Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2019, two armed residents of New Orleans, Zelda and Danny Townsend, confronted a young Black male, later identified as Emanuel Pipkins, who was inside their vehicle. The Townsends blocked the suspect from leaving. As a gray Acura drove by, a male voice shouted “just shoot ’em,” and Pipkins began shooting. The Townsends returned fire. Zelda Townsend died. Danny Townsend sustained a gunshot wound in an arm. Pipkins also sustained gunshot wounds but managed to flee. Pipkins later arrived at Tulane Medical Center with injuries to his back and foot. His girlfriend, defendant Byrielle Hebert, and his aunt accompanied him. Defendant eventually admitted to police she was with Pipkins when she witnessed the shootout with the Townsends. She would later be indicted by a grand jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and other felony offenses. After she was restored to competency, defendant filed a motion to suppress her pre-arrest statements, arguing that they flowed from an illegal arrest; they were made after she invoked her right to remain silent; she did not waive her Miranda rights; and her statements were made under duress and induced by false promises. The trial court, although noting its reservations about the tactics used by the detectives, denied the motion because it found that defendant’s eventual Miranda waiver was sufficiently attenuated from defendant’s earlier invocations of her right to remain silent. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, and vacated the trial court’s ruling, both of which denied defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Hebert" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to address the specific question of whether there was a cause of action for a writ of mandamus compelling a municipality to satisfy a judgment for back wages owed to its firefighter employees. Based on the ministerial nature of the statutorily and constitutionally mandated duty of the municipality to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment, the Court found the lower courts erred in sustaining the exception of no cause of action. View "Lowther et al. v. Town of Bastrop" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review in this case centered on whether an award of attorney fees and other litigation costs to defendant landowners in an expropriation proceeding could be upheld under current law. The underlying matter arose from the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline. As part of the project, Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC (“BBP”), sought to acquire servitudes on the property of various landowners. The specific piece of property at the center of this litigation is approximately 38 acres of land (“the property”). Prior to reaching servitude agreements with all individuals with an ownership interest in this particular parcel of land, BBP began pipeline construction. Peter Aaslestad, one of the property owners, filed suit against BBP in order to enjoin BBP from further construction. BBP later stipulated that it would remain off the property as of September 10, 2018. However, the pipeline construction was more than 90% complete at that time. Meanwhile, in late July 2018, after it had begun construction on the property, BBP filed expropriation litigation against hundreds of property owners with whom servitude agreements could not be reached, including Mr. Aaslestad, Katherine Aaslestad, and Theda Larson Wright (collectively referred to as “defendants”). In response, defendants filed a reconventional demand against BBP, alleging BPP trespassed on their property and violated due process by proceeding with construction of the pipeline prior to a judgment of expropriation. The matter proceeded to a trial wherein the trial court granted BBP’s petition for expropriation, finding the expropriation served a public and necessary purpose. The trial court also granted defendants’ reconventional demand, finding that BBP trespassed on defendants’ property prior to obtaining permission or legal authority. The trial court ultimately awarded each defendant $75.00 for the expropriation and another $75.00 in trespass damages. The court of appeal reversed in part: upholding the constitutionality of the expropriation process, but finding that BBP violated defendants’ due process rights and awarded $10,000.00 to each defendant for trespass, and granted attorney fees. The Supreme Court determined the award of fees was constitutional, and upheld the Court of Appeal. View "Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC v. 38.00 Acres, More or Less, Located in St. Martin Parish et al." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year old Donasty Cohen was charged with second-degree murder for the death of her 27-day-old infant son. After trial, a jury found her guilty of manslaughter. The district court sentenced her to serve 17 years imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed after deleting the restriction on eligibility for parole. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, defendant argued only that the district court erred in denying her challenge for cause of one prospective juror. In the course of reviewing the record, it became apparent that the verdict in this case was non-unanimous. The sealed jury polling slips contained in the record showed defendant was found guilty of manslaughter by vote of 11-1. The State conceded the verdict was not unanimous. The Court held defendant was entitled to a new trial. The appellate court's judgment was reversed, the conviction and sentence vacated, and the matter remanded fur further proceedings. View "Lousiana v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Defendant Jamal Washington was indicted for racketeering; human trafficking; and conspiracy to commit human trafficking. With regard to racketeering, the indictment alleged that defendant, his codefendants, and other persons, known and unknown, engaged in conduct that furthered a criminal enterprise involved in narcotics distribution and prostitution. Defendant pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State in exchange dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to forego recidivist sentence enhancement. The district court sentenced defendant in conformity with the plea agreement to serve eight years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal affirmed. Thereafter, defendant sought clarification that the court had not designated the offense as a crime of violence. A minute entry indicated that the district court had designated the offense as a crime of violence. However, no such designation was evident in the sentencing transcript. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeal determined that racketeering was not a crime of violence because it was not enumerated as such in La. R.S. 14:2(B), and because the use (or attempted use) of physical force was not an element of racketeering, as that crime was defined by statute. Therefore, the court of appeal found that the crime was incorrectly designated as a crime of violence in the district court's minute entry. The Louisiana Supreme Court found defendant did not admit to human trafficking when he pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State dismissed the charge of human trafficking. Defendant also did not admit that he personally performed any violent acts in the factual basis for his guilty plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal, which reversed the district court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to correct the sentencing minute entry to reflect that the offense was not designated as a crime of violence, and which remanded to the district court for correction of the minute entry. View "Washington v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Ronald Sewell, a 20-year-old Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree robbery and pleaded guilty as charged to possession