Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a 2016 road rage incident that led to the shooting death of Joseph McKnight. A grand jury indicted the defendant Ronald Gasser for second degree murder. The case proceeded to a trial before a twelve-person jury in January, 2018. The jury was presented with a verdict sheet listing the crime of second degree murder and three responsive verdicts: guilty of manslaughter, guilty of negligent homicide and not guilty. By a vote of ten to two, the jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of manslaughter and defendant was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor. While defendant's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), holding that non-unanimous jury verdicts in state felony cases were unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court then granted defendant’s writ application and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for patent review based on Ramos. Thereafter, and in accordance with Ramos, the Fifth Circuit found that defendant’s non-unanimous verdict entitled him to a new trial, vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to review when a non-unanimous jury finds a defendant guilty of a lesser, statutorily responsive verdict to a charged offense, valid at the time of its rendering, if the conviction was later set aside as unconstitutional, did double jeopardy preclude the State from retrying the defendant on the originally charged offense? The lower courts found that it did, and the Supreme Court agreed: double jeopardy barred the reinstatement and retrial of a defendant on a higher charge when he was lawfully convicted of a lesser included offense, even though the conviction was later vacated. The Court further agreed with the lower courts that, in this case, defendant’s conviction of a lesser included offense operated as an implied acquittal of the higher charge. View "Louisiana v. Gasser" on Justia Law

Defendant Chrystal Clues-Alexander was indicted for the second degree murder of her husband. She made two motions to declare former La.C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional, and require a unanimous jury at trial, which the district court denied. In 2018, she pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She pleaded guilty unconditionally and did not reserve any issues for review pursuant to Louisiana v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeal erred in ruling that defendant was entitled to withdraw her guilty plea based on Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 583, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020). At the time defendant pleaded guilty, the district court advised her that she had the right to a jury trial. After she pleaded guilty, the United States Supreme Court announced a new rule of criminal procedure in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense. The Louisiana Court found that this jurisprudential development subsequent to defendant’s knowing and voluntary plea did not render her plea involuntary or unknowing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the district court’s ruling, which denied defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. View "Louisiana v. Clues-Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant Mark Spell was the pastor of a church in Central, Louisiana. On March 31, 2020, he was issued six misdemeanor citations for violating two executive orders issued by Louisiana Governor Edwards in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Louisiana Supreme Court found certain provisions of those two executive orders, as applied to defendant, violated his fundamental right to exercise religion, did not survive strict scrutiny, and were thus unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Spell" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Cemetery Board (“LCB”) challenged a district court’s judgment finding Louisiana Administrative Code 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. Whether the Louisiana Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction was raised as an issue in an Answer to Appeal filed by appellees, Westlawn Cemeteries, L.L.C. and the Trustees of the Westlawn Memorial Park Perpetual Care Trust Fund. The Supreme Court determined it did not have appellate jurisdiction in this case because the LCB was not a “governing body” and did not exercise “legislative functions.” Its rules and regulations, therefore, were not “laws” for which appellate jurisdiction would lie with the Supreme Court. However, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to "avoid further delay, and is in the interest of judicial economy." The Court found that the trial court properly found LAC 46:XIII.1503 C to be unconstitutional. "As the only issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Rule, no purpose would be served by remanding this case to the appellate court before review would inevitably be sought in this Court." View "Westlawn Cemeteries, LLC v. Louisiana Cemetery Board" on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish directly appealed a trial court’s judgment finding that Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36-320, et seq., titled, “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”), was unconstitutional. After receiving notices of alleged violations of Section 36-320, et seq., of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, petitioners filed a class action Petition for Damages and Declaratory Judgment. They asserted multiple arguments against the SBSEP, including arguments based on violations of the Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter and violations of Louisiana statutory law. Petitioners sought a judgment declaring Section 36-320, et seq. unconstitutional and the return of the fines they paid pursuant to the violations. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding Section 36-320, et seq., unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5(G) and Article VIII, Section 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. View "Mellor, et al. v. Parish of Jefferson" on Justia Law

