Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) that Judge Darryl Derbigny be publicly censured, ordered to reimburse the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judicial Expense Fund (“JEF”) $57,359.96, and ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $8,150.24 in hard costs. The recommendation stems from Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program and charges that he accepted insurance coverage and benefits beyond those allowed by law or available to all other court employees, the premiums for which were paid from the JEF. The Supreme Court concluded the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program rose to the level of sanctionable misconduct under either the Code of Judicial Conduct or Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. However, the Court agreed with the Commission that Judge Derbigny was not entitled to the benefits of any whole life insurance policies or the Exec-U-Care program under the plain language of La. R.S. 13:691. Because Judge Derbigny already surrendered the cash value of the whole life policies to the JEF, the Court ordered him to reimburse the JEF $10,002.58, representing the out-of-pocket reimbursements paid to Judge Derbigny under the Exec-U-Care program. The Court declined to impose Judge Derbigny with hard costs incurred by the Commission. View "In re: Judge Darryl Derbigny" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Johno filed suit against Plaquemines Parish Government (“PPG”) and numerous other defendants alleging his house was unlawfully demolished by PPG and its agents after Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff subsequently moved to have La. R.S. 9:2800.17, which provided retroactive statutory immunity to the government and its agents for certain actions taken in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, declared unconstitutional. The District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. Significantly, the issue of immunity was never raised or argued by PPG. Only one of the defendants, Hard Rock Construction, LLC, one of the contractors for PPG, appealed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed: "When a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. Thus, a cause of action, once accrued, cannot be divested by subsequent legislation." Because the plaintiff’s causes of action accrued before effective date of the statute, the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this matter. View "Johno v. Doe" on Justia Law

Claimant Richard Borja, was employed by St. Bernard Parish Government (“St. Bernard”) as a firefighter. In March of 2004, claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging that he had injured his right knee and right thumb in an accident in 2002, and he also alleged he had an occupational disease. He described his injuries on the 2004 disputed claim for compensation as a “torqued knee” and “Heart and Lung,” indirectly referencing the Fireman’s Heart and Lung Act. After the accident, the claimant began receiving maximum workers’ compensation benefits, which continued until St. Bernard terminated them one year later. In the meantime, claimant had taken disability retirement in January 2003. The disputed claim form was filed within one year of the termination of the benefits. St. Bernard ultimately admitted that claimant had sustained an injury to his right knee, but disputed any thumb injury as well as any heart and lung claims as being related to his employment, stating that it did not know about the injuries, or that alternatively, they were prescribed. While St. Bernard conceded the claimant had been receiving the maximum benefits from the date of the accident until January 2003, it also maintained that because the claimant voluntarily retired in that month, he had removed himself from the workforce and was no longer entitled to future workers’ compensation benefits. Throughout the 2004 litigation, claimant had consistently argued that his heart and lung conditions were related to his employment. The dispute eventually went to mediation, which resulted in a compromise that claimant would receive back compensation payments in two lump sums, bringing him current to 2008, and that he would receive weekly indemnity benefits which were the maximum claimant could receive at that time. By October 2008, claimant moved dismiss the 2004 litigation noting “that this matter has been settled in full.” By 2013, St. Bernard, identifying the claimant’s benefits as Supplemental Earnings Benefits (“SEBs”), gave notice that it would terminate SEBs effective August 27, 2013, on the basis that he would have received the full 520 weeks of payments. In November 2013, claimant filed another disputed claim for compensation citing “knees, heart and lung” as his injuries. Specifically, he described his 2002 injury to the knee. St. Bernard filed exceptions of prescription and res judicata. A workers’ compensation judge granted the exception of res judicata for the knee injury, and granted the exception of prescription as to the claim under the “Heart and Lung Statute.” On appeal, a majority of the court of appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. After its review, the Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the claimant’s request for medical benefits under the heart and lung statute had prescribed because claimant timely filed his 2013 disputed claim asserting permanent and total disability as a result of his heart and lung condition. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment affirming the workers’ compensation judge’s rulings sustaining the exception of prescription and the exception of res judicata. View "Borja v. Fara St. Bernard Parish Gov't" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a res nova issue of whether a claim for negligent credentialing fell within the purview of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA) and was, therefore, subject to its statutory cap on damages. After completion of the medical review process, plaintiffs Brandi, Veronica, and Joseph Billeaudeau proceeded in their suit against Opelousas General Hospital Authority (OGH), among other defendants, for injuries Brandi sustained allegedly arising from the medical malpractice of Dr. Kondilo Skirlis-Zavala, an independent contractor working in the OGH’s emergency department (ED). Along with their medical malpractice claims, plaintiffs specifically alleged OGH was negligent in credentialing Dr. Zavala and subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination that their negligent credentialing claim was not subject to the LMMA’s cap on damages. The District Court granted the motion and ultimately certified the judgment as final. The Court of Appeal affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ negligent credentialing claim did not fall within the provisions of the LMMA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeal. View "Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

