Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned an undivided five-sixths interest of land on which they executed an oil and gas lease to Prestige Exploration, Inc. Plaintiffs ownership interests were managed by Regions Bank who helped negotiate the terms of the lease. Prestige acquired the lease on behalf of Defendant Matador Resources Company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the extension of that lease. Plaintiffs sought to rescind or reform the extension agreement to make it applicable only to a portion of their property. After several preliminary partial summary judgment rulings, a jury found in favor of Defendant for the extension to cover the entirety of Plaintiffs' land interest. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reformed the lease to extend only to the portion of land for which Plaintiffs asked. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs were precluded from rescinding the agreement on "excusable error." Further, the Court found no manifest error in the district court proceedings. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment in its entirety. View "Peironnet v. Matador Resources Co." on Justia Law

In October 2003, insurance agency Plaintiff Kennedy, Lewis, Renton & Associates, Inc. ("KLR"), secured a property insurance policy with Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") for Plaintiff Kirk Prest on property located in Boothville, Plaquemines Parish. Hurricane Ivan damaged Plaintiffs' buildings in 2004. Plaintiffs subsequently made repairs and undertook new construction on the property insured by Citizens. Because they were penalized for being underinsured for their losses in Hurricane Ivan, Plaintiffs wanted to ensure their property was properly covered by sufficient amounts of insurance in the future. The total amount of insurance coverage on the property was $350,000. As each phase of reconstruction and expansion was completed, Plaintiffs requested increased coverage on their buildings. There was a mistake on the form sent requesting increased coverage, in that the words "renew policy" were typed in rather than "increasing coverage." However, the comments immediately below correctly described the increased amounts of coverage on the buildings requested by the policy holder. Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, eleven days after an August 2005 policy change request. At that time, Plaintiffs believed they had a total of $540,000 in insurance coverage on their property. The KMR insurance agent assisting Plaintiffs in requesting the coverage increases also believed Plaintiffs had coverage in that amount. In May 2006, Citizens sent a letter to Plaintiffs, advising them the policy had been reviewed and the requested increases in the policy limits would not be honored. According to Citizens, Plaintiffs only had the original $350,000 worth of coverage on their property. Plaintiffs filed suit against Citizens, seeking payment of the full policy amounts, including the amount of the requested coverage increases, attorney fees and penalties. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also sought recovery from KLR. After engaging in pretrial discovery, Plaintiffs and Citizens entered into a settlement agreement in late 2008. Without admitting liability, Citizens settled the claims against it for a total of $540,000 from Citizens. After trial on the merits against KLR, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding KLR was negligent in its handling of its clients' requests for coverage increases. KLR appealed both the finding of liability and the award of damages. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence in part, holding there was manifest error in the trial court's finding the insurance agency failed to exercise reasonable diligence with regard to a July 2005 request for increased coverage. The Supreme Court granted KLR's writ, primarily to determine the correctness of the trial court's award of general damages. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages and reversed that portion of the damage award. View "Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

In February of 2009, a vehicle driven by Antoine Ellis ran a stop sign and struck a vehicle owned and operated by Ann Bernard. Norell Bernard and Andrea Bernard were guest passengers in Ann Bernard's vehicle at the time of the accident. Mr. Ellis was uninsured, and Ann, Norell and Andrea Bernard all filed suit against Imperial (Ann Bernard's insurer) for UM coverage. While Imperial did not dispute its named insured Ann Bernard was entitled to UM coverage, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Norell and Andrea Bernard's claims on the basis that the guest passengers were not residents of Ann Bernard's household, and therefore did not meet the definition of "insured person" under the terms of the insurance policy for UM coverage. Imperial challenged the court rulings that denied the insurer summary judgment on that issue. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were liability insureds under the Imperial policy and therefore entitled to UM coverage. Thus, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, denying Imperial's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Bernard v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend a ten year liberative prescriptive period applicable to an action by a mineral interest owner against the operator of a unit well who failed to pay the owner share of the proceeds for mineral production. Plaintiff James Wells filed suit after being contacted by a landman concerning leasing of his mineral interest in lands inherited from his parents. In the 1950s, Plaintiff's parents sold the land but reserved the mineral interests. Plaintiff's mother executed a mineral lease which was released a few years later because the well drilled resulted in a dry hole. However, the landowners executed their own mineral lease, which achieved production in 1965, and continued producing until 2007. