Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Larry Thompson was charged by bill of information with possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine). Defendant claimed to be visiting his girlfriend and a friend at a motel, and encountered police executing search warrants for two motel rooms. While being questioned by the officers, Defendant admitted he had been previously convicted of a felony and stated he possessed both a gun and crack cocaine in his truck, parked nearby in the motel’s parking lot. He gave officers permission to search his truck, both verbally and on a written consent form. He then recovered rocks of crack cocaine from the truck and gave them to the officers. During pretrial discovery, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming the consent to search was the product of an illegal detention. After its review of the facts and legal conclusions found by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court of appeal’s decision to the contrary was reversed, the ruling of the trial court is reinstated, and the case was remanded to the court of appeal for its review of the remaining assignment of error raised by Defendant on appeal. View "Louisiana v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant Rudy Trosclair pled guilty to sexual battery of a child under thirteen years of age, for which he was sentenced to serve thirty months imprisonment at hard labor "without benefit." Shortly after his incarceration, La. Rev. Stat. sec. 15:561.2 was amended to provide for lifetime supervision. Upon his release from custody, Defendant was placed under lifelong supervision in accordance with the amended provision. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court challenging the retroactive application of the amendment as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeal granted writs and found the amendment increased the penalty for the offense and could, therefore, not be applied retroactively to the defendant. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, after first converting this appeal to an application for supervisory writs, the Court concluded the amended supervised release provisions were predominantly nonpunitive in both intent and effect, and therefore, their retroactive application to this Defendant did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the Court granted the State’s application and reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Trosclair" on Justia Law

In March 2007, Plaintiff Joseph Trascher filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony, alleging that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis in August 2006, and that it was unlikely that he would survive more than another six months. Plaintiff also alleged he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages.The district court granted the ex parte order and the videotaped perpetuation deposition was scheduled for April 3, 2007, at Plaintiff's home. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the admissibility of the video deposition where the deposition was halted due to the deponent’s failing health and fatigue, and the deponent died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that while most of the video deposition was inadmissible, parts of the deposition were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. View "Trascher v. Territo" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant-Respondent Aubrey Brown by bill of information with one count of simple burglary of a religious building, and one count of simple burglary. The two crimes were apparently unrelated and the State ultimately severed the second count before bringing Defendant to trial. A jury convicted Defendant by a non-unanimous vote. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, the First Circuit noted Defendant's conviction stemmed from a proceeding in which a six-person jury offense had been mistakenly tried in a 12-person jury. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed his conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment, finding that Defendant acquiesced to the error by actively participating the selection of the jury without objection at any stage of the proceedings, and thereby waived any relief on appeal on grounds that the panel selected was composed of a greater number of jurors than required by law. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

As a consequence of a June 2006 storm, the stormwater drainage and storage system (including the wastewater treatment facility) at the Lake Charles refinery of Defendant CITGO Petroleum Company (CITGO), was filled beyond available capacity and overflowed, resulting in a major oil spill. Over 21 million gallons of waste, including 17 million gallons of contaminated wastewater and 4.2 million gallons of slop oil, escaped from the two existing wastewater storage tanks into an area around the tanks which was surrounded by levees or dikes. The oil spill, which was described at trial as "major" and "catastrophic," eventually contaminated over 100 miles of shoreline along the Calcasieu River, and required several months to clean up. Fourteen plaintiffs, employees of Ron Williams Construction (RWC) working at the Calcasieu Refining Company (CRC) south of the CITGO refinery, filed suit against CITGO and R&R Construction, Inc. (R&R) alleging various injuries due to their exposure to noxious gases emanating from the spill. CITGO and R&R stipulated that they were liable for the spill and agreed to pay plaintiffs for all their compensatory damages assessed to CITGO and R&R. After a two week bench trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had proved their injuries were caused by CITGO's admitted negligence in allowing the spill. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the district court's finding the spill caused plaintiffs' injuries was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted review of this case to determine whether the courts below erred as to the allocation of fault, in awarding damages for fear of future injury, and in awarding punitive damages. In sum, the Court held that Louisiana's conflict of laws statutes did not provide for the application of the punitive damages laws of Texas or Oklahoma under the facts of this case, that plaintiffs proved that their damages were caused by their exposure to toxic chemicals contained in the oil spill, that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for fear of contracting cancer, and that CITGO did not produce at the hearing on summary judgment factual support sufficient to establish that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

