Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court or the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a putative class of utility ratepayers in the City of Opelousas against Cleco Corporation and Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). The ratepayers sought reimbursement for alleged overcharges for electricity for a period of nearly twenty years, based on a franchise agreement Cleco signed with the City of Opelousas in 1991. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and sustained Cleco's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this is primarily a rate case that must be decided, in the first instance, by the LPSC. Furthermore, the Court found that LA. CONST. art. IV, section 21 (C) was inapplicable, which excludes from the LPSC's exclusive authority a public utility owned, operated, or regulated by a political subdivision, as this case did not involve a municipally-owned public utility company. Accordingly, the rulings of the lower courts were vacated and the ratepayers' claims were dismissed.View "Opelousas Trust Authority v. Cleco Corporation" on Justia Law

The issue in this matter was whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. Upon review of the applicable legislative history of the statute in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriff’s office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. The decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves " on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question presented by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The question presented sought "binding instructions from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the correct usage of a defendant's name (and other close relatives) in cases in which the victim is a minor related to the defendant." The Supreme Court concluded that the controlling statutory authority mandated confidentiality of the victim's identity in certain cases, but does not extend this protection to any other persons. View "Louisiana v. R. W. B." on Justia Law

In "Louisiana v. Duheart," the Supreme Court reversed part of the district court's judgment that La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded the case for reconsideration of defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant filed a second motion to suppress, again arguing La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court again granted the motion and held the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied in defendant's case. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court again held the district court erred in its analysis: the evidence defendant wanted suppressed had no bearing on the outcome of the motion and thus was not a justiciable controversy for review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court to the extent that it suppressed evidence based on La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. Duheart" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs prevailed in their action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The district court rendered a fee award, but reduced the requested number of billable hours by 20%, set an hourly rate, and declined to enhance the overall award. The plaintiffs and the defendants both appealed. The court of appeal amended the award for purposes of the lodestar calculation to increase the number of billable hours to the amount requested and the prevailing hourly rate to $265. The court of appeal further enhanced the fee award, finding the case to be "rare" and "exceptional" based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly-contested litigation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Covington v. McNeese State University" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The state charged defendant by bill of information with failing to maintain his registration as a convicted sex offender by failing to appear for his quarterly registration with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information on grounds that he had fully satisfied any registration duty he may have had before establishing residence in Louisiana and that he was therefore under no legal obligation to register as a sex offender in the state. Defendant argued, and the trial court agreed, that he had satisfied his duty to register in Louisiana by operation of law under the existing 10-year period by December 2005, and that he therefore had no duty to register when he came to Louisiana in March 2009. The trial court rejected the state’s argument that the registration period, whether measured by 10 years or 25 years, had not lapsed because it had not begun until defendant moved to this state in 2009. The court of appeal agreed with defendant in a split panel decision that his "duty to register expired by operation of law in December 2005, 10 years after his release from custody and a little over two years prior to the effective date of the [2007] amendment." The Supreme Court after its review disagreed with the trial and appellate courts and reversed: "defendant was not 'a person required to register' in Louisiana until he established residence . . .under former law, as under current law, defendant’s duty to register and maintain his registration for a period of 10 years did not terminate in 2005 because, as the state argue[d], it did not begin until 2009, when he established residency in this state, and he had not extinguished his obligation under the former law, much less under the current expanded registration periods, before his arrest in 2010." View "Louisiana v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Graham v. Florida" (130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010)), applied in a case in which the juvenile offender committed multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expectancy without the opportunity of securing early release from confinement. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, the Louisiana Court found Graham's holding that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids the imposition of life in prison without parole for juveniles committing non-homicide crimes, applied only to sentences of life in prison without parole, and did not apply to a sentence of years without the possibility of parole. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court which amended defendant's four 10-year sentences for four armed robberies. View "Louisiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Bazile was indicted by a grand jury for the second degree murder of his wife, Kendra. The indictment was returned on October 13, 2010, and defendant arraigned on October 15. The district court set a trial date of October 3, 2011; notice of the trial date was given to the defendant and his counsel in open court. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial after a colloquy with the district judge. The state objected to the defendant's action, arguing the waiver of the defendant's right to a jury was made in violation of the amendment to La. Const. art. I, sec. 17(A). On the first day of trial, defense asked for a continuance on the ground the state failed to fully comply with discovery requests. The prosecutor objected to the request for continuance. Overruling the prosecutor's objection, the district court set a new trial date of October 11, 2011. Giving effect to the defendant's earlier jury trial waiver, the new trial was set to proceed before the district judge. The prosecutor again objected, arguing the defense failed to waive trial by jury within the required time limitations under the state constitution. In an attempt to overcome the state's objection, defense counsel offered to re-set trial beyond forty-five days from the earlier waiver. The prosecutor objected to this offer, arguing a continuance does not extend the forty-five day period provided by the state constitution. The prosecutor contended whenever the trial was held, the mode of trial would be a trial before a jury since the forty-five day period contemplated by the state constitution had already run before the original October 3, 2011 trial date. The district judge held a defendant had a right to waive a jury trial at any time before trial under the federal constitution; thus, the state constitutional provision which imposed limits on that right was unconstitutional. The state appealed, and was denied without comment by a vote of 2-1. The state then applied to the Supreme Court for review. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the constitutionality of La. Const. art. I, sec. 17(A) was not raised by the parties in the district court, rather, raised sua sponte by the district judge. When the matter was once more before the district court, the defendant filed a "Motion to Declare Constitutional Amendment Unconstitutional," claiming La. Const. art. I, sec. 17(A), as amended in 2010, violated the federal constitution. The Supreme Court found the district court's ruling to be erroneous, and accordingly reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Bazile" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the trial court refused to qualify an expert witness for the plaintiffs, finding he did not satisfy the requirements for expert witnesses under the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict based on plaintiffs’ failure to present expert testimony to support their case. The court of appeal reversed these rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the lower court erred in its interpretation of the Act; the expert in question was not licensed to practice medicine at the time he was to be qualified as an expert. The Court reinstated the trial court's rulings. View "Benjamin v. Zeichner" on Justia Law