Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph E. Boudreaux, II and Jennifer Boudreaux were married in 1997, divorced in 2011. The couple had two children during their marriage. The parties entered into a consent judgment with regard to custody, visitation, and child support. In September 2011, Joseph filed a rule to change custody and reduce child support. The trial court modified the custody arrangement, but denied the motion to reduce the child support amount. Joseph applied for services through the Department of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), applying for support enforcement services available through the IV-D program, which allowed him to pay his support obligation directly to DCFS, who, as the new payee, would then tender the amount to Jennifer. In exchange for the services, he paid a twenty-five dollar registration fee, as well as a monthly administrative fee assessed by DCFS in the amount of five percent of his support obligation. This administrative fee was assessed in addition to his full support obligation. Joseph again moved to reduce his child support payments. Relying on La. R.S. 46:236.1.2 and 42 U.S.C. 654 (B)(i)-(ii), Jennifer filed an exception of no right of action, arguing DCFS had no right to intercede because the claim was not properly within the jurisdiction of IV-D categories over which a hearing officer has authority. In particular, she asserted that in order to invoke the services of DCFS, one must be receiving public benefits or delinquent in their child support payments. Jennifer's exception was denied, and the trial court ultimately reduced Joseph's child support. The court of appeal reversed, holding Joseph did not meet the requirements of the IV-D program. The Supreme Court reviewed this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in its reversal. Finding that it did, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Boudreaux v. Boudreaux" on Justia Law

This was a legal malpractice case. Defendant Michelle Myer-Bennett filed a peremptory exception of peremption asserting plaintiff Tracy Lomont filed her malpractice claim beyond the three-year peremptive period set forth in La. R.S. 9:5605. Lomont opposed the exception, arguing the peremptive period should not have applied because Myer-Bennett engaged in fraudulent behavior which prevented application of the peremptive period. Lomont hired Myer-Bennett to represent her in a divorce and related domestic matters, which included partitioning the community property. Citibank obtained a default judgment against John Lomont (the ex-husband) on a delinquent account. Citibank recorded the judgment in the mortgage records in Jefferson Parish as a lien against the home. Lomont attempted to refinance the mortgage on the home and learned from the bank that the settlement agreement, giving her full ownership of the home, was never recorded in the mortgage and conveyance records. Lomont contacted Myer-Bennett to advise her of the problem. According to Myer-Bennett, because it was her standard practice to record such documents, she initially believed Lomont was given inaccurate information by the bank. Upon investigation, Myer-Bennett discovered that she had not recorded the agreement. Myer-Bennett recorded the agreement the next day, September 30, 2010. In December 2010, Lomont was notified that her application to refinance the loan was denied because of Citibank’s lien on the property. According to Myer-Bennett, once she became aware of the Citibank lien she discussed with Lomont the fact she committed malpractice and gave Lomont several options to proceed, including hiring another lawyer to sue her, or allowing Myer-Bennett to file suit against John Lomont and/or Citibank to have the lien removed. Myer-Bennett stated. Lomont chose not to pursue a malpractice action, but wanted defendant to fix the problem. Lomont denied Myer-Bennett ever notified her she had committed malpractice. Lomont contended Myer-Bennett never mentioned malpractice in December 2010, but simply advised she would have the Citibank lien removed from the property by filing lawsuits against John Lomont and Citibank. The district court sustained the exception of peremption and the court of appeal affirmed. Based on the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found defendant committed fraud within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:5605(E). Thus, the peremptive periods contained in La. R.S. 9:5605 were not applicable and plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim was governed by the one-year prescriptive period in La. C.C. art. 3492. Further, the facts of this case supported an application of the doctrine of contra non valentem. Because the Court found plaintiff filed suit within one year of discovering defendant’s malpractice, the Court held the lower courts erred in sustaining defendant’s exception of peremption. View "Lomont v. Myer-Bennett" on Justia Law