In what the state termed as "particularly egregious and predatory acts of contractor fraud in New Orleans" following Hurricane Katrina, 63-year-old Defendant-Respondent John Colvin, a former elected state representative in Alabama, entered guilty pleas in November 2009, to six counts of felony theft. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and in 2010, conducted a sentencing hearing at which the victims on each count or members of their family, testified about their losses. The defense called several witnesses in mitigation. At the close of the hearing, the trial court sentenced respondent on each count to consecutive terms of 10 years imprisonment at hard labor, for a total of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences as excessive and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The Supreme Court granted the State's request to review the Fourth Circuit's decision and reversed, finding that given the circumstances in this case, there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the sentences by the trial court were reinstated, and the case was remanded for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Defendants Glen Dale Nelson and Melvin Goldman were convicted by jury of one count of illegal use of weapons, four counts of armed robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Both received substantial sentences as habitual offenders. Defendants appealed their convictions, asserting the trial court's handling of jury selection, specifically its handling of a "reverse-Batson" challenge by the State were all in error. Finding no error by the trial court, the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' writ applications to review the correctness of the court of appeal's decision. The sole issue was the reverse-Batson issue. In total, seventeen of the eighteen peremptory challenges exercised by Defendants were used to excuse white prospective jurors. The State used seven out of ten peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors. With a venire that was approximately thirty-three percent black, the eight jurors provisionally selected at that time were evenly divided along racial lines. The State urged a reverse-Batson objection, arguing that defense counsel had used their peremptory challenges to exclude white prospective jurors. The State further argued that because defense counsel conferred before striking prospective jurors, the court should consider their peremptory usage together for purposes of Batson. Upon review, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, finding the trial court erred both in its application of Batson, and in formulating a remedy for the alleged Batson violation. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, vacated the convictions and sentences, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted consolidated writ applications to address the majority opinion of the court of appeal which held the medical malpractice cap enunciated in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) was unconstitutional "to the extent it includes nurse practitioners within its ambit.” The Court reiterated its holding in "Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University," (508 U.S. 909 (1993)), which found the cap constitutional. Finding the cap to be applicable to all qualified healthcare providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, including nurse practitioners, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in this respect. Additionally, the Court addressed two other assignments of error asserted by the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund and affirmed those portions of the court of appeal judgment. The effect of the Court's holding was to reinstate the trial court judgment in full. View "Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute as to the proper application of La. Const. art. I, sec. 17 as applied to this case. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant loses the right to waive a trial by jury when the initial trial date was set within forty-five days of a pretrial proceeding and the district court indicated to the defendant a waiver was permissible. Defendant Gerald Chinn was charged by bill of information with three counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated criminal damage to property. Following a series of preliminary motions, a status conference was convened, and at that time, the State requested that the trial be set for a date forty-three days away. Defense counsel agreed to the trial date with the caveat that her client be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury. Following a brief colloquy with the defendant, the district court accepted the defendant’s jury-trial waiver, but the State objected. Finding that the court of appeal erred in ruling the defendant should not be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury under the unique facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the ruling of the district court permitting the defendant to waive his right to trial by jury. View "Louisiana v. Chinn" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrance Carter was indicted in 2006 for the first degree murder of Corinthian Houston. After initially pleading not guilty, Defendant changed his plea to a dual plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. The district court denied his motion to suppress his statements following a hearing conducted in 2008. After finding aggravating circumstances of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated arson, and a victim under the age of 12 years, the jury returned with a unanimous recommendation that Defendant be sentenced to death. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence of death, asserting twenty-five assignments of error and three supplemental assignments of error. The Supreme Court addressed the "most significant" of the alleged errors. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's first-degree murder conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Carter" on Justia Law