Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against certain judges of the Fourth Judicial District Court (Louisiana) as well as a law clerk employed by that court. Essentially, plaintiffs alleged the law clerk “spoliated, concealed, removed, destroyed, shredded, withheld, and/or improperly ‘handled’ court documents” in earlier litigation involving plaintiffs, and that the judges either aided or concealed these actions. The judges and law clerk filed motions to strike certain allegations from plaintiff’s petition and also filed exceptions of no cause of action. The district court granted the motions to strike and granted the exceptions of no cause of action. On appeal, a divided en banc panel of the court of appeal reversed the motions to strike in part. The court also reversed the granting of the exception of no cause of action as to the law clerk, but affirmed the granting of the exception of no cause of action as to the judges, finding they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Considering the "highly unusual and specific facts" of this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the court of appeal erred in finding the judges were entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Accepting the facts as alleged in the petition as true for purposes of the exception of no cause of action, the Supreme Court found plaintiff’s allegations regarding the judges’ supervision and investigation of the law clerk’s activities arose in the context of the judges’ administrative functions, rather than in the course of their judicial or adjudicative capacities. Therefore, accepting on the well-pleaded allegations of plaintiff’s petition, the Supreme Court found absolute judicial immunity would not apply, and plaintiff was able to state a cause of action against the judges. View "Palowsky v. Campbell et al." on Justia Law

Louisiana, represented by its Attorney General, filed this lawsuit in 2014 against defendants, Molina Healthcare, Inc., Molina Information Systems, L.L.C. d/b/a Molina Medicaid Solutions, and Unisys Corporation. As described in the state’s petition, “[o]ver the last thirty (“30”) years, the Defendants have been the fiscal agent responsible for processing Louisiana’s Medical pharmacy provider reimbursement claims.” Pursuant to a contract to which the state itself was allegedly a party, “the Defendants assumed operational liability” of a “customizable” computerized system known as the Louisiana Medicare Management Information System (“LMMIS”). As part of defendants’ duties, they were “responsible for the operation and maintenance of LMMIS, as well as creating and implementing design changes to the LMMIS that comply with State and federal mandates.” The crux of the state’s allegations in this lawsuit is that Unisys caused the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) to overpay Medicaid pharmacy providers through Unisys’ improper operation and management of LMMIS. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to review the correctness of the appellate court’s ruling, sustaining an exception of no right of action for the Attorney General’s lawsuit against the defendants. By statute, the Louisiana Department of Health had the capacity to sue and be sued for programs that it administered, such as Medicaid. However, because the Louisiana Department of Health delegated–and defendants allegedly contractually accepted–some of the administrative functions of the state’s Medicaid program, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General had the capacity, and hence a right of action, to prosecute this lawsuit. View "Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Molina Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Justin and Gwen Ulrich and Raymond and Pam Alleman purchased and installed residential solar systems with the expectation of receiving an income tax credit of up to $12,500 pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 47:6030(B)(1). In 2016, when plaintiffs filed their Louisiana income tax returns for the 2015 tax year, asserting entitlement to the solar electric system tax credits under La. Rev. Stat. 47:6030, the tax credits were denied or reduced by the Department of Revenue, citing Acts 2015, No. 131, which limited the maximum amount of solar tax credits to be granted by the Department of Revenue to $25,000,000. In letters sent by the Department of Revenue to plaintiffs in August 2016, they were informed that Act 131 of the 2015 Regular Session had amended La. Rev. Stat. 47:6030 “to establish the maximum amount of solar tax credits that may be granted;” that “[f]or fiscal years 2015-2016 and 2016- 2017, the cap limit was $10,000,000 per year;” that “[t]he credits are required to be granted based on a first-come, first served basis;” and that the “cap limits were met prior to [their] claim being filed.” This appeal challenged the district court’s judgment declaring unconstitutional 2015 La. Acts, No. 131, section 1, which amended La. Rev. Stat. 47:6030 by placing a cap on the total amount of solar electric system income tax credits available to Louisiana taxpayers, because it retroactively deprived plaintiffs of a vested property right and substantially impaired the obligations of private contracts. The district court also implicitly found the plaintiffs had standing to bring the constitutional claim and that a justiciable controversy existed because the constitutional issue was not moot. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the district court erred in overruling the Department of Revenue’s peremptory exception of mootness, and reversed. View "Ulrich v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ in this termination of parental rights case to determine if the court of appeal erred in reversing a district court judgment terminating the parental rights of the father, C.K.D. The child was removed from his mother's care after testing positive for methamphetamines. The Department of Children and Family Services developed a case plan for the parents; as relating to C.K.D., the plan required him, among other things, to remain drug free, maintain a safe and stable home that met the basic needs of his children, complete random drug screens, and obtain a legal source of income to support his children. The plan was amended to require that C.K.D. complete parenting classes, anger management, and mental health counseling and to pay $25/month per child to DCFS for the support of his children. DCFS initially placed the children with C.K.D.’s mother, D.D. Some time later, DCFS received reports that C.K.D. was improperly living with D.D., and that D.D. was possibly using drugs while caring for the children. C.K.D., D.D., and both children tested positive for drugs. As a result, DCFS removed the children from D.D.’s home and placed them in non-relative foster care with G.B. Shortly thereafter, DCFS petitioned to terminate both parents' parental rights. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found no reversible error in the district court’s ruling that termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the best interests of the children. View "Louisiana In the Interest of A.L.D. & L.S.D." on Justia Law