In December of 2002 Thomas Lowrie married Melissa Lowrie, who gave birth to two children during the marriage: A.L., born February 2003; and B.W., born May 2009. In October of 2010 the Lowries were divorced. Although the children were born during the marriage, Mr. Lowrie, believing that Stephen Wetzel was the biological father of the children, sought to disavow paternity of the children. Mr. Lowrie successfully disavowed paternity of the younger child, B.W., in January of 2011; however, his action to disavow the older child, A.L., was found to be untimely. Therefore, Mr. Lowrie remained the legal father of A.L. In September of 2012, the State Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) filed an action against Mr. Lowrie, seeking medical and child support for A.L. DCFS alleged that it was providing services for A.L., which created a cause of action in favor of the State pursuant to the State's child support enforcement law. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an alleged biological father should have been joined in a child support enforcement action, filed pursuant to LSA-R.S. 46:236.1.1 et seq. against the legally-presumed father. The juvenile court denied joinder, and the appellate court denied writs. Concluding that a biological father owes an obligation of support to his child, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Lowrie" on Justia Law

This case concerned a highly contested custody dispute over three minor children. After an eleven-day trial and extensive written reasons for judgment, the trial court awarded sole custody of the children to the father and conditionally reserved visitation privileges to the mother. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeal erred in finding the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting the children from testifying at trial and not relying on a sexual abuse evaluation. After careful consideration, the Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion nor did it find any manifest error. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "C.M.J. v. L.M.C." on Justia Law

The issue in this case stemmed from the divorce action between Lange Allen and Susan Allen, for the partition of separately owned property, a 2008 Toyota Land Cruiser, and restitution of separate property. The parties entered in a matrimonial agreement establishing a regime of separation of property before their marriage. The vehicle at issue was acquired during their marriage. The Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether the family court divisions of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over partition proceedings involving divorcing spouses’ separate property. Finding these courts had subject matter jurisdiction over those matters, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether homeschooling of children born of the marriage was a factor the trial court could consider when awarding final support. The District Court found homeschooling was not a factor legally considered in the determination of final support. In a plurality opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court was charged pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 112 with considering all relevant factors in determining the amount and duration of final support, thus the homeschooling of children born of the marriage could be a relevant factor in the determination of such support. Therefore, the Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts as to this issue only and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Rhymes v. Rhymes" on Justia Law

Kerry Moseley and Derek Pociask were married and had two children. They separated ten years later, and shortly thereafter, were granted a divorce. But several months before the judgment of divorce, Moseley had another child. Pociask filed a petition to disavow paternity of the latest child. In her exception, Moseley argued that Pociask did not file his petition to disavow within a year of the child's birth. The district court overruled the exception. The parties entered a consent agreement whereby the DNA of the child was tested. The test results revealed Pociask was not the biological father. The district court granted Pociask's motion for summary judgment allowing him to disavow paternity of the child. The appellate court reversed, finding the disavowal action prescribed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Pociask v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Mother Misty Hernandez appealed a family court order denying her motion for permission to move to another state with the child she shared with Father Brandon Jenkins. Upon review of the family court matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the family court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the proper legal standard with regard to Mother's motion and by denying it. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Mother. View "Hernandez v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the trial court ordered a change in custody, finding the father satisfied the requirements of "Bergeron v. Bergeron" by establishing that any harm caused by a modification of a 2004 custody decree would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child. The trial court’s ruling was reversed by the court of appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s ruling. Because the Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in modifying custody, it reversed the appellate court and reinstated the ruling of the trial court. View "Mulkey v. Mulkey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether an alleged biological father could bring a wrongful death and survival action for his illegitimate child, where the father did not file a timely avowal action, but filed his wrongful death and survival petition to assert his paternity within the peremptive period of La. Civ. Code art. 198. In resolving this issue, the Court had to decide whether the filiation requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 198 applied to actions under La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2. Upon review, the Court concluded that while the alleged was required to file an avowal action in order to bring a wrongful death and survival action, under Louisiana’s fact-pleading system, his petition pled sufficient facts to state an avowal action. View "Udomeh v. Joseph" on Justia Law