of a stolen firearm. The district court sentenced him to serve three years imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility for each first degree robbery, and one year imprisonment at hard labor for possession of a stolen firearm, with the sentences to run concurrently. After he served his sentences, the federal Government commenced removal proceedings based on these felony guilty pleas. Sewell filed an application for post-conviction relief in which he contended the guilty pleas had to be set aside because counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that they would result in his removal from the United States. Sewell’s former counsel testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing stating she was unaware that Sewell was not a United States citizen, and that she would have advised him of the possibility of removal if she had known his status as a noncitizen. Former counsel also testified that Sewell spoke English fluently and without an accent, and that he never informed her that he was born outside of the United States. The judge who presided over the post-conviction evidentiary hearing also accepted the guilty pleas. The judge indicated that she recalled the case and agreed that nothing about Sewell would have prompted anyone to question whether he was a United States citizen. Nonetheless, the district court granted Sewell’s application for post-conviction relief and ordered that his guilty pleas be withdrawn. The court noted that no one had advised defendant of the strong likelihood he would be removed from the United States based on his guilty pleas, the plea form did not contain any place to indicate citizenship, and therefore the court found it incumbent upon it to grant the relief requested. The State appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that under the circumstances here, Sewell failed to carry his burden post-conviction that his attorney’s failure to inquire into his citizenship fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, the district court erred in granting Sewell’s application for post-conviction relief and in ordering that Sewell’s guilty pleas be withdrawn. Accordingly, the State’s application was granted and the rulings of the courts below reversed. Sewell’s guilty pleas were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Sewell" on Justia Law

Defendant Gemini Insurance Company appealed a district court's holding La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” and overruling the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of no right of action. At issue was whether plaintiffs Daniel Goins and David Watts, two adult children who were given in adoption as minors, had a right to bring wrongful death and survival actions stemming from the deaths of their biological father and his two minor children, who were not given in adoption, and were plaintiffs’ biological half-siblings. After a de novo review, based on the clear and unambiguous wording of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded Goins and Watts were “children of the deceased” and “brothers of the deceased” who were permitted to bring wrongful death and survival actions arising from the death of their biological father and half-siblings. In view of the Court's holding that plaintiffs had a right to assert survival and wrongful death actions, the Court declined to address their argument that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption. View "Rismiller v. Gemini Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Tyrone Johnson pled guilty as charged to distribution of methamphetamine, for which he received a 23 year sentence of imprisonment at hard labor in exchange for the State promising not to file a habitual offender bill of information and seek a life sentence. The court of appeal vacated the plea and sentence because it found defendant was denied his right to counsel of choice when the district court refused on Friday to continue the Monday trial date to allow defendant additional time in which to hire a new attorney. Under the circumstances of this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the court of appeal erred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reinstated the guilty plea and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Revish was found guilty of the second degree murder of Latrell Davis and the attempted second degree murder of Jamond Rougeau. All three were in Rougeau’s parked vehicle on March 26, 2012, in Baton Rouge when violence erupted from a dispute over cocaine. Rougeau’s weapon was used to shoot Rougeau and Davis. Rougeau identified defendant as the shooter. Defendant, however, turned himself in to police, admitted he shot Rougeau and Davis, but claimed he did so in self-defense. The district court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility for second degree murder and 25 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted second degree murder. The court of appeal vacated the convictions and sentences because it found trial counsel provided ineffective assistance sufficient to deprive defendant of a fair trial by failing to object to a defective jury instruction on self-defense. The court of appeal remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial and after several delays, defendant moved to quash the indictment in which he contended the State failed to timely commence the new trial. In opposing this motion, the State argued that when the court of appeal’s order of a new trial became final, the slate was wiped clean, the clock restarted, and the State had a new two-year period to commence trial. The parties also disputed whether the time to commence trial was interrupted by the filing of various motions, and, if so, when the interruptions ceased. The district court rejected the State’s interpretation of Articles 578 and 582 and granted defendant’s motion to quash. The State appealed. Finding that the State miscalculated the time afforded by statute to retry a defendant following mistrial, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Revish" on Justia Law

Defendant Margaret Stockstill killed Cody Couch during an alcohol-fueled argument and physical fight in the home of Kristin Copeland on April 14, 2017, in Folsom, Louisiana. Couch and Copeland had a five-month-old daughter together, who was present in the home during the conflict along with Copeland’s six-year-old son. The conflict began when Couch, who had a pending DWI charge, borrowed defendant’s car to go out drinking with friends rather than spend the evening at home with Copeland. After Couch left, Copeland drank, complained to defendant about him, and angrily called and texted him at the bar repeatedly. Copeland set some clothing on fire in the yard and sent him a picture of it. Copeland told Couch not to return that night, piled some of his belongings on the porch, and locked him out. Couch eventually returned, entering through the back door. He refused to leave and the conflict escalated. Couch and the two women argued and fought. They fought throughout the home and broke furniture, including a crib with the youngest child still in it. The fight ended when defendant shot Couch once at close range. Defendant was indicted for second degree murder; she claimed self-defense. Defendant was ultimately convicted as charged, for which she was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without being eligible for parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found there was a "reasonable possibility" that erroneously admitted evidence could have contributed to the jury’s decision to reject defendant’s claim that she acted in defense of herself or another, and to the jury’s decision to return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder rather than a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The appellate court's ruling was reversed and the sentence vacated. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Stockstill" on Justia Law