Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 8, 2012, defendant Rosa Lugo Marquez was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that she was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Marquez" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2012, defendant Bonifacio Ramirez was arrested during a traffic stop in for operating a motor vehicle without documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws titled "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways." One of the statutes proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. Violation is a felony that carried a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal a claim that the statute was preempted by federal law, defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 was indeed preempted. After review of the relevant law, the Supreme Court found that based on "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)), La. R.S. 14:100.13 was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Sarrabea" on Justia Law

The state charged respondent with aggravated rape on the basis of allegations made by C.C., the granddaughter of Gayle Ardoin, respondent's live-in partner, that respondent had repeatedly abused her sexually over the course of the several years she lived in the home with the permission of her legal guardian, Paula Martinez, Gayle Ardoin's sister. The record reflected that another individual may have been responsible for C.C.'s injury, and that as the girl grew older, her allegations of abuse may have been couched as resentment toward new rules of the household. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision of the district court to provide respondent with post-conviction relief from his conviction and sentence. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and reinstated respondent's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Pierre" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle in a highly intoxicated state, defendant Craig Oliphant struck and killed a pedestrian and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of vehicular homicide. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, with the first fifteen years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and designated the offense a crime of violence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reversed the portion of the sentence designating vehicular homicide a crime of violence, vacated the twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted this writ to provide guidance to the lower courts regarding whether the offense of vehicular homicide fit the general definition of a "crime of violence" under La. Rev. Stat. 14:2(B). The Court found that the offense of vehicular homicide is a crime of violence as the offense involves the use of physical force and the substantial risk that force will be used against another person in the commission of the offense as well as the use of a dangerous weapon. Finding no error in the District Court’s designation, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. View "Louisiana v. Oliphant" on Justia Law

In 1993, respondent Isaiah Overstreet, Jr., who was then 32 years old, quit his job, began living in his car, and started preaching on the grounds of college campuses. On April 25, 1994, at about 6 a.m. police were dispatched to a Southeastern dormitory where respondent, after failing to force his way into one room, entered another, forced a student onto her bed, and struggled with her before fleeing. At 11:30 p.m. on the same day, police were dispatched to Louisiana State University where respondent had grabbed a student as she waited for campus transit, dragged her into the bushes, pinned her to the ground, and attempted to remove her clothing before fleeing. Also on that day, respondent tried to gain entry to another dormitory by breaking a window and pulling the handle on a fire door. Respondent was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Respondent was evaluated to determine his competency to proceed to trial. Experts agreed that respondent was delusional and unable to assist in his defense. After several stints in treatment centers, respondent was ultimately treated with low doses of anti-psychotic medication and his symptoms generally went into remission. Respondent denies any memory of the attacks and has consistently refused to participate in sex offender assessment or treatment. He filed a motion to be released, but because of his refusal to participate, a review panel of the court recommended against his release.Respondent was informed by treatment center staff that if he was transferred to a group home, he would be required to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion for declaratory judgment in which he asked the district court to determine whether he was classified as a sex offender and subject to the registration requirement. This case came before the Supreme Court because the district court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 15:541(7) and 15:542 (laws requiring registration for sex offenders) were unconstitutional as applied to a person who pled and was found not guilty by reason of insanity to a sex offense. Having reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the district court because respondent failed to sufficiently particularize any basis for finding the statutes unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Overstreet" on Justia Law

The State appealed the grant of post-conviction relief for Defendant Anthony Thomas. The trial court granted the application based on an allegation that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded defendant did not satisfy the "Strickland" standard and that it was in error to grant defendant post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Respondent Manuel Ortiz was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1995 for the killing of his wife. The State urged jurors to find that Respondent was involved in a murder-for-hire scheme motivated by his desire to collect on an insurance policy taken out on the wife. Post-conviction relief proceedings stretched out over years. One of the allegations Respondent raised on appeal involved prosecutorial misconduct by a former assistant district attorney. The litigation took place against the background of the assistant DA's subsequent but unrelated legal difficulties which resulted his disbarment and imprisonment on federal charges. The district court ultimately denied respondent the post-conviction relief he sought, effectively rejecting specific claims that the assistant DA had suppressed certain exculpatory evidence and suborned perjury, but vacated Respondent's death sentence. Both Respondent and the State appealed the district court's decision. With no evidence that any prosecutorial decision made before or during the guilt or sentencing stages of trial stemmed in whole or part from any pecuniary interest in the insurance proceeds relating to the victim's death (including the decision to charge Respondent with his wife's murder), the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in vacating Respondent's death sentence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated respondent's death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question presented by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The question presented sought "binding instructions from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the correct usage of a defendant's name (and other close relatives) in cases in which the victim is a minor related to the defendant." The Supreme Court concluded that the controlling statutory authority mandated confidentiality of the victim's identity in certain cases, but does not extend this protection to any other persons. View "Louisiana v. R. W. B." on Justia Law

In "Louisiana v. Duheart," the Supreme Court reversed part of the district court's judgment that La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded the case for reconsideration of defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant filed a second motion to suppress, again arguing La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court again granted the motion and held the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied in defendant's case. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court again held the district court erred in its analysis: the evidence defendant wanted suppressed had no bearing on the outcome of the motion and thus was not a justiciable controversy for review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court to the extent that it suppressed evidence based on La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. Duheart" on Justia Law