Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are producers of rice in Louisiana. In 1972, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 3:3531, et seq. and La. R.S. 3:3541, et seq. which established the Louisiana Rice Promotion Board and the Louisiana Rice Research Board ("the Rice Boards"), to promote the growth and development of the rice industry in Louisiana. The Rice Statutes were amended in 1992 to provide that a refund is not available if the voting majority of rice producers vote to abolish the statutory refund provisions. Since the Rice Statutes went into effect, rice producers voting in the periodic referendums have approved the levy of an assessment. The refund provisions were abolished in the 1992 referendum. Plaintiffs, approximately forty rice producers, filed suit against the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry (LDAF) and the Rice Boards, challenging the constitutionality of the Rice Statutes both on their face and as applied, as an improper delegation of legislative authority. Plaintiffs argued the Rice Statutes permit a small group of private citizens to determine by majority vote whether the LDAF shall enforce and collect statutory assessments on rice, and whether the refund provisions will be abolished. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, declaring those sections of the Rice Statutes relative to abolishment of the refunds unconstitutional. The LDAF, State and the Rice Boards directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R.S. 3:3544 were facially unconstitutional. The Legislature improperly transferred its assessment power to a particular group of private voters who could impose, maintain or revoke the assessment and right to refunds through private elections. Thus, the Court affirmed and amended the district court's judgment to declare La. R.S. 3:3534 and La. R4. S. 3:354 unconstitutional in their entirety. View "Krielow v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

The taxpayer in this case, a paper mill, requested a refund on taxes it paid on purchases of caustic soda, arguing that the chemical was used in the production of a product for resale and excluded from local and state taxation. An attorney for the tax collector denied the request, and gave no reason for the denial. The taxpayer made a second request for taxes inadvertently paid on caustic soda and sodium hydrosulfide, chemicals they argued, qualified for the tax exemption. The tax collector did not respond to the second request. The taxpayer then sent a third and fourth refund request, again for the purchase of raw materials. Again, the requests were denied with no grounds for the denial. The taxpayer then filed suit seeking the refunds it felt were due back from the tax collector. The district court found that the claims were untimely filed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the taxpayer's writ application to clarify the proper procedure and time period for appeals when the tax collector has failed to act on a refund claim for overpayment of taxes after one year, and to determine whether the taxpayer was required to use a "payment under protest" procedure in this case in order to obtain a refund. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the tax refund claims, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.View "Tin, Inc. v. Washington Parish Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether La. R.S. 13:4210 was constitutional. Dionysia Prejean was a party to a child custody proceeding captioned "Dionysia F. Huval Prejean v. Ronald Joseph Prejean," which was pending in the 15th Judicial District Court. The last day of trial in the "Prejean" proceeding was March 18, 2011, at which time the district judge took the matter under advisement. When the district judge court did not render judgment within thirty days, as required by La. R.S. 13:4207, Ms. Prejean filed writ of mandamus against the Acadia Parish Clerk of Court, Robert Barousse, seeking an order requiring him to immediately notify the legislative auditor that the district judge failed to render a decision within the time prescribed by La. R.S. 13:4207, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210.2 In addition, she sought an order against the state auditor to withhold one quarter’s salary from the district judge, as required by La. R.S. 13:4210. The district court denied the writ of mandamus. Ms. Prejean then appealed. On its own motion, the court of appeal raised the issue of the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4210, and determined the statute was unconstitutional on its face because the legislature lacked the authority to regulate judicial conduct. In addition, the court of appeal found La. R.S. 13:4210 was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause, as it purported to reduce a judge’s salary without providing the judge notice or opportunity to be heard. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that La. R.S. 13:4210 was unconstitutional on its face, but that "this action will in no way alter the obligation of district judges to render judgements timely, and adhere to the reporting requirements set forth in General Administrative Rule, Part G, sec. 2(b)."View "Prejean v. Barousse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a law was declared unconstitutional by a district court. The district court granted in part the Louisiana High School Athletic Association, Inc.’s (LHSAA’s) Motion for Summary Judgment, declaring La. R.S. 17:176(F), La. R.S. 17:176(G), and La. R.S. 17:236.3 (Title 17 statutes) unconstitutional because they are prohibited special laws under La. Const. art. III, sec. 12(A). The district court further denied in part the LHSAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent the LHSAA requested a declaration it was not a “quasi public agency or body,” and to the extent it requested a declaration La. R.S. 24:513(J)(4)(a) and (b) and La. R.S. 24:513(A)(1)(b)(v) (Title 24 statutes) were unconstitutional. The issue arose from LHSAA's refusal to provide the State an audit of its records: LHSAA argued that it was exempt from the statutory authority the State relied upon to obtain the records. The LHSAA filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction against the defendants the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), Daryl G. Purpera, in his official capacity as the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (LLA), and James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Louisiana. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling with regard to the Title 17 statutes, and reversed the district court’s ruling to the extent it denied the LHSAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to the Title 24 statutes; the Court found these statutes were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. View "Louisiana High School Athletics Association, Inc. v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

his matter came before the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that respondent Judge Leo Boothe of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parishes of Catahoula and Concordia, be removed from office and ordered to reimburse and pay the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this case. The Commission determined that Judge Boothe violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(6), and 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in willful conduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought his judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, sec. 25(C). After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found that certain charges against Judge Boothe were proven by clear and convincing evidence; however, the Court rejected the recommendation that he be removed from office. The Court suspended the Judge from office for one year, without pay, and ordered him to reimburse and pay the Commission $11,731.79 in costs. View "In re: Judge Leo Boothe, Seventh Judicial District court Catahoula & Concordia Parishes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the State could directly enforce Article I, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution to prevent a candidate from taking public office without regard to the Election Code's lime limits on challenges to candidacy. Answering in the affirmative, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Louisiana v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the court of appeal erred in overturning the rulings of the district courts with regard to certain tax assessments. Questions were raised as to whether review by the Court and the court of appeal was timely. Because the Supreme Court determined that the application in "Caldwell Parish School Board, 12-C-1383," was untimely filed, and the underlying appeal to the court of appeal in "Tensas Parish School Board, 12-C-1762," was also untimely filed, the Court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider the validity of the decision of the court of appeal in "Caldwell Parish School Board," and the district court judgment in "Tensas Parish School Board" was final and definitive. View "Caldwell Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC" on Justia Law

During the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the House of Representatives considered House Bill No. 61, which provided for the establishment of a cash balance retirement plan for certain new members of the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, and the Louisiana School Employees' Retirement System hired on or after July 1, 2013. The bill passed committee and eventually became Act No. 483. Opponents to the Act filed suit in district court; the district court declared the Act unconstitutional. Finding no error in the district court's analysis of the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Retired State Employees Association v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court or the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a putative class of utility ratepayers in the City of Opelousas against Cleco Corporation and Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). The ratepayers sought reimbursement for alleged overcharges for electricity for a period of nearly twenty years, based on a franchise agreement Cleco signed with the City of Opelousas in 1991. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and sustained Cleco's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this is primarily a rate case that must be decided, in the first instance, by the LPSC. Furthermore, the Court found that LA. CONST. art. IV, section 21 (C) was inapplicable, which excludes from the LPSC's exclusive authority a public utility owned, operated, or regulated by a political subdivision, as this case did not involve a municipally-owned public utility company. Accordingly, the rulings of the lower courts were vacated and the ratepayers' claims were dismissed.View "Opelousas Trust Authority v. Cleco Corporation" on Justia Law