Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The state charged respondent with aggravated rape on the basis of allegations made by C.C., the granddaughter of Gayle Ardoin, respondent's live-in partner, that respondent had repeatedly abused her sexually over the course of the several years she lived in the home with the permission of her legal guardian, Paula Martinez, Gayle Ardoin's sister. The record reflected that another individual may have been responsible for C.C.'s injury, and that as the girl grew older, her allegations of abuse may have been couched as resentment toward new rules of the household. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision of the district court to provide respondent with post-conviction relief from his conviction and sentence. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and reinstated respondent's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Pierre" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to review an appellate court reversal of a district court's ruling that defendants, a medical diagnostic monitoring company and its employee/physician, were not "qualified health care providers" under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act for purposes of alleged acts of medical malpractice. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Luther v. IOM Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the New Home Warranty Act ("NHWA") provided the exclusive remedy between a home builder and a purchaser of residential property, where the builder failed to disclose known defects in the home in a Residential Property Disclosure Statement. The NHWA provides the "exclusive remedies, warranties, and preemptive periods as between builder and owner relative to home construction," but, when the new home is occupied by the builder for some time period before being sold, the builder/seller must also comply with the provisions of the RPDA. As the RPDA does not "limit or modify any obligation between buyers and sellers created by any other statute or that may exist in law," a seller can be liable for fraud for violating the RPDA. In this case, the trial court found the Meltons committed fraud by making a willful misrepresentation of a known defect and this was not manifest error. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and held that the purchasers were not limited to the provisions of the NHWA under the facts of this case. View "Stutts v. Melton" on Justia Law

Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C. and Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C., Louisiana's exclusive Caterpillar franchise dealers, sold, leased, and/or repaired Caterpillar equipment and machinery in parishes throughout the state. Following an audit, the taxing authorities from numerous parishes began tax collection proceedings against the companies, alleging they incorrectly failed to charge and collect sales and use taxes from their customers on their taxable sales, leases, and/or repairs for certain tax periods, and that the companies were liable for these taxes, penalties, and interest under the provisions of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). The tax collector for Catahoula Parish obtained partial summary judgments at district court, declaring that the tax assessments it issued to the companies were final, and the executory judgments issued by the court and could not be challenged. The companies appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the grants of partial summary judgment based on deficiency of the notices of assessment and the lack of sufficient evidence to support the judgments. The tax collector applied for supervisory review to the State Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeal properly reversed the district court's grants of partial summary judgment, and remanded the cases back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Catahoula Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are producers of rice in Louisiana. In 1972, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 3:3531, et seq. and La. R.S. 3:3541, et seq. which established the Louisiana Rice Promotion Board and the Louisiana Rice Research Board ("the Rice Boards"), to promote the growth and development of the rice industry in Louisiana. The Rice Statutes were amended in 1992 to provide that a refund is not available if the voting majority of rice producers vote to abolish the statutory refund provisions. Since the Rice Statutes went into effect, rice producers voting in the periodic referendums have approved the levy of an assessment. The refund provisions were abolished in the 1992 referendum. Plaintiffs, approximately forty rice producers, filed suit against the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry (LDAF) and the Rice Boards, challenging the constitutionality of the Rice Statutes both on their face and as applied, as an improper delegation of legislative authority. Plaintiffs argued the Rice Statutes permit a small group of private citizens to determine by majority vote whether the LDAF shall enforce and collect statutory assessments on rice, and whether the refund provisions will be abolished. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, declaring those sections of the Rice Statutes relative to abolishment of the refunds unconstitutional. The LDAF, State and the Rice Boards directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R.S. 3:3544 were facially unconstitutional. The Legislature improperly transferred its assessment power to a particular group of private voters who could impose, maintain or revoke the assessment and right to refunds through private elections. Thus, the Court affirmed and amended the district court's judgment to declare La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R4. S. 3:354 unconstitutional in their entirety. View "Krielow v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle in a highly intoxicated state, defendant Craig Oliphant struck and killed a pedestrian and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of vehicular homicide. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, with the first fifteen years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and designated the offense a crime of violence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reversed the portion of the sentence designating vehicular homicide a crime of violence, vacated the twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted this writ to provide guidance to the lower courts regarding whether the offense of vehicular homicide fit the general definition of a "crime of violence" under La. Rev. Stat. 14:2(B). The Court found that the offense of vehicular homicide is a crime of violence as the offense involves the use of physical force and the substantial risk that force will be used against another person in the commission of the offense as well as the use of a dangerous weapon. Finding no error in the District Court’s designation, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. View "Louisiana v. Oliphant" on Justia Law

