Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case presents the res nova issue of whether an attorney, representing an incarcerated felon, is subject to the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1, when making a public records request to obtain information relative to a potential post-conviction relief application. Both the district court and the appellate court in this case held that the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1 were applicable to the public records request of petitioner, attorney James Boren, reasoning, in essence, that Mr. Boren stood in the shoes of his client, Stephan Bergeron, an incarcerated felon who had exhausted his appellate remedies. Therefore, the lower courts ruled that Boren was required to satisfy the necessary inquiries of the custodian (here, the St. Landry Parish District Attorney) to ascertain “if the request of any such individual in custody for a felony conviction is limited to grounds upon which such individual may file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3,” as provided by La. R.S. 44:31.1. Because the defendant/custodian denied Boren’s public records request in this case on the basis of La. R.S. 44:31.1, for his failure to answer an inquiry as to “the grounds for post-conviction relief” to be put forth on behalf of Bergeron, the denial was improper. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boren v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged “agreement not to prosecute,” under which the defense claimed that in exchange for the defense providing the names of witnesses who would testify before the grand jury, the sharing of defense attorney work product, and the waiving of the spousal privilege as to the grand jury testimony of the defendant’s wife, the prosecution agreed to abide by the grand jury indictment, whether manslaughter or second degree murder. When the grand jury returned a manslaughter indictment, the State nevertheless presented the case to the grand jury again, approximately seven-and-one-half months after the first indictment, and procured an indictment for second degree murder. The defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging the prosecution failed to abide by the agreement. The district court granted the motion, quashing the second degree murder indictment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed. Finding that the prosecution did not prove it had a valid justification to withdraw from its agreement not to prosecute during the hearing on the motion to quash held in this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that, since there was no factual or legal error in the district court ruling, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash the second degree murder indictment, and the appellate court erred in reversing the district court decision. View "Louisiana v. Karey" on Justia Law

Defendant Thayer Green was adjudicated a third felony offender and sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law to a term of life in prison without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, for a home invasion committed as a juvenile. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) applied to an enhanced single sentence of life in prison without parole under the habitual offender statute. The Louisiana Court held Graham was, indeed, applicable to a defendant who was adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole for an offense committed as a juvenile. Therefore, the Court amended defendant’s life sentence under the Habitual Offender Law to delete the restriction on parole eligibility and directed the Department of Corrections to revise defendant’s prison masters according to the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4(D) to reflect an eligibility date for consideration by the Board of Parole. View "Louisiana v. Green" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review in two consolidated matters to examine the timeliness of a prosecution following defendant’s failure to appear in court after receiving actual notice and whether the court of appeal erroneously reversed the trial court’s ruling. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash, finding the prosecution untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling, which reversed the quashal and found the State had no affirmative duty to locate an absent defendant, and remanded these cases to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review in this case was whether the court of appeal correctly found the evidence insufficient to support the jury’s determination that defendant committed money laundering pursuant to R.S. 14:230(B)(2), in conjunction with his scheme to fraudulently overbill Union Pacific Railroad for diesel fuel. The Court found that the jury rationally concluded that defendant knowingly gave, transferred, maintained an interest in, and/or otherwise made available things of value which he knew to be for the purpose of committing or furthering the commission of the criminal overbilling scheme. The Court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded this case to the court of appeal for consideration of the two remaining grounds in the motion for post-judgment verdict of acquittal. View "Louisiana v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Gary Howard was arrested in his girlfriend’s home pursuant to an arrest warrant for violating his probation and parole. Officers had received a tip that defendant could be found at that location, which included an allegation that he possessed a firearm and was involved in narcotics distribution. In this matter, the issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether the evidence presented at trial reasonably permitted a finding that defendant possessed 18 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute it. The Court found that, while the quantity of marijuana was small, its packaging in conjunction with other indicia of drug trafficking found nearby, when viewed through the due process lens of “Jackson v. Virginia,” (443 U.S. 307 (1979)), sufficed to exclude the hypothesis of innocence that the marijuana was intended only for personal use. View "Louisiana v. Howard" on Justia Law

Although he bore various diagnoses, the 56-year-old respondent suffered from severe chronic mental illness involving at times paranoia, delusional and disordered thought processes, and mood instability. He had been in and out of psychiatric treatment since he was a teenager. This matter presented interrelated questions of whether persons who are found not guilty of a sex offense by reason of insanity are subject to the sex offender registration and notification requirements of La.R.S. 15:540 et seq., and whether a petition for injunctive relief or for declaratory judgment regarding those requirements must be filed in the manner established by La.R.S. 15:544.1 when it pertains to such persons. Finding that the legislature chose for reasons of public safety to treat persons convicted of a sex offense the same as those found not guilty by reason of insanity for purposes of the sex offender registration and notification law, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in both finding it was the proper forum to hear respondent’s claim and in ruling that respondent be relieved of the obligation to register. View "Louisiana v. Cook" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to determine whether the appellate court erroneously applied the domestic abuse battery statute, La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court determined there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction under the statutory provision requiring that an offender and victim be past or present members of the same household. As interpreted by the appellate court, La. R.S. 14:35.3 required the state to show the offender and victim engaged in a relationship comparable to the civil law concept of “open concubinage.” After that review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court’s requirement that the state prove “open concubinage” between the victim and offender was not grounded in the statute. Moreover, the appellate court’s requirement of proof of “open concubinage” thwarts the broader inquiry into the circumstances of the relationship intended by the legislature. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court’s ruling that the totality of evidence was sufficient to find the victim and offender were part of the same household and, therefore, was sufficient to support the conviction. View "Louisiana v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant Corei Guidry was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, one count of possession with intent to distribute Tramadol, and one count of conspiracy to commit simple escape. The charge of possession with intent to distribute heroin carried the highest sentence: ten to fifty years at hard labor. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court could allow a criminal jury to be informed of the possible mandatory minimum sentence faced by the defendant if, after a conviction on the offense being tried, he were to be sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law. After review, the Court found the district court erred in denying the State’s motion in limine, which sought to disallow the defendant from mentioning in argument the mandatory minimum sentence the defendant could be subject to under the Habitual Offender Law should the State seek to enhance his sentence under that law and should the court find the State has proved all of the elements to warrant enhancement of the sentence. "We find the issue of the possible mandatory minimum sentences that may be imposed if the defendant is convicted and the State successfully pursues enhancement of the sentence under the Habitual Offender law is too attenuated from the guilt phase of trial to be discussed before a jury, because it shifts the focus of the jury from its duty to determine guilt or innocence to issues regarding sentencing, possibly causing confusion of the issues and inviting the jury to speculate as to why a defendant may be facing such a term of imprisonment." View "Louisiana v. Guidry" on Justia Law

Derroceus Abney was murdered on or about February 10, 2007. His body was found on or about February 23, 2007 hidden in an inoperable freezer. Investigators determined that the body had been moved to the freezer immediately after his murder. A fingerprint found at the scene was entered into a national database, and it was determined to be the fingerprint of defendant Channing Gray. Gray was arrested in 2013. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 576 could be applied to render timely the institution of a prosecution against defendant for obstruction of justice, following the dismissal of a prosecution for murder. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to quash the bill of information charging him with obstruction of justice; however, the appellate court granted the defendant’s writ application, granted defendant’s motion to quash, and dismissed the bill of information. The appellate court concluded that the charge of obstruction of justice was not “based on the same facts” as the murder prosecution, contrary to the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 576, and therefore was untimely filed. The Supreme Court disagreed with this, vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court judgment. View "Louisiana v. Gray" on Justia Law