Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the appropriate remedy for a defendant when he is prohibited, in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1, from using a peremptory challenge to back strike a provisionally selected juror. Agreeing with the court of appeal’s determination that the error is one which is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court nevertheless find the court of appeal misapplied the harmless error standard of review in this case. Because, after review, the Court could not conclude with certainty that the guilty verdicts rendered in this case were surely unattributable to the district court’s error in prohibiting the defendant from using a back strike to peremptorily challenge a provisionally selected juror, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, vacated defendant’s convictions and sentences, and remanded this matter to the district court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Jeremy Patterson and co-defendant Tyrone Reynolds were charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether, following a district court ruling prohibiting the defendant from exercising a peremptory challenge to back strike a provisionally selected juror in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1, the court of appeal appropriately applied a harmless error analysis to conclude that the error in denying the back strike was not harmless. Finding the court of appeal correctly applied a harmless error analysis to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Louisiana v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant Mazen Hamdan was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The bill of information stated that defendant was previously convicted in Orleans Parish of possession of heroin and possession of methadone, which were used in the trial for the underlying weapon offense. A jury found defendant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to serve 10 years of imprisonment at hard labor. On the day of the sentencing hearing, the state filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant’s sentence should be enhanced due to his prior guilty plea in federal court to interstate transportation of stolen property. Defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill in which he contended that the predicate offense alleged by the state had no felony equivalent in Louisiana. Defendant also alleged that the charging instrument in the federal prosecution did not indicate whether he actually possessed the stolen property or simply arranged for its transportation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider the criteria by which the courts of this state are to evaluate a criminal defendant’s previous conviction in a foreign jurisdiction during a habitual offender adjudication: "[w]hether a predicate offense does not necessarily include conduct criminal under Louisiana law, the conviction cannot lead to an enhanced penalty. In determining whether the predicate offense satisfies this criteria, courts are not confined to an examination of the applicable laws and the charging instrument of the foreign jurisdiction. Rather, when . . . there is information from the foreign proceeding available in the record that clearly establishes that the crime for which the defendant was convicted in a foreign jurisdiction would be a felony if committed in this state, courts are required to consider all of the available information in the record in deciding whether the foreign crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” The Court held that the trial court legally erred in quashing the state’s habitual offender bill. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion to quash, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Hadman" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC. Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police. Telschow was arrested and prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism and sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment. Ultimately the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numerosity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment which granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. View "Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (specifically La. R.S. 23:1036) as the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter in claims for personal injury against the "fire company," similarly applies to claims for personal injury against fellow volunteer members. After reviewing the record and the law, the Court found the defendant failed to establish that the Workers’ Compensation Law granted immunity to fellow volunteer members of a volunteer fire company from suits in tort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved a 1925 tax sale and the failure to give notice of the pending tax sale to the property owner. The specific issue in the present case was whether "Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams," (462 U.S. 791 (1983)), could be applied retroactively to invalidate this 1925 tax sale. Plaintiffs, owners of oil, gas, and mineral interests, filed suit against four groups of record landowners including Pirate Lake Oil Corporation, the Mayronne Group, the Handlin-Jones Group, and the Zodiac Group, to determine the parties entitled to the proceeds of production. The Mayronne and Handlin-Jones Groups filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Zodiac Group had no interest in the property. The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Zodiac Group’s claims of ownership in the property with prejudice. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the Zodiac Group’s ancestor in title was never the record owner of the property. Further, the Zodiac Group traced its ownership of the property to a 1925 tax sale, and there was no evidence the Sheriff provided notice of the sale to the record owner of the property, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause under "Mennonite." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "Mennonite" could not apply retroactively to invalidate the 1925 tax sale for lack of notice. Further, while the Zodiac Group’s ancestor in title was not the record owner of the property, any defect was cured by the five-year peremptive period of Article X, section 11 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts. View "Quantum Resources Management, LLC v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in ordering the return of $144,320 to Tina Beers after finding the State did not establish probable cause for forfeiture of her currency under the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (the Act). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the State proved there was probable cause for the forfeiture. Furthermore, the Court found that the court of appeal erred by reversing the decision of the district court to strike Tina Beers' claim to the money. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeal and reinstated the decision of the district court. View "Louisiana v. $144,320.00 Tina Beers, 132 Woody Lane, Silver City, NC 27344" on Justia Law

In 2006, a grand jury indicted Defendant Michael Garcia for first-degree murder of Matthew Millican (Matt). During his arraignment defendant pled not guilty. During trial on the merits, the presentation of the State’s case unfolded in a chronological fashion with five witnesses testifying to other unadjudicated crimes, including threats, aggravated battery, rape, and murder perpetrated by defendant while armed with a machete against victims in Michigan and Florida, followed by four witnesses who had exclusive knowledge of Matt’s murder. Thereafter, the defense called four guilt phase witnesses and then rested. After hearing closing arguments, receiving the District Court’s instructions, and deliberating defendant’s guilt for eleven minutes, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. After trial on the penalty phase, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of death. The District Court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and sentenced defendant to death in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Defendant directly appealed his conviction and death sentence, raising eighty-five assignments of error. The Supreme Court addressed the "most significant" errors in its opinion, and the remaining errors were addressed in an unpublished appendix. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Court affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a member of a putative class was entitled to the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 when an independent, individual lawsuit is filed prior to a ruling on the class certification issue. The respective district courts in each of these cases sustained exceptions of prescription, dismissing plaintiffs' individual lawsuits filed prior to a resolution of the class certification issue in class action proceedings in which the plaintiffs were putative members. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissals, finding that the filing of an individual lawsuit by a member of a putative class prior to a ruling on the class certification issue operates as an "opt out" of the class action and a forfeiture of the suspension provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court found that because plaintiffs were members of a class asserted in a class action petition, they were entitled to the benefits of the suspension of prescription provided under La. C.C.P. art. 596, notwithstanding that they also filed individual actions prior to a resolution of the class certification issue. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts sustaining exceptions of prescription to the petitions of the plaintiffs and remanded these matters to the respective district courts for further proceedings. View "Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider two separate, but related issues: (1) whether the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 extended to a putative class member who filed an individual claim after a ruling on the class certification issue and, if so, (2) whether La. C.C.P. art. 596 suspended prescription when the putative class action is filed in another jurisdiction. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Court found that the filing of an individual lawsuit after a ruling on class certification does not operate as an "opt out" of a class action proceeding and a forfeiture of the benefits of suspension provided in La. C.C.P. art. 596, but that the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596 do not extend to suspend prescription on claims asserted in a putative class action filed in a federal court. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's judgment denying the defendant's exception of prescription, sustain the exception, and remanded this case to the district court to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the petition, if they could, to allege facts to show their claims were not prescribed. View "Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law