Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned Defendants’ entitlement to trial by jury. Specifically, whether the Court’s holding in "Beauclaire v. Greenhouse" mandated that a resolution in accordance with La. R.S. 13:5015, waiving the prohibition against jury trials in suits against a political subdivision, must be passed by the political subdivision prior to a plaintiff filing suit for the political subdivision to be entitled to a trial by jury. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court found that Defendants were entitled to trial by jury, and therefore reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Marcille v. Dauzat" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of the City of Bossier City to determine the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 33:2501(C)(1); specifically, whether the statutory authority of the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board to modify discipline was conditioned upon a finding that the appointing authority acted in bad faith or without cause. After review, the Court found that a municipal fire and police civil service board has the statutory authority to review and modify the discipline imposed, even when the appointing authority acts in good faith for cause. View "City of Bossier City v. Vernon" on Justia Law

During its 2010 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 749 (Act), comprising La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041 through 17:4049, known as the "Red Tape Reduction and Local Empowerment Waiver Program." The Act authorized the Board of Secondary and Elementary Education ("BESE") to grant waivers exempting school districts and individual schools from complying with a number of statutes provided for in Title 17, the Education Code. Under the Act, a waiver could not be presented to BESE "unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request." At this point, no waiver had been granted under the Act, or even requested. The Louisiana Federation of Teachers and others (collectively "LFT") filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State of Louisiana and BESE, seeking a judgment declaring Act 749 unconstitutional. In particular, LFT sought to enjoin Defendants from applying and enforcing La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041(7). Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitutional challenge presented in this case was premature and presented no justiciable controversy. Therefore the Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which held Act 749 unconstitutional. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment. View "Mercer v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP" on Justia Law

In 2008, Petitioner Peter Vizzi, M.D. filed an open account against the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG) for expenses incurred following his treatment of Quinton Contrell Sam. Sam allegedly committed armed robbery in early 2008. He fled the scene of the crime on foot and forced his way into a private residence. When police arrived on the scene, they arrested Sam. Sam was taken by ambulance to Lafayette General Medical center where he was treated for a gunshot wound. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to interpret the meaning of La. R.S. 15:304 to determine whether Dr. Vizzi was legally entitled to recover the expenses he incurred for treatment of Sam. After review of the record, the Court concluded the lower courts erred by holding that LCG was liable for the expenses: LCG argued that the expenses were not caused by the arrest, but were merely the result of an injury prior to the arrest, and therefore, La. R.S. 15:304 was inapplicable. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower courts' holdings. View "Peter D. Vizzi, M.D. v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment. That judgment confirmed and quieted title to a tax purchaser on the basis that the former property owner failed to file a separate action or reconventional demand to institute a proceeding to annul the tax sale within six months from the date of service of the petition and citation to quiet title. Upon review, the Court concluded the former property owner's claim that the tax sale was null and void was timely made and the former property owner had sufficiently established that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the sheriff provided notice of the tax delinquencies and the tax sale to the record property owner as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (failure of which would have rendered the tax sales entirely null and void). Accordingly, the Court found summary judgment to quiet tax titles in favor of the tax purchaser was not warranted in this case. View "Smithko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc." on Justia Law

"This matter has a complicated and convoluted procedural history, which has ultimately resulted in a 'cobweb of litigation.'" This case has its genesis in 1994 when ANR Pipeline Company (ANR) first challenged the ad valorem taxes assessed against its public service pipelines by filing a protest with the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC). Thereafter, through 2003, ANR filed annual protests with the LTC. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) and Southern Natural Gas Company (SNG) also filed protests with the LTC regarding the ad valorem taxes assessed against their public service pipelines from 2000 to 2003.The issues before the Supreme Court concerned whether the reassessment of public service properties issued on remand of this matter in accordance with a court order constituted a local assessment by the local assessors or a central assessment by the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC) and whether, in this taxpayers’ action, the assessors have a right to challenge a decision of the LTC relative to those reassessment valuations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the reassessments were central assessments governed by the provisions of La. Const. art. VII, sec. 18 and La. R.S. 47:1851, et seq. Furthermore, the Court found that once joined by the taxpayers as defendants in the taxpayers’ Section 1856 action for judicial review, the assessors are entitled to challenge the LTC’s final determination of the reassessment valuations. Accordingly, the Court found the lower courts erred in sustaining the taxpayers’ exceptions of no right of action and dismissing the assessors’ cross-appeals. View "ANR Pipeline Co v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits. View "Clay v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a "statement made or action taken" language in La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for negligent acts of omission and to ascertain whether an action may be filed pursuant to La. R.S. 17:439(D) directly against a school employee for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle to the extent his or her liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance. Nakisha Credit, mother of Adrianne Breana Howard (Breana), sued on behalf of Breana's half-siblings and herself stemming from a fight Breana had on school grounds. Breana was involved in "an ongoing feud" with Courtney McClain. Breana was dropped off in the rear of Rayville High School after school had been dismissed for the day at Richland Career Center and began to walk home. Plaintiffs contend LeBaron Sledge instigated a fight between Breana and Courtney whereby the two girls began fighting on the sidewalk in the rear of the school. During the altercation, Breana was either pushed by Courtney or fell off the sidewalk, and was struck by an oncoming Richland Parish school bus. Breana died as a result of her injuries. Among other allegations, Plaintiffs' petition alleged Defendants the School District, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the school board's insurer, the school superintendent and the bus driver were negligent in a variety of ways by failing to supervise the children, failing to timely respond to the fight, and failing to adequately staff the bus area with teachers or school employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to hold that La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for certain negligent acts, including acts of commission and acts of omission. The Court otherwise affirmed the court of appeal's ruling that La. R.S. 17:439(D) permits an action directly against a school bus driver for the negligent operation of a school bus to the extent the driver’s liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance. View "Credit v. Richland Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted consolidated writ applications to address the majority opinion of the court of appeal which held the medical malpractice cap enunciated in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) was unconstitutional "to the extent it includes nurse practitioners within its ambit.” The Court reiterated its holding in "Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University," (508 U.S. 909 (1993)), which found the cap constitutional. Finding the cap to be applicable to all qualified healthcare providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, including nurse practitioners, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in this respect. Additionally, the Court addressed two other assignments of error asserted by the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund and affirmed those portions of the court of appeal judgment. The effect of the Court's holding was to reinstate the trial court judgment in full. View "Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic" on Justia Law