Defendant, Lawrence Clark was issued a citation for displaying his art for sale on neutral ground at Decatur Street and Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans, in violation of New Orleans Municipal Code. Clark moved to quash the charging affidavit, asserting the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to consider whether New Orleans Municipal Code section 110-11, which regulated the outdoor retail sale of art, was indeed unconstitutional as a violation of Clark’s First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court concurred with Clark that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Therefore, it reversed the lower courts’ rulings and granted the motion to quash the charging affidavit against Clark. View "City of New Orleans v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this case to determine whether the lower courts erred in finding that the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney was not legally obligated and entitled to serve as “legal adviser to the [Parish C]ouncil, [Parish P]resident and all departments, offices and agencies, and represent the Parish government in legal proceedings.” On April 11, 2016, Applicant, Warren Montgomery, in his official capacity as District Attorney for St. Tammany Parish, filed suit against the St. Tammany Parish Government by and through the St. Tammany Parish Council, and Patricia "Pat" Brister in her official capacity as Parish President (collectively "Respondents"). Applicant sought declaratory relief; Respondents filed dilatory exceptions of prematurity and unauthorized use of summary proceeding, as well as peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. Respondents also answered the petition by denying Applicant's claims and asserting several affirmative defenses. In the same pleading, Respondents filed a reconventional demand for declaratory relief that La. R.S. 42:261-263, La. R.S. 16:2 and Section 4-03 (A) of the St. Tammany Parish Home Rule Charter were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the lower courts did, in fact, err, and reversed the trial court’s grant of Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Louisiana Constitution, the laws of the State, and the St. Tammany Parish Charter mandate that Applicant was the general attorney for St. Tammany Parish, the Court granted Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. View "Montgomery v. St. Tammany Parish Government" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a City of New Orleans ordinance levying a gallonage tax based on volume upon dealers who handle high alcoholic content beverages was a valid exercise of its authority to levy and collect occupational license taxes within the meaning of La. Const. Art. VI, sec. 28. The trial court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found the portion of the ordinance at issue was not an unconstitutional exercise of the City’s taxing authority. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Beer Industry League of Louisiana v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

The Board of Ethics (“Board”) filed formal charges against respondents, Walter Monsour and Jordan Monsour. Respondents filed separate motions for summary judgment with the Ethics Adjudicatory Board (“EAB”), seeking dismissal of the charges and attaching exhibits in support of their motions for summary judgment. The Board opposed the motions and attached exhibits in support of its opposition. Respondents filed a reply memorandum, arguing the exhibits attached to the Board’s opposition did not constitute competent evidence because they were unsworn, unverified, and not self-proving. The EAB denied respondents’ objections to the Board’s exhibits and admitted them into evidence. At the end of the hearing, the EAB took the motion for summary judgment under advisement. Respondents sought supervisory review of the ruling admitting the exhibits into evidence. The court of appeal found the EAB erred in admitting the Board's exhibits, because these exhibits did not meet the requirements of La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967. Accordingly, the court reversed the EAB’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings. Two judges dissented in part, and would have allowed the Board, on remand, to submit competent evidence prior to a ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the evidence produced in connection with motions for summary judgment in these administrative proceedings had to conform to the same requirements applicable to civil proceedings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal and remanded the case to the EAB for further proceedings. View "Board of Ethics in the Matter of Jordan Monsour & Walter Monsour" on Justia Law

This disciplinary proceeding was instituted by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) against respondent, Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish. The matter arose out of an anonymous complaint lodged against respondent in April 2013, alleging that he was arrested on several occasions for domestic abuse and simple battery of his now ex-wife, Lisa Rabalais. The Commission alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent was not a lawyer, and was elected to office in 1996. In August 2012, Ms. Rabalais moved out of the matrimonial home. While packing her belongings into the car, the police were summoned to the home in response to complaints by Ms. Rabalais that respondent had grabbed her by the shirt to prevent her from leaving. Ms. Rabalais filed a Petition for Protection from Domestic Abuse citing the August 10th incident. She also alleged that respondent repeatedly contacted her after the incident “by phone[,] email and 3rd parties to get [her] to talk to him” and that he also made “threats” through her places of employment “trying to find [her] to talk.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found respondent violated the aforementioned Canons as alleged by the Commission, and suspended respondent without pay for six months, and ordered him to reimburse and pay to the Commission $3,040.02 in costs. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish" on Justia Law

At issue in consolidated cases was the correctness of administrative decisions issued by the Louisiana Tax Commission (“Commission”) on review of the valuations, for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, by the Orleans Parish Tax Assessor (“Assessor”) of a low-income housing development, owned by Opportunity Homes Limited Partnership (“Opportunity Homes”), for purposes of assessment of ad valorem taxes. The Commission ruled in favor of Opportunity Homes for both tax years. The administrative decisions were upheld by the district court but reversed by the appellate court. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the assessment values as determined by the Commission. The Court found no conflict between La. R.S. 47:2323, providing parish assessors a choice of three generally recognized appraisal methods to utilize to determine fair market value (the market approach, the cost approach, and/or the income approach), and La. Admin. Code, Title 61, Part V, sec. 303(C), which recommended the use of the income approach for assessing affordable rental housing, such as the Opportunity Homes LIHTC development. The Supreme Court found this case turned purely on the facts established before the Commission, proving that the income approach was the more appropriate method for determining fair market value in this case. Consequently, the appellate court erred in holding that the Commission’s decisions were in violation of statutory provisions, in excess of its authority, based upon unlawful procedures, and legally incorrect. View "Williams v. Opportunity Homes Limited Partnership" on Justia Law