In 1993, respondent Isaiah Overstreet, Jr., who was then 32 years old, quit his job, began living in his car, and started preaching on the grounds of college campuses. On April 25, 1994, at about 6 a.m. police were dispatched to a Southeastern dormitory where respondent, after failing to force his way into one room, entered another, forced a student onto her bed, and struggled with her before fleeing. At 11:30 p.m. on the same day, police were dispatched to Louisiana State University where respondent had grabbed a student as she waited for campus transit, dragged her into the bushes, pinned her to the ground, and attempted to remove her clothing before fleeing. Also on that day, respondent tried to gain entry to another dormitory by breaking a window and pulling the handle on a fire door. Respondent was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Respondent was evaluated to determine his competency to proceed to trial. Experts agreed that respondent was delusional and unable to assist in his defense. After several stints in treatment centers, respondent was ultimately treated with low doses of anti-psychotic medication and his symptoms generally went into remission. Respondent denies any memory of the attacks and has consistently refused to participate in sex offender assessment or treatment. He filed a motion to be released, but because of his refusal to participate, a review panel of the court recommended against his release.Respondent was informed by treatment center staff that if he was transferred to a group home, he would be required to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion for declaratory judgment in which he asked the district court to determine whether he was classified as a sex offender and subject to the registration requirement. This case came before the Supreme Court because the district court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 15:541(7) and 15:542 (laws requiring registration for sex offenders) were unconstitutional as applied to a person who pled and was found not guilty by reason of insanity to a sex offense. Having reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the district court because respondent failed to sufficiently particularize any basis for finding the statutes unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Overstreet" on Justia Law

The State appealed the grant of post-conviction relief for Defendant Anthony Thomas. The trial court granted the application based on an allegation that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded defendant did not satisfy the "Strickland" standard and that it was in error to grant defendant post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether La. R.S. 13:4210 was constitutional. Dionysia Prejean was a party to a child custody proceeding captioned "Dionysia F. Huval Prejean v. Ronald Joseph Prejean," which was pending in the 15th Judicial District Court. The last day of trial in the "Prejean" proceeding was March 18, 2011, at which time the district judge took the matter under advisement. When the district judge court did not render judgment within thirty days, as required by La. R.S. 13:4207, Ms. Prejean filed writ of mandamus against the Acadia Parish Clerk of Court, Robert Barousse, seeking an order requiring him to immediately notify the legislative auditor that the district judge failed to render a decision within the time prescribed by La. R.S. 13:4207, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210.2 In addition, she sought an order against the state auditor to withhold one quarter’s salary from the district judge, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210. The district court denied the writ of mandamus. Ms. Prejean then appealed. On its own motion, the court of appeal raised the issue of the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4210, and determined the statute was unconstitutional on its face because the legislature lacked the authority to regulate judicial conduct. In addition, the court of appeal found La. R.S. 13:4210 was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause, as it purported to reduce a judge’s salary without providing the judge notice or opportunity to be heard. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that La. R.S. 13:4210 was unconstitutional on its face, but that "this action will in no way alter the obligation of district judges to render judgements timely, and adhere to the reporting requirements set forth in General Administrative Rule, Part G, sec. 2(b)."View "Prejean v. Barousse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law