Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the attorney general or whether it is necessary to also serve other entities/individuals when a tort action is brought against the State Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Plaintiff Shawn Burnett fax-filed a suit seeking damages from an automobile accident against several defendants, including the State through the DOTD. DOTD filed a motion for involuntary dismissal and exception of insufficiency of service of process because Plaintiff had not also requested service on the secretary of DOTD. After a hearing, the trial court denied DOTD's motion to dismiss and overruled its exception of insufficiency of service of process, stating, "it would be absurd that you have to serve two people with the State of Louisiana." The appellate court granted DOTD's application for supervisory writs from that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that service of citation only on the attorney general was sufficient. Consequently, the Court found that the trial court's judgment that denied DOTD's motion to dismiss was correct, and that the appellate court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's suit. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Burnett v. James Construction Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Desi Fulmer was an employee with the State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Central to the case was whether an injured, state-employed seaman could sue under the State's "Jones Act" in state court or whether provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act applied. Upon consideration of the trial record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that under the Jones Act, the State waived its sovereign immunity from suits for injury. View "Fulmer v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff B.W. Greemon was a paramedic with the Bossier City Fire Department. In 2007, he responded to a call to assist an apparently intoxicated Eric Holloway who was in police custody. At the scene, Plaintiff was informed that the Mr. Holloway had consumed as many as 18 beers and was possibly a diabetic. Plaintiff evaluated Mr. Holloway and authorized his transport to jail. Mr. Holloway was transported and booked into jail where he was found dead the next morning. A complaint was filed against Plaintiff for clearing Mr. Holloway's transport to jail rather than to a medical facility. After an investigation, Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Bossier City. Plaintiff subsequently filed a civil service appeal, which was then submitted to the Civil Service Board. One Board member moved to enter into executive session, and another member "seconded" the motion. No formal vote on the motion to enter executive session was reflected in the hearing transcript, but the presiding board member clearly directed that the Civil Service Board enter the executive session, which was then closed to the public. After the session, the Board returned to an open session. The Board then publicly voted 3 to 2 to uphold Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff then appealed the Board's decision to district court, alleging that the closed executive session was a violation of the State Open Meetings Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff failed to bring a timely claim under the Open Meetings Law, and that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment under that law. The Court reversed the lower court's voiding of the Civil Service Board's action, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Greemon v. City of Bossier City " on Justia Law

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the head of a state agency or to also serve the attorney general and the office of risk management when a tort action is brought against the agency. In May 2003, Plaintiff Regina Whitley was five months pregnant when she was in an automobile accident. In July 2003, she delivered a stillborn infant. She filed a medical malpractice suit against the state hospital that treated her immediately following the accident. At the time of filing, Plaintiff requested service of process only on the hospital's chairman. Two and a half years later, the attorney general and the office of risk management received faxed-copies of the complaint. The hospital moved to dismiss, citing insufficiency of service of process. After a hearing, the trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initial service on only the hospital was sufficient and that the subsequent service on the attorney general and office of risk management cured the hospital's exception of insufficiency of service. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Whitley v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

To provide relief in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress appropriated funds to Louisiana which distributed some of those funds through the "Road Home" program. The State required more than 150,000 Road Home grant recipients to execute a "Limited Subrogation/Assignment Agreement." The Road Home program created "perverse incentives" for insurance companies and their insured homeowners: some insurers inadequately adjusted and paid grant-eligible claims, and some grant-eligible homeowners had little motivation for file insurance claims. As a result, Road Home applications skyrocketed and created a $1 billion shortfall in the program. The State filed suit against more than 200 insurance companies, seeking to recover the funds spent and yet to be spent on claims under the Road Home program. The Insurance Companies successfully removed the case to the federal district court. The Insurance Companies then sought to dismiss the State's case, arguing that as a matter of law, anti-assignment clauses in the homeowners' policies invalidated the subrogation/assignment to the State. The federal district court denied the Companies' motion to dismiss. The Companies appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Because interpretation of the policy provisions at issue was a matter of State law, the Court certified interpretation to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that there is no public policy in Louisiana that precludes anti-assignment claims from applying to post-loss assignments. The Court commented that the language of the anti-assignment clause must clearly and unambiguously express that it applies to post-loss assignments, and as such must be evaluated on a policy-by-policy basis.