This matter involved the interpretation and application of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. (Yesterdays) and Cowboy’s Nightlife, Inc. (Cowboy’s) were cash-based bars or nightclubs located adjacent to each other in Calcasieu Parish. The clubs were audited in 2009, by the Calcasieu Parish School System Sales and Use Tax Department ("Collector) for years 2005 through 2008, on the basis that the clubs had violated their duties as tax collection agents for the Calcasieu Parish School System. The trial court found ambiguity in the language of the ULSTC requiring the plaintiff nightclubs to “keep and preserve suitable records” of all sales and expenditures. The trial court then found the tax collector had failed to show that the records actually kept by the clubs, in this case, bank statements and deposit slips, were not "suitable records" within the meaning of the ULSTC. The trial court further found the tax collector’s assessment was arbitrary and that the tax collector had failed to establish that its methodology for auditing the taxpayer was proper. Accordingly, the trial court: (1) ordered the tax collector to refund amounts paid under protest by the clubs; (2) determined that prescription had run on the sales taxes for the years 2005 and 2006 for one of the clubs, aside from those taxes admittedly withheld by the clubs; and (3) denied the tax collector’s motion for new trial and awarded attorney fees to the clubs. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment ordering a refund of the taxes and interest paid under protest by the clubs. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sales & Use Tax Dept." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Alexandria Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board properly excluded a firefighter’s alleged failed breath alcohol test results, resulting in the firefighter’s reinstatement to employment after the City of Alexandria had terminated him. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, finding the Board should have considered the breath alcohol test results. The court of appeal overturned the trial court, reinstating the firefighter’s employment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Board’s exclusion of the breath test results was incorrect and further, the court of appeal was in error in reversing the trial court’s ruling that the breath alcohol test results were admissible. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment reversing the Board’s decision was reinstated, and the case was remanded back to the Board for proper consideration of the breath alcohol test results. View "City of Alexandria v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) was in the business of generating electric power in Lake Charles. In order to comply with state and federal environmental regulations, NISCO introduces limestone into its power generation process; the limestone acts as a “scrubbing agent.” The limestone chemically reacts with sulfur to make ash, which NISCO then sells to LA Ash, for a profit of roughly $6.8 million annually. LA Ash sells the ash to its customers for varying commercial purposes, including roads, construction projects, environmental remediation, etc. NISCO appealed when taxes were collected on its purchase of limestone over four tax periods. NISCO claimed its purchase of limestone was subject to the “further processing exclusion” of La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), which narrowed the scope of taxable sales. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted NISCO’s writ application to determine the taxability of the limestone. The trial court ruled in the Tax Collectors' favor. After its review, the Supreme Court found that NISCO’s by-product of ash was the appropriate end product to analyze for purposes of determining the “further processing exclusion’s” applicability to the purchase of limestone. Moreover, under a proper “purpose” test, the third prong of the three-part inquiry enunciated in "International Paper v. Bridges," (972 So.2d 1121(2008)) was satisfied, "as evidenced by NISCO’s choice of manufacturing process and technology, its contractual language utilized in its purchasing of the limestone, and its subsequent marketing and sale of the ash." Therefore the Court reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of NISCO. View "Bridges v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' writs in consolidated cases to review the appellate court's interpretation of the Medical Malpractice Act provision LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(2)(b) directing that a request for review of a malpractice claim "shall be deemed filed on the date of receipt of the request stamped and certified by the division of administration." The Louisiana Division of Administration (“DOA”) maintained, and the appellate court agreed, that Section 1231.8(A)(2)(b) required that a request for review to be “stamped and certified” by the DOA prior to being considered “received.” This construction rendered the plaintiffs’ electronically-transmitted requests untimely, as prescribed, despite having been filed via facsimile transmission before midnight on the last day of the prescriptive period, though after the DOA’s regular business hours. After review, the Supreme Court found that when LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(2)(b) was read in conjunction with Louisiana’s Uniform Electronic Transmission Act (“UETA”), LSA-R.S. 9:2601 et seq., it was clear that the plaintiffs’ facsimile-transmitted requests for review were “received” by the DOA when transmitted into the DOA’s facsimile transmission system on the last day of the prescriptive period, and the plaintiffs’ requests for review were not prescribed. View "In re: Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Peighton Miller, et al. v. Tulane Lakeside Hospital" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal centered on whether a statutory prescriptive period could be shortened by an administrative rule. This issue arose in a workers’ compensation case where the hearing officer refused to consider the worker’s request to have medically recommended magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of his lumbar spine because the worker failed to appeal the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration medical director’s decision denying his request for medical treatment within the 15-day time period required by an administrative rule. In so doing, the hearing officer sustained defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription. After review, the Supreme Court found the hearing officer erred as a matter of law. The Court therefore reversed and vacated in part that portion of the judgment sustaining the defendants’ peremptory exception of prescription, and the case was remanded for the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) to consider the merits of the worker’s claim that the medical director failed to appropriately apply the medical treatment guidelines in denying the lumbar spine MRI requested by the worker’s orthopedic surgeon. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Arrant v. Wayne Acree PLS, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the email communications of an employee of a public agency, via the public agency's email system, on private political matters with private individuals, were subject to disclosure under Louisiana's Public Records Law, when those emails have been referenced in audits of the public agency. William Shane, a private citizen, exchanged emails related to political matters in 2010 with Lucien Gunter, who was then the Executive Director of the Jefferson Parish Economic Development Commission (“JEDCO”). In June of 2012, the results of an audit on JEDCO operations were released by outside auditing company, which noted that there had been some “de minimis use” of JEDCO's email systems by “certain JEDCO employees” to engage in “political campaign activities” during 2010. Subsequently, in October, The Times-Picayune reporter Drew Broach transmitted a public records request via email to JEDCO seeking to inspect the emails. JEDCO's then-public records custodian denied the public records request, stating that the emails at issue were not subject to disclosure because they were “purely personal in nature” and had “no relation to the public business of JEDCO,” and, even if considered public records, they were exempted from disclosure under LSA-Const. Art. I, Sec. 5's right to privacy. Upon a balancing of the public and private interests, the Supreme Court concluded that constitutional rights of privacy and association asserted by the plaintiff/private email correspondent were adequately protected by the release of the emails with redaction of all references to the private individuals, as ordered by the district court. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision and reinstated the district court decision. View "Shane v. Jefferson Parish" on Justia Law