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Donald Zadeck and Zadeck Energy Group and several other companies who were allegedly conducting oil and gas exploration and production activities from his unleased unitized acreage without tendering to him (or his parents) their rightful share of proceeds from the production. In response, Zadeck filed a Peremptory Exception of Prescription, urging that Plaintiff's claim to recover payments was a quasi contract that prescribed ten years from Zadeck's successor's cessation of involvement with the "dry hole." Plaintiff argued that the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend the running of prescription since he had no knowledge of the existence of the mineral interests or production until December 2008. Plaintiff contended that his ignorance was not attributable to any fault of his own, and he clearly exercised due diligence in discovering the relevant facts once he learned from the landman that he owned the mineral interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the doctrine of contra non valentem applied to suspend the running of prescription because the mineral interest owners did not know nor reasonably should they have known of the mineral production until December 2008. View "Wells v. Zadeck Energy Group" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case arose in connection with a motion to rank creditors in a suit for executory process. DDS Construction, LLC developed a subdivision in Reserve. To fund that development, DDS obtained various loans from First National Bank. To secure its repayment of those loans, DDS granted First National a "Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage" over individual lots located in the subdivision. One property, Lot 8 Square A, was at the center of this controversy. The district court held a notarial act which cancelled the lot's mortgage could be corrected by an act of correction under La. R.S. 35:2.1 and First National, the lender which erroneously cancelled the mortgage, maintained its rank relative to a subsequent mortgage under the statute's provisions. The court of appeal disagreed, holding that under these facts the subsequent mortgage primed the mortgage by the First National, which must be ranked as of the time of the act of correction. After review, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal erred and reversed, reinstating the ruling of the district court. View "First National Bank v. DDS Construction" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff Laurie Jenkins entered into a contract with Chet Medlock for the sale, transfer and delivery of a metal building. The purchase price was to be paid in three equal installments. After the building was completed, issues arose regarding the quality of work. Plaintiff contacted Defendant Larry Starns who wrote a letter to Medlock on her behalf, pointing out several complaints Plaintiff had with the building. Medlock sued Plaintiff for breach of contract; she was personally served. Defendant was in contact with Medlock's attorney, and believed there was an informal agreement for an extension of time to file responsive pleadings. When no answer was filed, Medlock obtained a default judgment against Plaintiff. Plaintiff notified Defendant of the judgment, to which he filed a petition to annul the judgment. Medlock responded arguing insufficiency of service and improper venue. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant made an appearance at court. The trial court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff's suit. Ultimately the court issued a judgment of garnishment against Plaintiff's bank account. Plaintiff filed suit against her attorney alleging legal malpractice, which she lost. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court and court of appeal erred in applying the "continuous representation rule" to suspend the commencement of the one-year peremptive period in La. R.S. 9:5605 until Defendant's efforts to remedy his negligence had concluded. The court of appeal's judgment was reversed. View "Jenkins v. Starns" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred in reversing a trial court's denial of Harold Wright's exception of res judicata. Mr. Wright was paralyzed and incapacitated by a medical accident in 1973. He received $1.7 million in damages. The court declared Mr. Wright an interdict and appointed his wife as his curatrix. In conjunction with the proceeding, the court issued an order allowing the curatrix to invest the damages in long-term bonds. No portion of the Mr. Wright's capital estate could be withdrawn from any long range investments without specific orders from the court. Through his investment bank Defendant A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (and with the court's permission), Mr. Wright received disbursements from the invested damages award. In 2002, Mrs. Wright sued Defendant alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, she argued that A.G. Edwards and its agents misappropriated the entire $1.7 million and disbursed principal in violation of the court's order. Furthermore, Mrs. Wright alleged that when one of her account managers left A.G. Edwards to work for Morgan Stanley, he took Mr. Wright's remaining principal with him. The dispute went to arbitration. While pending, Mr. Wright died, thereby terminating the interdiction proceeding. An arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Defendants. Mr. Wright's estate then filed a motion with the district court, and Defendants filed several exceptions including an exception of res judicata where they contended the arbitration proceeding precluded further court action. The trial court denied the exception, and the appellate court reversed, dismissing the estate's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration award was unconfirmed, and therefore did not have a preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interdiction of Harold Wright" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court arose from the sale of land sold to Plaintiff Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. who later discovered the land was allegedly contaminated with radioactive material. Plaintiff sued the former landowners and the oil and trucking companies allegedly responsible for the contamination. The oil and trucking companies moved to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellate court initially affirmed the dismissal, but reversed its own decision after rehearing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a subsequent purchaser of property has the right to sue a third party for non-apparent property damage inflicted before the property sells absent an assignment or subrogation to that right. After review, the Court found that the "fundamentals of Louisiana property law compel the conclusion" that such a right of action is not permitted. "Instead, the subsequent purchaser has the right to seek rescission of the sale, reduction of the purchase price or other legal remedies." The Court found that the appellate court erred in reversing itself on rehearing, and reinstated the ruling of the district court. View "Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp." on Justia Law