Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following deliberations, a six-person jury found defendant Gerald Dahlem guilty on a fourth offense of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), and the trial court sentenced defendant as a habitual offender to 25 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The court of appeal affirmed both defendant’s conviction and his sentence. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether trial by a jury composed of fewer jurors than required by law was a non-waivable structural defect which required that a defendant’s conviction be reversed and his sentence vacated. Specifically, the narrow question before the Court was whether defendant was denied a fair trial and due process of law because he was, without contemporaneous objection at trial, tried by a six-person jury, instead of a twelve-person jury, on his DWI charge. The Court found that due to defendant’s multiple offender status and subsequent sentence as such, his trial by a six-person jury was not an error requiring his conviction be reversed or his sentence vacated. View "Louisiana v. Dahlem" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Robert Coleman with for the first-degree murder of 70-year-old Julian Brandon, Jr., and the attempted first-degree murder of Brandon’s wife, Alice. A jury later found Coleman guilty and voted for the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court found a “Batson” violation and remanded for a new trial. A second jury also found Coleman guilty and again voted for the death penalty. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence raising 38 assignments of error, variously combined into 21arguments. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any alleged error relative to the issue of guilt. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder conviction. However, the Court found error relative to the state’s failure to provide sufficient notice of evidence of an unadjudicated murder introduced in the penalty phase. Thus, the Court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded this case for a new sentencing hearing. View "Louisiana v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the allotment system of criminal cases in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court when the date of the offense is uncertain, specifically, whether La. Dist. Ct. Rule 14.0 or the defendants’ due process rights are violated by the case allotment system of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, which randomly assigns cases to different District Judges based on the first date of the first alleged offense. Defendants argued the procedure in place at the time of the allotment of their cases was unconstitutional as applied to multi-count, multi-defendant cases, or to cases in which the date of offense is uncertain and in which the prosecutor has discretion to allege the earliest date of a charged offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court’s allotment process was sufficiently random and did not vest the District Attorney with the power to choose the Judge to whom a particular case is assigned, instead tethering judicial assignment to the defendant’s conduct. As defendants presented no evidence of actual manipulation or prejudice, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal granting the motions to quash allotment and ordering re-allotment, reinstate the trial courts’ denials of the defendants’ motions to quash and/or for re-allotment, and remanded these cases to their respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "Lousiana v. Nunez" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to determine whether the lower courts erred in allowing certain expert psychological testimony as to the victim’s intelligence quotient (IQ) and in admitting into evidence a letter written by the expert which contained hearsay evidence. Defendant Vernon Mullins was indicted for the aggravated rape of J.W. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant raised issues he claimed the trial court made that warrant reversal of sentence: (1) allowing Dr. Mark Vigen, the State’s expert psychologist, to present evidence as to the results of IQ testing he did not administer or score violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the lower courts erred in allowing hearsay testimony and the introduction into evidence of a letter Dr. Vigen prepared in advance of trial, both of which were based on information gained from persons who did not testify; (3) the lower courts erred in allowing the introduction of Dr. Vigen’s letter, where the letter contained hearsay, not subject to any exception; and (4) the court of appeal erred in failing to find that the trial court had erred in allowing expert testimony where the State failed to comply with Article 705(B) of the Code of Evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that the letter containing the IQ test results and introduced by the State for the primary purpose of proving an essential element of the crime of aggravated rape contains testimonial statements and therefore was subject to Confrontation Clause requirements. As a result, the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by ruling the letter could be admitted into evidence without testimony. Furthermore, the Court found that the introduction of the letter violated the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions below, vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded this case to the District Court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Defendant Quint Mire shot and killed Julian Gajan in 2011. They were hunting deer out-of-season. Defendant shot the victim three times with a semi-automatic shotgun, striking him in the head, neck, and torso from a distance of approximately 40 to 70 feet. Defendant collected the spent shotgun shells and left without trying to render aid and did not seek help. Defendant then discarded the shotgun shells in a canal. The victim was reported missing the next day. His body was found after a search by state and parish agencies and members of the community. Defendant stood by while others diligently searched and even took steps to divert attention from himself and cast suspicion on others. Defendant later admitted to detectives that he shot and killed the victim. He claimed it was a hunting accident. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant testified at trial, characterizing the shooting as a terrible mistake. When asked why he did not attempt to assist the victim, defendant claimed he had a crippling fear of the dead. The state’s witnesses described the tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim over the years and their various business disputes. The jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for murder, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor for obstruction. The court of appeal, however, vacated defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, entered a judgment of guilty of negligent homicide, and remanded for sentencing because it found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant’s specific intent. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. "The lynchpin of the court of appeal’s analysis was its determination that the state failed to establish a clear motive for the killing. The court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence regarding defendant’s motive for that of the jury, and thus failed to correctly apply the due process standard. Although the court of appeal found the evidence of specific intent equivocal, the jury’s acceptance of this evidence was not shown to be irrational." Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Mire" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, could be applied retroactively to defendant’s criminal misconduct which occurred prior to the effective dates of these statutes. Defendant Lynn Foret, a medical doctor who specialized in orthopedic surgery, pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud, for criminal acts that occurred between 2003 and 2009. The trial court granted Dr. Foret’s declinatory exceptions, dismissing with prejudice, the State's action for penalties under the Sledge Jeansonne Act and dismissed with prejudice causes of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the conduct regulated by the substantive statute was the underlying fraud, rather than the subsequent guilty plea. Therefore, even though the State's cause of action could not have accrued until Dr. Foret pled guilty, application of the Acts nonetheless attached new consequences to his criminal misconduct, which occurred before the Acts became effective. One judge on the appellate panel dissented, reasoning the plain language of the Sledge Jeansonne Act demonstrated it was the guilty plea that gave the State Attorney General the authority to act, not the criminal activity, and because the guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the statute, its application herein would be prospective, not retroactive. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sledge Jeansonne Act was not an impermissible retroactive application of the law. After review, the Supreme Court held that both the Sledge Jeansonne Act and Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act operated prospectively only, applying to causes of action arising after the effective date of each Act. The Court affirmed the court ofappeal ruling finding that the statutes at issue could not be retroactively applied to this defendant’s past criminal conduct. View "Louisiana v. Foret" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Wells was convicted of manslaughter in the 2008 shooting death of Brandon McCue. Defendant met with McCue to purchase marijuana. The two argued when McCue told defendant he had nothing to sell. According to defendant, the victim then pointed a handgun at him and instructed him to leave. Defendant returned to his own vehicle, retrieved his own handgun, then shot and killed McCue because he saw him "messing with the slide of his weapon." Defendant appealed contending, among other claims, that the jury was incorrectly instructed as to what constituted justifiable homicide. The court of appeal found the error in the instruction was not harmless and reversed. The State appealed, and finding that the court of appeal erred in its judgment, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Wells" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Meiko Prevo was arrested in April 2000 in East Baton Rouge Parish for felony crime against nature. Plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor. She was sentenced to ninety days in jail, suspended, and placed on probation for a period of one year, which she successfully completed. Plaintiff was not required to register as a sex offender based on her conviction for misdemeanor criminal mischief. In September 2008, plaintiff was again arrested and charged with distribution of cocaine. She pleaded guilty, received a hard labor suspended sentence, and was placed probation for a period of five years with the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety Division of Probation and Parole. Thereafter, plaintiff reported to her probation officer, David Phillips. Officer Phillips reviewed plaintiff’s criminal history which identified her as a sex offender based on a disposition for crime against nature in April 2000. He also relied on an East Baton Rouge Parish “conviction notification” which showed she was convicted of crime against nature. Based on this information, Officer Phillips advised plaintiff that she was required to register as a sex offender based on what he understood to be her earlier 2000 conviction, and if she failed to do so, she would be sent to jail to serve her five-year sentence. Plaintiff objected to being required to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff registered as a sex offender. On several occasions after registering, plaintiff continued to ask Officer Phillips to further investigate her case, claiming each time that she was not a sex offender and should not have to be registered. According to plaintiff, Officer Phillips took no action on her requests. Plaintiff obtained a copy of her criminal records, confirming she had been convicted of criminal mischief. Assigned a new probation officer, Mike Ware, plaintiff informed him that she had not been convicted of crime against nature and was erroneously required to register as a sex offender. Officer Ware investigated plaintiff’s allegations and obtained information from the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court showing plaintiff’s guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief. Officer Ware informed plaintiff of his findings and began the process of having her removed from the sex offender registry. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections Division of Probation and Parole, alleging that she was "coerced" to register as a sex offender and suffered significant injury as a result. After discovery, the State filed a peremptory exception arguing plaintiff’s petition sounded in tort and was subject to a one-year prescriptive period. A five-judge panel of the court of appeal, with two judges dissenting, reversed the judgment of the district court insofar as it granted the State’s exception of prescription. The State appealed and reversed, finding that the district court was correct in its judgment. View "Prevo v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 1998, an Orleans Parish jury found respondent Ronald Marshall guilty of armed robbery. Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated respondent a second felony offender and sentenced him to 49 and a half years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In 2010, respondent filed a second application for post conviction relief, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeal granted respondent's writ, in part, and denied, in part, concluding the trial court erred by summarily dismissing respondent's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover his attorney's time sheets and to convey the plea offer. The court remanded those claims for consideration at an evidentiary hearing, concluding they were substantively different from respondent's earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, neither repetitive nor successive. The court of appeal also ordered the trial court to grant respondent's motion to issue the subpoena duces tecum to obtain the time sheets. The state filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's ruling, which was the subject of this opinion. Finding that respondent exhausted his right to state collateral review, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of claims for post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. By agreement with the state, defendant admitted the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information and was sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as a second felony offender to 22 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal reversed the conviction because it found the state presented insufficient evidence to prove defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. The court of appeal noted that a guest in defendant’s home, rather than defendant, was found in possession of two small rocks of crack cocaine. The court of appeal acknowledged that defendant admitted to police that he sold cocaine in small quantities but nonetheless determined that a jury could not reasonably infer defendant’s intent to sell those particular "rocks" from the evidence presented by the state. Finding that the evidence presented at trial indeed supported the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ellis" on Justia Law