Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In November 2008, a grand jury indicted defendant Lamondre Tucker for the first degree murder of Tavia Sills. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of death, finding aggravating circumstances that: (1) the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second degree kidnaping; and (2) the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death in accordance with the jury's determination. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising 55 assignments of error, combined into 21 arguments. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Tucker" on Justia Law

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In a cold-case prosecution initiated over 12 years after the victim died, the state charged defendant by grand jury indictment with second degree murder. A jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and sentence after finding that the evidence presented at trial did not support a verdict for either the charged offense or for its responsive verdict of manslaughter, an apparent compromise, and entered a judgment of acquittal. The state appealed. After briefing and argument and independent review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal and affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Robertson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the state’s writ application to determine whether a person required to register as a sex offender as a result of an offense committed as a juvenile under La. R.S. 15:542 had to comply with the sex offender identification required by La. R.S. 32:412(I) or La. R.S. 40:1321(J). After briefing and argument, it became apparent that the deficient record in this matter did not permit the Court to answer that question. Rather, the record made clear that the respondent in this case, K.L.A., was not required by La. R.S. 15:542 to register as a sex offender, though he agreed to do so by plea. Based on the specific facts of this case, the Court found he was also not required to obtain the sex offender identification. The judgments of the district court and the court of appeal were affirmed, solely as to their ruling that respondent himself was not required to obtain the sex offender identification required of sex offender registrants. View "Louisiana in the interest of K.L.A." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Relator’s convictions stemmed from unrelated attacks on two different women in the 1990s: a 1991 attack on a victim identified as K.T.; and a 1994 attack on a victim identified as A.R. In both cases, the investigations went cold. More than a decade later, Orleans Parish law enforcement authorities began DNA testing of its voluminous stored evidence in an effort to resolve cold cases, and a Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) search identified relator as a match for biological evidence collected in both attacks. The district court sentenced him to three terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, 50 years imprisonment at hard labor, 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor, all to be served consecutively to one another. The district court also sentenced relator to undergo the administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (“chemical castration”) pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 and R.S. 15:538. Relator appealed his convictions and sentences, and additionally filed a separate writ application seeking review of the chemical castration order. In an opinion consolidating relator’s appeal and writ application, the Fourth Circuit affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences and denied his application for review of the district court’s judgment ordering relator to undergo chemical castration. Aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping were punishable by life imprisonment and as such are not subject to a prescriptive period per La.C.Cr.P. art. 571; consequently the Supreme Court affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences on those counts. However, the portion of the trial court’s sentence requiring that relator undergo chemical castration pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 (enacted in by the legislature in 2008) was vacated. "Although some remedial regulations may be applied retroactively without violating the constitution, the chemical castration requirements of the new statute are expressly part of the punishment that a court may impose for the sex crimes enumerated in La.R.S. 14:43.6. Because the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of new laws that increase the penalty for which the crime is punishable, and because we find no clearly expressed legislative intent to apply this substantive change in the law retroactively, the portion of the court’s sentence requiring that relator submit to chemical castration is vacated." View "Louisiana ex rel. Nicholson v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

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In an interlocutory appeal, defendant David Koederitz stood accused of second degree battery and false imprisonment. He filed a motion to exclude certain portions of the medical records from Ochsner Hospital in New Orleans, that documented the victim's treatment for a broken nose and black eye from the spring of 2013. According to those records, the victim, defendant’s estranged girlfriend and mother of his child, appeared in the emergency room at Ochsner on February 23, 2013 and “report[ed] physical altercation with boyfriend.” The state alleged that her injuries occurred on February 19, 2013, when the victim paid defendant a visit, and he kept her confined in the following days to allow her injuries to heal. The victim’s initial report and treatment of her physical injuries led to a follow-up session in the hospital with a psychiatrist on February 25, 2013, in which she again identified defendant as her assailant and informed the doctor that “this isn’t the first time he hit me.” Defendant also moved to exclude three letters ostensibly written by the victim, one before the incident that formed the basis of the instant prosecution, and two written months afterwards. The state alleged that the victim subsequently committed suicide in the spring of 2014. Given the unavailability of the victim, the state intended to introduce the medical records and letters in lieu of her live testimony at trial. The trial court granted the defense motions on grounds that introduction of the documentary evidence in substitution of the victim’s live testimony would constitute hearsay in violation of Louisiana’s evidentiary rules and would deny defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The court specifically found that the victim’s statements to the medical personnel at Ochsner were not reasonably related to the treatment and diagnosis of her injuries and were therefore inadmissible as a matter of the hearsay exception. The court further ruled that the letters constituted inadmissible other crimes evidence, even assuming they were properly authenticated and sufficiently connected defendant to the alleged incidents. The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review because it found that the statements made by the victim to her treating physicians identifying the person who struck her repeatedly in the face and broke her nose, as recorded in the certified records from Ochsner Hospital, were admissible under the hearsay exception. The rulings of the courts below were reversed in part and this case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Koederitz" on Justia Law

