Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Mark Spell was the pastor of a church in Central, Louisiana. On March 31, 2020, he was issued six misdemeanor citations for violating two executive orders issued by Louisiana Governor Edwards in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Louisiana Supreme Court found certain provisions of those two executive orders, as applied to defendant, violated his fundamental right to exercise religion, did not survive strict scrutiny, and were thus unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Spell" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Cemetery Board (“LCB”) challenged a district court’s judgment finding Louisiana Administrative Code 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. Whether the Louisiana Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction was raised as an issue in an Answer to Appeal filed by appellees, Westlawn Cemeteries, L.L.C. and the Trustees of the Westlawn Memorial Park Perpetual Care Trust Fund. The Supreme Court determined it did not have appellate jurisdiction in this case because the LCB was not a “governing body” and did not exercise “legislative functions.” Its rules and regulations, therefore, were not “laws” for which appellate jurisdiction would lie with the Supreme Court. However, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to "avoid further delay, and is in the interest of judicial economy." The Court found that the trial court properly found LAC 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. "As the only issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Rule, no purpose would be served by remanding this case to the appellate court before review would inevitably be sought in this Court." View "Westlawn Cemeteries, LLC v. Louisiana Cemetery Board" on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish directly appealed a trial court’s judgment finding that Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36-320, et seq., titled, “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”), was unconstitutional. After receiving notices of alleged violations of Section 36-320, et seq., of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, petitioners filed a class action Petition for Damages and Declaratory Judgment. They asserted multiple arguments against the SBSEP, including arguments based on violations of the Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter and violations of Louisiana statutory law. Petitioners sought a judgment declaring Section 36-320, et seq. unconstitutional and the return of the fines they paid pursuant to the violations. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding Section 36-320, et seq., unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5(G) and Article VIII, Section 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. View "Mellor, et al. v. Parish of Jefferson" on Justia Law

This summary judgment matter arose from a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration (amongst other things) that defendant First Guaranty Bank (the “Bank”) applied an incorrect interest rate and thus miscalculated the principal owed on a Promissory Note executed by borrower-petitioner Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. (“Leisure”) in favor of the Bank in December 1991 (the “Note”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Leisure’s writ application to determine whether the court of appeal erred in applying the “voluntary payment doctrine” to hold that Leisure was estopped from recovering payments voluntarily made, regardless of whether owed. In addition, the Court reviewed whether the court of appeal erred in determining the Note presented an alternative obligation as to the Prime Rate interest structure for years 11 through 30 of its repayment, whether it erred in imposing its own interest rate structure during that period, and whether the Bank’s prescription arguments preclude Leisure’s recovery of any interest paid and not due between 2001 and 2013. Finding the “voluntary payment doctrine” contravened the Louisiana Civil Code, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the portion of the district court’s judgment denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the Bank as to the voluntary payment affirmative defense; (2) dismissed Leisure’s claim for declaratory relief as to the interest it voluntary paid the Bank between 2001 and 2013; and (3) rendered judgment ordering the Bank to repay Leisure “any overcharge of interest in excess of the prime rate that Leisure paid on the [Note] since the filing of its suit on October 7, 2013, together with interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid.” Finding that the Note set forth an “alternative obligation,” the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the district court decree that Leisure was entitled to select the Prime Rate structure pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1810; and (2) reversed the district court’s declaration that Leisure paid all indebtedness owed to the Bank on the Note as of June 28, 2015, and was owed return of all amounts paid thereafter. The case was remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the Bank’s arguments on appeal that were pretermitted by the court of appeal opinion and were not in conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First Guaranty Bank" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to determine whether the State carried its heavy burden of showing that the two-year limitations period to commence trial on defendant Joseph Schmidt's non-capital felony charges was interrupted by defendant’s failure “to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears in the record.” After careful review, the Supreme Court found the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the statute of limitations was tolled. Specifically, the Court found no proof in the record that defendant failed to appear at a proceeding in 1995 pursuant to actual notice. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeal and the district court that this non-capital felony prosecution had to be quashed because the State failed to timely commence the trial. View "Louisiana v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Defendant David Brown was indicted by grand jury for the first degree murder of Captain David Knapps, a correctional officer at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. Defendant was tried by jury which found defendant guilty as charged and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, recommended a sentence of death. Defendant was sentenced accordingly. Defendant raises 23 assignments of error on automatic appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending his conviction and sentence should have been reversed. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Supreme Court found no merit in any of the contentions defendant raised in his appeal. Therefore, defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Lousiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2015, applicant Elizabeth Trahan was involved in a tragic automobile accident, which resulted in a fatality. Applicant and her boyfriend were in a Dodge Charger, which was traveling north at 72 mph in the left lane on Highway 167 between Maurice and Abbeville, Lousiana. Motorcyclist Carl Johnson passed them on the right, switched into the left lane in front of them, and then braked, apparently intending to turn left across the highway median. Skid marks showed that the driver of the Charger attempted to stop. The Charger collided with the motorcycle and Johnson was killed. A jury found applicant guilty of vehicular homicide, for which the trial court sentenced her to 15 years imprisonment at hard labor, with all but six years of the sentence suspended, and with three years of active supervised probation. Regarding whether the State proved that applicant’s impairment was a contributing factor, the court of appeal acknowledged that metabolites detected in applicant’s blood and urine, standing alone, did “not allow the jury to assume the defendant was impaired or that the presence of those substances was a contributing factor in the accident.” However, the court of appeal found that the jury could consider additional circumstances, such as the fact that applicant exceeded the speed limit and was unable to stop in time to avoid the accident, to conclude that drugs impaired her driving and thus contributed to the accident. The dissent observed that expert testimony in conjunction with evidence of behavioral manifestations of intoxication was ordinarily used to establish that a driver was impaired, and no such evidence was offered by the State in this case. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' dissent that a jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence presented at trial that applicant was impaired or that her impairment was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, and therefore the conviction could not survive appellate review under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Because a rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude, without speculating, that applicant’s ingestion of controlled dangerous substances was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, the Supreme Court concluded applicant was entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40(1981). Accordingly, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal, vacated applicant’s conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide, and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Louisiana v. Trahan" on Justia Law

