Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Luann Landry (St. Bernard Parish, Ward E) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Landry was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, plus costs of $554.00.View "In re Justice of the Peace Luann Landry" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers (Point Coupee Parish, District 4) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Myers was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500.00. View "In re Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers" on Justia Law

The issue in this matter was whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. Upon review of the applicable legislative history of the statute in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriff’s office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. The decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves " on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet (Calcasieu Parish, Ward 6) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Threet failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting him to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $2,500.00, plus costs of $253.20. In addition, Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to file his financial disclosure statement for 2010. View "In Re: Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Broussard sued the State for damages he sustained from an accident caused by a misaligned elevator. After a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Broussard’s favor, finding the offset between the elevator and lobby floors presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The district court reduced Broussard’s damages in proportion to his assigned percentage of fault. The court of appeal held the jury’s factual determination that the elevator’s defective condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly erroneous because the defect was open and obvious, and reversed. The Supreme Court granted Broussard’s writ to further examine, under the manifest error doctrine, whether a defective condition is more properly considered an open and obvious hazard where no duty is owed, rather than an unreasonably dangerous condition where comparative fault is applicable. After reviewing the applicable law and the record in its entirety, the Court found the jury’s unreasonable risk of harm determination was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the District Court's judgment in its entirety. View "Broussard v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (specifically La. R.S. 23:1036) as the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter in claims for personal injury against the "fire company," similarly applies to claims for personal injury against fellow volunteer members. After reviewing the record and the law, the Court found the defendant failed to establish that the Workers’ Compensation Law granted immunity to fellow volunteer members of a volunteer fire company from suits in tort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the minimum monthly salary referenced in La.R.S. 33:1992 included the supplemental amount paid by a municipality for purposes of calculating wage differentials for higher-ranking firefighters. current and former firefighters for the City of West Monroe filed suit against the City, alleging that the pay practices in use violated La.R.S. 33:1992. Particularly, Plaintiffs argued the base salary which was used to compute percentage differentials for higher ranking firefighters, failed to include the city supplemental pay of $300 per month. They contended the correct minimum monthly salary was $1,800, reflecting a $1,500 base salary in addition to a $300 supplemental salary. Without the supplement, the first year firefighters’ pay would not meet the minimum wage required by federal law. The City argued the proper minimum monthly salary was $1,500 because the city supplement was only a temporary monthly payment given to first-year firefighters. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the interplay between La.R.S. 33:1992 and R.S. 33:2002 necessitated the exclusion of the enhanced amount of $300 from the base pay of a firefighter when calculating the pay differentials. Thus, the Court reversed the grant of partial summary judgment as to liability against the City of West Monroe and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit in its entirety. View "West Monroe Firefighters Local 1385 v. City of West Monroe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) writ application to consider whether the Office of Workers' Compensation hearing officer erred in requiring a vocational rehabilitation counselor to comply with the so-called "Crain Brothers conditions," drafted by claimant's counsel, before the counselor could commence or continue to provide vocational rehabilitation services to the claimant. Upon review, the Court held that the hearing officer erred in imposing these conditions ostensibly as a prophylactic measure without an evidentiary showing that any of the imposed conditions were reasonably necessary to resolve or rectify a "dispute . . . concerning the work of the vocational counselor" as provided in La. Rev. Stat. 23:1226(B)(3)(a). Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts' rulings, and remanded the case to the Office of Workers' Compensation. View "Hargrave v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeal erred in holding the district court erred in finding that a governmental entity proved a sufficient public necessity for expropriating property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that court of appeal did not properly apply the manifest error standard of review. As such, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov't v. Person" on Justia Law