Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed the grant of post-conviction relief for Defendant Anthony Thomas. The trial court granted the application based on an allegation that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded defendant did not satisfy the "Strickland" standard and that it was in error to grant defendant post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether La. R.S. 13:4210 was constitutional. Dionysia Prejean was a party to a child custody proceeding captioned "Dionysia F. Huval Prejean v. Ronald Joseph Prejean," which was pending in the 15th Judicial District Court. The last day of trial in the "Prejean" proceeding was March 18, 2011, at which time the district judge took the matter under advisement. When the district judge court did not render judgment within thirty days, as required by La. R.S. 13:4207, Ms. Prejean filed writ of mandamus against the Acadia Parish Clerk of Court, Robert Barousse, seeking an order requiring him to immediately notify the legislative auditor that the district judge failed to render a decision within the time prescribed by La. R.S. 13:4207, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210.2 In addition, she sought an order against the state auditor to withhold one quarter’s salary from the district judge, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210. The district court denied the writ of mandamus. Ms. Prejean then appealed. On its own motion, the court of appeal raised the issue of the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4210, and determined the statute was unconstitutional on its face because the legislature lacked the authority to regulate judicial conduct. In addition, the court of appeal found La. R.S. 13:4210 was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause, as it purported to reduce a judge’s salary without providing the judge notice or opportunity to be heard. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that La. R.S. 13:4210 was unconstitutional on its face, but that "this action will in no way alter the obligation of district judges to render judgements timely, and adhere to the reporting requirements set forth in General Administrative Rule, Part G, sec. 2(b)."View "Prejean v. Barousse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a law was declared unconstitutional by a district court. The district court granted in part the Louisiana High School Athletic Association, Inc.’s (LHSAA’s) Motion for Summary Judgment, declaring La. R.S. 17:176(F), La. R.S. 17:176(G), and La. R.S. 17:236.3 (Title 17 statutes) unconstitutional because they are prohibited special laws under La. Const. art. III, sec. 12(A). The district court further denied in part the LHSAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent the LHSAA requested a declaration it was not a “quasi public agency or body,” and to the extent it requested a declaration La. R.S. 24:513(J)(4)(a) and (b) and La. R.S. 24:513(A)(1)(b)(v) (Title 24 statutes) were unconstitutional. The issue arose from LHSAA's refusal to provide the State an audit of its records: LHSAA argued that it was exempt from the statutory authority the State relied upon to obtain the records. The LHSAA filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction against the defendants the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), Daryl G. Purpera, in his official capacity as the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (LLA), and James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Louisiana. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling with regard to the Title 17 statutes, and reversed the district court’s ruling to the extent it denied the LHSAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to the Title 24 statutes; the Court found these statutes were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. View "Louisiana High School Athletics Association, Inc. v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Respondent Manuel Ortiz was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1995 for the killing of his wife. The State urged jurors to find that Respondent was involved in a murder-for-hire scheme motivated by his desire to collect on an insurance policy taken out on the wife. Post-conviction relief proceedings stretched out over years. One of the allegations Respondent raised on appeal involved prosecutorial misconduct by a former assistant district attorney. The litigation took place against the background of the assistant DA's subsequent but unrelated legal difficulties which resulted his disbarment and imprisonment on federal charges. The district court ultimately denied respondent the post-conviction relief he sought, effectively rejecting specific claims that the assistant DA had suppressed certain exculpatory evidence and suborned perjury, but vacated Respondent's death sentence. Both Respondent and the State appealed the district court's decision. With no evidence that any prosecutorial decision made before or during the guilt or sentencing stages of trial stemmed in whole or part from any pecuniary interest in the insurance proceeds relating to the victim's death (including the decision to charge Respondent with his wife's murder), the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in vacating Respondent's death sentence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated respondent's death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the State could directly enforce Article I, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution to prevent a candidate from taking public office without regard to the Election Code's lime limits on challenges to candidacy. Answering in the affirmative, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Louisiana v. Gibson" on Justia Law

During the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the House of Representatives considered House Bill No. 61, which provided for the establishment of a cash balance retirement plan for certain new members of the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, and the Louisiana School Employees' Retirement System hired on or after July 1, 2013. The bill passed committee and eventually became Act No. 483. Opponents to the Act filed suit in district court; the district court declared the Act unconstitutional. Finding no error in the district court's analysis of the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Retired State Employees Association v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Mother Misty Hernandez appealed a family court order denying her motion for permission to move to another state with the child she shared with Father Brandon Jenkins. Upon review of the family court matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the family court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the proper legal standard with regard to Mother's motion and by denying it. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Mother. View "Hernandez v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

This writ application involved the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), and whether the running of the statutory ninety (90) day grace period in which prescription is suspended in a medical malpractice case begins when a plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint is dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman, or when plaintiff is notified that his complaint has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that the 90 day grace period begins to run from the date of dismissal. Because plaintiff failed to file her petition for damages within this 90 day period, her claim was dismissed. View "Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center" on Justia Law