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On March 10, 2010, the Plaquemines Parish Government (PPG) acquired ownership of the state school located at 251 F. Edward Hebert Blvd. in Plaquemines Parish from the Department of Health and Hospitals. In January 2011, contractors working at the site reported that the power was off and that copper wire had been removed from one or more of the buildings over the weekend. A detective responded to the report and determined that the copper wire to three buildings grouped together in one of the complexes on the grounds had been pulled out “from the breakers, all the way through the walls and through the ceiling.” It appeared that a vehicle had been used to pull the wire out of the three buildings. Less than a month later, a second incident also involving the massive loss of electrical copper wiring occurred at the site in one of the five buildings comprising the Beech Grove complex at the back of the sprawling grounds and farthest away from the entrance on F. Edward Hebert Blvd. Left behind was some sort of remote vehicle key pad access device. Also left behind were spots of blood on the otherwise clean linoleum floor inside the building and samples were taken. The DNA found in the sample was matched to defendant’s DNA profile in CODIS and a warrant for his arrest issued on the basis of the two preliminary DNA matches. Defendant was charged with two counts of simple burglary. After trial before a six-person jury in August 2012, he was found guilty of unauthorized entry of a place of business on count one and not guilty on count two. The trial court sentenced him to six years at hard labor. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit pretermitted other assignments of error and reversed defendant’s conviction and sentence on grounds of insufficient evidence. Finding, however, that the evidence was indeed sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and defendant's conviction and sentence were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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The federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Louisiana Law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: did the dismissal of Scott Lemoine's criminal stalking prosecution (pursuant to the state Code of Criminal Procedure article 691) constitute a bona fide termination in his favor for the purposes of the malicious prosecution suit before the federal appellate court? The Louisiana Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: "a dismissal of a criminal prosecution pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 691 will constitute a bona fide termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff unless the charge is dismissed pursuant to an agreement of compromise, because of misconduct on the part of the accused, or in his behalf for the purpose of preventing trial, out of mercy requested or accepted by the accused, because new proceedings for the same offense have been instituted and have not been terminated favorably to the accused, or when the dismissal is due to the impossibility or impracticality of bringing the accused to trial." View "Lemoine v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

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At a pretrial hearing on the State’s motion to introduce evidence of defendant Gary Layton's 1997 "sexually assaultive behavior," the trial court ruled the evidence was inadmissible because defendant’s alleged conduct did not meet the "elements of a sexual battery" as defined by state law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Trial Court and denied supervisory writs. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that Louisiana law does not strictly limit evidence of past "sexually assaultive behavior" to sexual offenses. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Layton" on Justia Law

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In 2009, defendant Daniel Marshall ended a love triangle by repeatedly shooting Ronald Hodges, Jr., as Hodges ran toward Marshall, jumping off the porch of a residence. The residence belonged to Ebony Gastinell, the mother of his three children. In all, Hodges sustained five gunshot wounds: two to the back, and projectile fragment abrasions on his right shoulder, arm and hand. The police found nine spent casings scattered on the ground but did not find any firearms discarded on the scene. Following defendant’s second degree murder trial and his conviction and sentence for the lesser verdict of manslaughter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence upon finding that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s post-arrest silence was not harmless because it undercut his plausible self-defense claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s writ application, and, after reviewing the record and the applicable law, reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

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Juvenile defendant J.M. was charged with simple battery and simple criminal damage to property. On February 25, 2013, J.M. appeared to answer the petition and entered a denial of the allegations. Pursuant to La. Ch. Code art. 877, the state had ninety days from the date of the answer hearing to adjudicate the case (here, until May 26, 2013). The juvenile court set a trial date of March 26, 2013. Defendant failed to appear for trial and an arrest warrant was issued for her arrest. Service was never rendered on the defendant. On April 17, 2013, the warrant was recalled when defendant appeared in court and a new trial date of May 14, 2013 was set. On May 13, 2013, for reasons unclear from the record, the State expressly requested an extension of the adjudication deadline from May 26, 2013 to May 28, 2013 without objection. The juvenile court granted the extension and set a hearing date of May 28, 2013. On that date, the state requested a second continuance of the adjudication hearing. The juvenile court denied the state’s motion to continue, noting the State had already been granted additional time and finding no good cause to grant an additional continuance. Critically, the State did not object to or seek review of this ruling, but instead entered a nolle prosequi and dismissed the case. The same day, the State filed a new petition alleging the same delinquent acts. An answer hearing for the refiled petition was set for June 11, 2013. On June 11, 2013, the record reflected service was not made on the defendant and a new hearing date was set for June 25, 2013. On that date, the juvenile court judge was absent and the matter was delayed until July 16, 2013. On that date, 141 days from the original answer hearing, J.M. appeared in court to answer the refiled petition. J.M. once again denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the state violated the time limitations found in Louisiana Children’s Code Article 877. The juvenile court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. J.M. noticed intent to seek review of that ruling and appealed. The court of appeal granted defendant’s writ application and reversed the ruling of the juvenile court, dismissing the case on the basis that the state failed to adjudicate the matter within the time limitations provided in the Children’s Code. The State appealed the court of appeal’s decision, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal ruling. View "Louisiana in the interest of J.M." on Justia Law