepchildren without a living biological parent from being able [to] reside with their respective foster parents and stepparents . . . while allowing an unlimited number of very distant relatives via blood, marriage or adoption to reside together.” The defendant also urged, along with defenses and/or matters not relevant hereto, that the zoning law’s definition of “family” should be declared void for vagueness because its prohibitions were not clearly defined and it does not contain an unequivocal statement of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in its rulings; therefore, the Court reversed the declaration of unconstitutionality and the denial of a suspensive appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Baton Rouge v. Myers" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant as a principal in the murder of Mark Westbrook, victim of an apparent execution committed by Ortiz Jackson. Based primarily on the circumstantial evidence provided by cellular phone records from Sprint and Verizon tying the cell numbers of defendant and Jackson together with the number of an “unknown” person, the state argued, and jurors ultimately concluded, that defendant, who had intervened in an argument between Westbrook and Rock McKinney, one the victim’s friends, on a night of drinking, got on his cell phone and orchestrated Westbrook’s demise, after exchanging words with the intoxicated victim outside of the bar. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the state’s contention that defendant threatened the victim, was seen using a cell phone, and that the victim died shortly after a series of phone calls between defendant, an unknown person, and Jackson. Defendant argued because the state could not prove the content of the phone calls made to Jackson and the unknown party before the shooting, the state could not satisfy its burden of proof regarding any specific intent to murder the victim. Finding the state’s case rested wholly on circumstantial evidence, the majority of the Court of Appeal reasoned that, given Sprint and Verizon records indicating that calls linking the cell numbers of defendant’s, Jackson’s, and “unknown’s” phones in the hours well before the late-evening murder, “the State did not exclude that another logical inference, other than to procure murder, could be drawn from these telephone calls; namely, that the defendant may have been returning the phone call of the unknown caller and/or that these calls were to discuss the business that pre-existed among them prior to defendant’s interjection of himself into the altercation between the victim and Rock McKinney.” Underlying the controversy between the state and defendant in this case was the question of how much deference a reviewing court in Louisiana must give to the jury’s verdict in a case involving primarily or exclusively circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant’s conviction for second degree murder on the basis the state failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. Therefore, the conviction and sentence were reinstated, and the court of appeal was directed to address defendant’s remaining claims on the merits on remand of the case. View "Louisiana v. Mack" on Justia Law

In 2009, a grand jury indicted defendant Eric Ross for the 2008 second degree murder of Albert McClebb, Jr., who was shot to death in a housing development in New Orleans. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case for the limited purpose of determining whether the appellate court erred in reversing defendant's conviction, because the appellate court reviewed the grand jury testimony of a recalcitrant witness, as violative of Louisiana's grand jury secrecy laws. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in so doing, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the rest of defendant's appeal. View "Louisiana v. Ross" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, Jimmie Jackson, E. Simms Hardin, and KSD Properties, LLC, untimely paid ad valorem taxes to the City of New Orleans on their respective properties, and were assessed penalties, fees, and interest thereon for various tax years between 2003 and 2009. Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinance Number 22207, and the collection of any penalties, fees, and interest collected thereunder, violated the statutes and constitution of Louisiana, and that the application of Ordinance Number 22207 to this case violated U.S. Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The district court issued rulings on the City's exceptions and on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which: granted the City's exception of no cause of action as to Jackson and Hardin, dismissing these plaintiffs (for failing to comply with the city ordinance requiring payment under protest); denied the City's objections of no cause of action and prescription as to plaintiff KSD; and granted KSD's motion for summary judgment (upon a finding of unconstitutionality as to Ordinance Number 22207). Both plaintiffs and the City filed motions for new trial. The City's motion was granted in part, to dismiss KSD's claims as to its 2008 tax penalty and fees for failure to state a cause of action and to amend the judgment accordingly (for KSD's failure to timely assert a protest as to the penalty and fees assessed for that year's delinquent tax payment); the motions for new trial were denied in all other respects. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment by declaring Ordinance Number 22207 unconstitutional. After review of the district court record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

The Attorney General for the State of Louisiana brought an action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies alleging, among other things, violations of the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity Law (MAPIL). The district court entered a judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the Attorney General, finding the defendants' alleged misconduct in marketing certain drugs had violated provisions of MAPIL as it read in November 2003, and awarding civil penalties of $257,679,500.00, $70,000,000.00 in attorney fees, and $3,000,200.00 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed the district court's judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General failed to establish sufficient facts to prove a cause of action against the defendants under MAPIL because no evidence was presented that any defendant made or attempted to make a fraudulent claim for payment against any Louisiana medical assistance program within the scope of MAPIL. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "Caldwell v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc." on Justia Law