Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a Court of Appeals decision to reverse defendant Jason Duhe's conviction and habitual offender sentence for the creation or operation of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. Defendant moved before trial to suppress pseudoephedrine tablets found in his car on grounds that they were the products of an illegal seizure. The trial court heard the motion on the day of trial after jury selection and before opening statements, and denied it. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him as a habitual offender to 13 years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal found that while the arresting officer had unquestionably seized defendant when he ordered him from the car, frisked him, and placed him in handcuffs, the court did not have to resolve whether the officer's conduct was justified by a reasonable suspicion defendant had been engaged in "smurfing" as part of a plan to produce methamphetamine. The court of appeal determined that, in any event, the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of what amounted to lawful amounts of pseudoephedrine available for purchase over the counter. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant before he conducted his "wing span" search and went into the vehicle. But the Court also agreed with the State that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain all of the occupants of the vehicle and that he acted reasonably in entering the vehicle in a search for weapons to protect himself and his partner. Furthermore, the Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did apply the officer's recovery of the 40 tablets from a closed container sitting on the back seat next to empty Sudafed boxes and extruded blister packs, a circumstance omitted from the court of appeal's assessment of probable cause. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the court of appeal and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Duhe" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the State appealed a judgment that declared La. R.S. 14:95.1 as unconstitutional. In connection with a motion to quash the bill of information filed by the defendant in this case, the district court found the provisions of the statute violated article I, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution. After reviewing the defendant's claim, and taking into account his status as a probationer at the time of his arrest for the instant offense, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Louisiana v. Draughter" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for distribution of cocaine. He argued that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether "Miller v. Alabama," (567 U.S. __ (2012)) applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings. Defendant Darryl Tate, whose mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a second-degree murder he committed as a juvenile became final in 1984, filed a motion seeking resentencing in light of Miller. The District Court denied his motion, but the Court of Appeal granted writs, remanding the matter for a sentencing hearing. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to address the retroactivity of Miller to those juvenile homicide convictions final at the time Miller was rendered. Upon review, the Louisiana Court found Miller did not apply retroactively in cases on collateral review as it merely set forth a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure, which is neither substantive nor implicative of the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the judgment of the District Court. View "Louisiana v. Tate" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2012, defendant Rosa Lugo Marquez was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that she was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Marquez" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2012, defendant Bonifacio Ramirez was arrested during a traffic stop in for operating a motor vehicle without documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws titled "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways." One of the statutes proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. Violation is a felony that carried a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal a claim that the statute was preempted by federal law, defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 was indeed preempted. After review of the relevant law, the Supreme Court found that based on "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)), La. R.S. 14:100.13 was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Sarrabea" on Justia Law

The state charged respondent with aggravated rape on the basis of allegations made by C.C., the granddaughter of Gayle Ardoin, respondent's live-in partner, that respondent had repeatedly abused her sexually over the course of the several years she lived in the home with the permission of her legal guardian, Paula Martinez, Gayle Ardoin's sister. The record reflected that another individual may have been responsible for C.C.'s injury, and that as the girl grew older, her allegations of abuse may have been couched as resentment toward new rules of the household. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision of the district court to provide respondent with post-conviction relief from his conviction and sentence. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and reinstated respondent's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Pierre" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle in a highly intoxicated state, defendant Craig Oliphant struck and killed a pedestrian and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of vehicular homicide. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, with the first fifteen years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and designated the offense a crime of violence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reversed the portion of the sentence designating vehicular homicide a crime of violence, vacated the twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted this writ to provide guidance to the lower courts regarding whether the offense of vehicular homicide fit the general definition of a "crime of violence" under La. Rev. Stat. 14:2(B). The Court found that the offense of vehicular homicide is a crime of violence as the offense involves the use of physical force and the substantial risk that force will be used against another person in the commission of the offense as well as the use of a dangerous weapon. Finding no error in the District Court’s designation, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. View "Louisiana v. Oliphant" on Justia Law

In 1993, respondent Isaiah Overstreet, Jr., who was then 32 years old, quit his job, began living in his car, and started preaching on the grounds of college campuses. On April 25, 1994, at about 6 a.m. police were dispatched to a Southeastern dormitory where respondent, after failing to force his way into one room, entered another, forced a student onto her bed, and struggled with her before fleeing. At 11:30 p.m. on the same day, police were dispatched to Louisiana State University where respondent had grabbed a student as she waited for campus transit, dragged her into the bushes, pinned her to the ground, and attempted to remove her clothing before fleeing. Also on that day, respondent tried to gain entry to another dormitory by breaking a window and pulling the handle on a fire door. Respondent was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Respondent was evaluated to determine his competency to proceed to trial. Experts agreed that respondent was delusional and unable to assist in his defense. After several stints in treatment centers, respondent was ultimately treated with low doses of anti-psychotic medication and his symptoms generally went into remission. Respondent denies any memory of the attacks and has consistently refused to participate in sex offender assessment or treatment. He filed a motion to be released, but because of his refusal to participate, a review panel of the court recommended against his release.Respondent was informed by treatment center staff that if he was transferred to a group home, he would be required to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion for declaratory judgment in which he asked the district court to determine whether he was classified as a sex offender and subject to the registration requirement. This case came before the Supreme Court because the district court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 15:541(7) and 15:542 (laws requiring registration for sex offenders) were unconstitutional as applied to a person who pled and was found not guilty by reason of insanity to a sex offense. Having reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the district court because respondent failed to sufficiently particularize any basis for finding the statutes unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Overstreet" on Justia Law