Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Juvenile J.M. argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon(La. R.S. 14:95(A)), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile (La. R.S. 14:95.8), failed to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should have been severed from the statute. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the juvenile court erred in both of its rulings. The Supreme Court held both statutes constitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the interest of J.M. " on Justia Law

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The State appealed a Court of Appeals decision to reverse defendant Jason Duhe's conviction and habitual offender sentence for the creation or operation of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. Defendant moved before trial to suppress pseudoephedrine tablets found in his car on grounds that they were the products of an illegal seizure. The trial court heard the motion on the day of trial after jury selection and before opening statements, and denied it. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him as a habitual offender to 13 years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal found that while the arresting officer had unquestionably seized defendant when he ordered him from the car, frisked him, and placed him in handcuffs, the court did not have to resolve whether the officer's conduct was justified by a reasonable suspicion defendant had been engaged in "smurfing" as part of a plan to produce methamphetamine. The court of appeal determined that, in any event, the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of what amounted to lawful amounts of pseudoephedrine available for purchase over the counter. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant before he conducted his "wing span" search and went into the vehicle. But the Court also agreed with the State that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain all of the occupants of the vehicle and that he acted reasonably in entering the vehicle in a search for weapons to protect himself and his partner. Furthermore, the Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did apply the officer's recovery of the 40 tablets from a closed container sitting on the back seat next to empty Sudafed boxes and extruded blister packs, a circumstance omitted from the court of appeal's assessment of probable cause. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the court of appeal and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Duhe" on Justia Law

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In a direct appeal, the State appealed a judgment that declared La. R.S. 14:95.1 as unconstitutional. In connection with a motion to quash the bill of information filed by the defendant in this case, the district court found the provisions of the statute violated article I, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution. After reviewing the defendant's claim, and taking into account his status as a probationer at the time of his arrest for the instant offense, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Louisiana v. Draughter" on Justia Law

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Defendant Brandon Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for distribution of cocaine. He argued that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether "Miller v. Alabama," (567 U.S. __ (2012)) applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings. Defendant Darryl Tate, whose mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a second-degree murder he committed as a juvenile became final in 1984, filed a motion seeking resentencing in light of Miller. The District Court denied his motion, but the Court of Appeal granted writs, remanding the matter for a sentencing hearing. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to address the retroactivity of Miller to those juvenile homicide convictions final at the time Miller was rendered. Upon review, the Louisiana Court found Miller did not apply retroactively in cases on collateral review as it merely set forth a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure, which is neither substantive nor implicative of the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the judgment of the District Court. View "Louisiana v. Tate" on Justia Law

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On May 8, 2012, defendant Rosa Lugo Marquez was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that she was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Marquez" on Justia Law

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On August 2, 2012, defendant Bonifacio Ramirez was arrested during a traffic stop in for operating a motor vehicle without documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

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In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws titled "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways." One of the statutes proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. Violation is a felony that carried a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal a claim that the statute was preempted by federal law, defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 was indeed preempted. After review of the relevant law, the Supreme Court found that based on "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)), La. R.S. 14:100.13 was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Sarrabea" on Justia Law

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The state charged respondent with aggravated rape on the basis of allegations made by C.C., the granddaughter of Gayle Ardoin, respondent's live-in partner, that respondent had repeatedly abused her sexually over the course of the several years she lived in the home with the permission of her legal guardian, Paula Martinez, Gayle Ardoin's sister. The record reflected that another individual may have been responsible for C.C.'s injury, and that as the girl grew older, her allegations of abuse may have been couched as resentment toward new rules of the household. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision of the district court to provide respondent with post-conviction relief from his conviction and sentence. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and reinstated respondent's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Pierre" on Justia Law

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While driving his vehicle in a highly intoxicated state, defendant Craig Oliphant struck and killed a pedestrian and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of vehicular homicide. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, with the first fifteen years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and designated the offense a crime of violence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reversed the portion of the sentence designating vehicular homicide a crime of violence, vacated the twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted this writ to provide guidance to the lower courts regarding whether the offense of vehicular homicide fit the general definition of a "crime of violence" under La. Rev. Stat. 14:2(B). The Court found that the offense of vehicular homicide is a crime of violence as the offense involves the use of physical force and the substantial risk that force will be used against another person in the commission of the offense as well as the use of a dangerous weapon. Finding no error in the District Court’s designation, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. View "Louisiana v. Oliphant" on Justia Law