Respondent Noe Aguliar-Benitez was convicted by jury of attempted aggravated rape and sexual battery. The evidence presented at trial established that respondent, while a guest in the home, sexually abused an 8-year-old child who resided there. As part of that abuse, he raped or attempted to rape her. Respondent claimed the offenses occurred during a single incident; the victim described repeated abuse. The trial court sentenced respondent to serve the statutory maximum sentences of 50 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted aggravated rape and 99 years imprisonment at hard labor for sexual battery, to run concurrently and without parole eligibility. The court of appeal vacated the sentences, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to rule on respondent’s motion for new trial before resentencing. On remand, the trial court denied respondent’s motion for new trial and resentenced him to the same terms of imprisonment. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences as unconstitutionally excessive, and remanded for resentencing a second time. On remand, the trial court resentenced respondent to serve 40 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted aggravated rape and 75 years imprisonment at hard labor for sexual battery, to run concurrently and without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the 40-year sentence for attempted aggravated rape, but vacated the 75-year sentence for sexual battery as unconstitutionally excessive, and remanded for resentencing a third time. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to determine whether the trial court, after the second remand, abused its discretion in imposing a sentence for sexual battery that, while it was 24 years less than the sentence originally imposed, was still 20 years greater than the maximum recommended by the court of appeal. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing following the second remand. Furthermore, the Court respectfully disagreed with the court of appeal’s emphasis on whether the trial court articulated a sufficient justification for departing from the court of appeal’s recommended sentencing range. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in part and reinstated the 75-year sentence imposed by the trial court for sexual battery. View "Louisiana v. Aguliar-Benitez" on Justia Law

Calcasieu Parish School Board Sales & Use Tax Department and Kimberly Tyree, in her capacity as Administrator thereof (collectively, “CPSB”) appealed the court of appeal's declaration that 2016 Act No. 3 (“Act 3”) was unconstitutional for violating La. Const. Art. VII, section 2 (the “Tax Limitation Clause”). Appellee Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) owned and operated an electrical power generating facility in Lake Charles in which it produced multiple products: electricity, steam, and ash. After not taxing NISCO for its limestone purchases for many years, the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”) and CPSB sued NISCO to collect unpaid taxes for its limestone purchases between 2005 and 2012. The suit went before the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bridges v. Nelson Indus. Steam Co., 190 So. 3d 276 (“NISCO I”), in which the Court determined the limestone purchases were excluded from sales tax of sales at retail under the “further processing exclusion” as then set forth in La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa). Before NISCO I was final, Act 3 was passed into law in the 2016 Second Extraordinary Session with less than a two-thirds favorable vote of the members of both houses of the Legislature. Following legislative amendments, CPSB brought the underlying lawsuit against NISCO to collect sales taxes on its limestone purchases retroactively. The court of appeal held that Act 3 was a “new tax” and therefore unconstitutional under the Tax Limitation Clause for failure to garner a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Calcasieu Parish School Bd. Sales & Use Dept., et al. v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law