Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the people voted to amend Article I, Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution (effective December 10, 2012), which provided: "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny." Prior to its amendment this article provided that, "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person." Some arrested or convicted of crimes involving firearms have attempted to show that the laws under which they were charged did not withstand strict scrutiny and were thus unconstitutional. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court rejected those arguments. "Our law proscribing the possession of firearms by convicted felons is not affected by the amendment and withstands a strict scrutiny analysis. Such laws are effective, time-tested, and easily understandable, and do not violate the constitution. Common sense and the public safety allow no other result." View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the state’s application to review the decision of the First Circuit affirming the district court’s order of expungement entered in respondent’s case following the court’s set aside of his misdemeanor conviction and sentence for domestic abuse battery with child endangerment in violation of La.R.S.14:35.3(I), and dismissal of the prosecution under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894. The district court entered the order, and the court of appeal affirmed, notwithstanding La.R.S. 44:9(A)(5)(b), which provided that “[n]o person shall be entitled to an expungement if the misdemeanor conviction arose from circumstances involving a sexual act or act of domestic violence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and vacated the expungement order. View "Louisiana v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a recent constitutional amendment involving a fundamental right to bear arms found in La. Const. art. I, section 11 rendered a criminal statute related to the possession of a firearm while possessing illegal drugs, facially unconstitutional. According to the defendant, because the right to bear arms has been recently enshrined as a fundamental constitutional right, notwithstanding the fact the defendant was allegedly carrying illegal drugs while in possession of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:95(E) was facially unconstitutional. Defendant argued that, even assuming he possessed illegal drugs, because La. R.S. 14:95(E) dealt not only with illegal drugs but with firearms, the firearm aspect of the statute cannot survive strict judicial scrutiny, and the entire statute must be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court disagreed: "Nothing in the recent constitutional amendment regarding firearms requires dismissal of the criminal charges against the defendant for carrying a firearm while in possession of illegal drugs. The legislature’s criminalization of the possession of illegal drugs with the illicit possession of a firearm, therefore, passes strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, on its face, there is nothing in La. R.S. 14:95(E) that requires this court to declare that statute to be unconstitutional." View "Louisiana v. Webb" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether a defendant having been tried once, may nevertheless be ordered to stand trial a second time when the trial judge in the first proceeding, acting without authority, grants a motion for acquittal in a jury trial, dismisses the jury and subsequently orders a mistrial. After review, the Court found the trial judge had no constitutional or statutory authority to grant the acquittal under Louisiana law, which distinguished this case from the federal jurisprudence relied upon by the court of appeal to reverse. Finding the trial judge’s verdict of acquittal was without legal authority or effect, the Court held the mistrial was properly granted and retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. View "Louisiana v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with DWI-3rd offense. The trial judge granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with a traffic stop by a police officer who was outside his jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Although the Supreme Court found the factors set forth in the appellate court’s test should be considered in connection with the totality of the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, the Court held there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the specific requirements relied upon by the trial court and court of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable, vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Gates" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant as a principal in the murder of Mark Westbrook, victim of an apparent execution committed by Ortiz Jackson. Based primarily on the circumstantial evidence provided by cellular phone records from Sprint and Verizon tying the cell numbers of defendant and Jackson together with the number of an “unknown” person, the state argued, and jurors ultimately concluded, that defendant, who had intervened in an argument between Westbrook and Rock McKinney, one the victim’s friends, on a night of drinking, got on his cell phone and orchestrated Westbrook’s demise, after exchanging words with the intoxicated victim outside of the bar. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the state’s contention that defendant threatened the victim, was seen using a cell phone, and that the victim died shortly after a series of phone calls between defendant, an unknown person, and Jackson. Defendant argued because the state could not prove the content of the phone calls made to Jackson and the unknown party before the shooting, the state could not satisfy its burden of proof regarding any specific intent to murder the victim. Finding the state’s case rested wholly on circumstantial evidence, the majority of the Court of Appeal reasoned that, given Sprint and Verizon records indicating that calls linking the cell numbers of defendant’s, Jackson’s, and “unknown’s” phones in the hours well before the late-evening murder, “the State did not exclude that another logical inference, other than to procure murder, could be drawn from these telephone calls; namely, that the defendant may have been returning the phone call of the unknown caller and/or that these calls were to discuss the business that pre-existed among them prior to defendant’s interjection of himself into the altercation between the victim and Rock McKinney.” Underlying the controversy between the state and defendant in this case was the question of how much deference a reviewing court in Louisiana must give to the jury’s verdict in a case involving primarily or exclusively circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant’s conviction for second degree murder on the basis the state failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. Therefore, the conviction and sentence were reinstated, and the court of appeal was directed to address defendant’s remaining claims on the merits on remand of the case. View "Louisiana v. Mack" on Justia Law

In 2009, a grand jury indicted defendant Eric Ross for the 2008 second degree murder of Albert McClebb, Jr., who was shot to death in a housing development in New Orleans. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case for the limited purpose of determining whether the appellate court erred in reversing defendant's conviction, because the appellate court reviewed the grand jury testimony of a recalcitrant witness, as violative of Louisiana's grand jury secrecy laws. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in so doing, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the rest of defendant's appeal. View "Louisiana v. Ross" on Justia Law

Juvenile J.M. argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon(La. R.S. 14:95(A)), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile (La. R.S. 14:95.8), failed to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should have been severed from the statute. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the juvenile court erred in both of its rulings. The Supreme Court held both statutes constitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the interest of J.M. " on Justia Law

The State appealed a Court of Appeals decision to reverse defendant Jason Duhe's conviction and habitual offender sentence for the creation or operation of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. Defendant moved before trial to suppress pseudoephedrine tablets found in his car on grounds that they were the products of an illegal seizure. The trial court heard the motion on the day of trial after jury selection and before opening statements, and denied it. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him as a habitual offender to 13 years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal found that while the arresting officer had unquestionably seized defendant when he ordered him from the car, frisked him, and placed him in handcuffs, the court did not have to resolve whether the officer's conduct was justified by a reasonable suspicion defendant had been engaged in "smurfing" as part of a plan to produce methamphetamine. The court of appeal determined that, in any event, the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of what amounted to lawful amounts of pseudoephedrine available for purchase over the counter. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant before he conducted his "wing span" search and went into the vehicle. But the Court also agreed with the State that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain all of the occupants of the vehicle and that he acted reasonably in entering the vehicle in a search for weapons to protect himself and his partner. Furthermore, the Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did apply the officer's recovery of the 40 tablets from a closed container sitting on the back seat next to empty Sudafed boxes and extruded blister packs, a circumstance omitted from the court of appeal's assessment of probable cause. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the court of appeal and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Duhe" on Justia Law