This summary judgment matter arose from a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration (amongst other things) that defendant First Guaranty Bank (the “Bank”) applied an incorrect interest rate and thus miscalculated the principal owed on a Promissory Note executed by borrower-petitioner Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. (“Leisure”) in favor of the Bank in December 1991 (the “Note”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Leisure’s writ application to determine whether the court of appeal erred in applying the “voluntary payment doctrine” to hold that Leisure was estopped from recovering payments voluntarily made, regardless of whether owed. In addition, the Court reviewed whether the court of appeal erred in determining the Note presented an alternative obligation as to the Prime Rate interest structure for years 11 through 30 of its repayment, whether it erred in imposing its own interest rate structure during that period, and whether the Bank’s prescription arguments preclude Leisure’s recovery of any interest paid and not due between 2001 and 2013. Finding the “voluntary payment doctrine” contravened the Louisiana Civil Code, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the portion of the district court’s judgment denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the Bank as to the voluntary payment affirmative defense; (2) dismissed Leisure’s claim for declaratory relief as to the interest it voluntary paid the Bank between 2001 and 2013; and (3) rendered judgment ordering the Bank to repay Leisure “any overcharge of interest in excess of the prime rate that Leisure paid on the [Note] since the filing of its suit on October 7, 2013, together with interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid.” Finding that the Note set forth an “alternative obligation,” the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the district court decree that Leisure was entitled to select the Prime Rate structure pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1810; and (2) reversed the district court’s declaration that Leisure paid all indebtedness owed to the Bank on the Note as of June 28, 2015, and was owed return of all amounts paid thereafter. The case was remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the Bank’s arguments on appeal that were pretermitted by the court of appeal opinion and were not in conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First Guaranty Bank" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to determine whether the State carried its heavy burden of showing that the two-year limitations period to commence trial on defendant Joseph Schmidt's non-capital felony charges was interrupted by defendant’s failure “to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears in the record.” After careful review, the Supreme Court found the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the statute of limitations was tolled. Specifically, the Court found no proof in the record that defendant failed to appear at a proceeding in 1995 pursuant to actual notice. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeal and the district court that this non-capital felony prosecution had to be quashed because the State failed to timely commence the trial. View "Louisiana v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Defendant David Brown was indicted by grand jury for the first degree murder of Captain David Knapps, a correctional officer at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. Defendant was tried by jury which found defendant guilty as charged and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, recommended a sentence of death. Defendant was sentenced accordingly. Defendant raises 23 assignments of error on automatic appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending his conviction and sentence should have been reversed. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Supreme Court found no merit in any of the contentions defendant raised in his appeal. Therefore, defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Lousiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2015, applicant Elizabeth Trahan was involved in a tragic automobile accident, which resulted in a fatality. Applicant and her boyfriend were in a Dodge Charger, which was traveling north at 72 mph in the left lane on Highway 167 between Maurice and Abbeville, Lousiana. Motorcyclist Carl Johnson passed them on the right, switched into the left lane in front of them, and then braked, apparently intending to turn left across the highway median. Skid marks showed that the driver of the Charger attempted to stop. The Charger collided with the motorcycle and Johnson was killed. A jury found applicant guilty of vehicular homicide, for which the trial court sentenced her to 15 years imprisonment at hard labor, with all but six years of the sentence suspended, and with three years of active supervised probation. Regarding whether the State proved that applicant’s impairment was a contributing factor, the court of appeal acknowledged that metabolites detected in applicant’s blood and urine, standing alone, did “not allow the jury to assume the defendant was impaired or that the presence of those substances was a contributing factor in the accident.” However, the court of appeal found that the jury could consider additional circumstances, such as the fact that applicant exceeded the speed limit and was unable to stop in time to avoid the accident, to conclude that drugs impaired her driving and thus contributed to the accident. The dissent observed that expert testimony in conjunction with evidence of behavioral manifestations of intoxication was ordinarily used to establish that a driver was impaired, and no such evidence was offered by the State in this case. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' dissent that a jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence presented at trial that applicant was impaired or that her impairment was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, and therefore the conviction could not survive appellate review under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Because a rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude, without speculating, that applicant’s ingestion of controlled dangerous substances was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, the Supreme Court concluded applicant was entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40(1981). Accordingly, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal, vacated applicant’s conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide, and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Louisiana v. Trahan" on Justia Law