Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Louisiana law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from the claims handling by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company following an automobile accident. In 2005, Danny Kelly was injured when the insured, Henry Thomas, and he were traveling in opposite directions. Both Kelly and a witness told police that Thomas had failed to yield to oncoming traffic, but Thomas maintained he was not at fault. Kelly was taken to a hospital by ambulance and treated for a fractured femur. He remained hospitalized for approximately six days. The cost of his medical care totaled $26,803.17. Both questions related to claims that an insurer was liable for subjecting its insured to a court judgment in excess of insurance policy limits. The Louisiana Court responded to the questions: (1) A firm settlement offer was unnecessary for an insured to sustain a cause of action against an insurer for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, because the insurer's duties to the insured can be triggered by information other than the mere fact that a third party has made a settlement offer; and (2) an insurer could be found liable under La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(1) for misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts that are not related to the insurance policy’s coverage because the statute prohibits the misrepresentation of “pertinent facts,” without restriction to facts “relating to any coverages.” View "Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Across the state, plaintiffs were filing complaints against health care providers from whom they sought treatment following automobile accidents and with whom their health care insurers had contracted reimbursement rates for the services rendered. At issue was the legality of these providers' policy of collecting or attempting to collect the undiscounted rate from the insured if a liability insurer may be liable, implemented through the filing of medical liens against plaintiffs' lawsuits and settlements pursuant to the health care provider lien statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the appellate courts of this state on the issue of whether a class action is the superior method for adjudicating actions brought pursuant to the Health Care Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act ("Balance Billing Act"). After review, the Court found plaintiffs in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal proceeded as a class, while plaintiffs in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal were denied class certification. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the class action was superior to any other available method for a fair and efficient adjudication of the common controversy over the disputed billing and lien practices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Finding all other requirements for class certification properly met, the Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Baker v. PHC-Minden, L.P." on Justia Law

This case presented a res nova issue for the Louisiana Supreme Court: whether gradual noise induced hearing loss caused by occupational exposure to hazardous noise levels was a personal injury by accident or an occupational disease, or both, under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act ("LWCA"), thereby entitling the defendant employer to immunity from suits in tort under the exclusivity provisions of the LWCA. Interpreting the Act and mindful of the clear legislative purpose behind the workers' compensation scheme, the Louisiana Court found occupational noise-induced hearing loss fell squarely within the parameters of the LWCA, either the pre-1990 definition of “accident” or the post-1975 definition of “occupational disease.” As such, the Court concluded the defendants were entitled to immunity from suits in tort under the LWCA. Accordingly, the court of appeal properly reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. View "Arrant v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose on March 14, 2011 when, unbeknownst to school bus driver Harold Thibeaux, six-year-old La'Derion Miller's arm became trapped in the school bus door while he was attempting to board the bus. La'Derion was dragged by the school bus some eighty feet, and, when his arm became dislodged from the door, he fell beneath the wheels of the bus and was critically injured. La'Derion died approximately forty minutes later. La'Derion's mother, Heather Jagneaux, witnessed the accident from her front yard and heard La'Derion call out for her help, but she was unable to reach him. The issue presented in this wrongful death and survival action was whether a putative father was entitled to seek filiation of his deceased minor child by simply alleging in his petition that he is the biological father of the child. Concluding that the appellate court erred in holding that the plaintiff-father alleged insufficient facts to constitute a filiation action, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Thibeaux" on Justia Law

In 2002, Warren Lester and hundreds of other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corp. and others seeking personal injury damages allegedly caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) and other hazardous materials at various Louisiana pipeyards operated by Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (“ITCO”). A flight of several plaintiffs, including John Oleszkowicz, was severed and transferred to the 24th Judicial District Court, at which point the only remaining defendants were ITCO and Exxon. The jury considered each of the plaintiffs’ compensatory claims for increased risk of cancer, as well as a claim for exemplary damages pursuant to former La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. During the course of trial, the district court instructed the jurors that plaintiffs could bring a “new lawsuit” in the event they actually contracted cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for the increased risk of cancer. Oleszkowicz was personally awarded $115,000 in compensatory damages. Significantly, the jury did not award exemplary damages to the plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, based on a finding that Exxon did not engage in wanton or reckless conduct in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied writs. Several months after the verdict, Oleszkowicz was diagnosed with prostate cancer. As a result, he filed the instant suit against Exxon and others, alleging his cancer stemmed from the same NORM exposure at ITCO’s pipeyard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim for punitive and exemplary damages was barred by res judicata and, if so, whether “exceptional circumstances” existed to justify not applying res judicata to bar the claim, as set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A). Although the court of appeal cited “exceptional circumstances” to justify relief from the res judicata effect of the jury’s verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the Supreme Court found no such “exceptional circumstances” exist under the facts of this case and reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a claim for punitive damages after having settled such claims relating to fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer in a prior suit, albeit with a reservation of rights as to a claim for damages related to future cancer diagnosed after the effective date of the settlement agreement. The trial court found res judicata barred the plaintiff’s subsequent claim for punitive damages relating to the diagnosis of cancer where the same alleged misconduct had given rise to the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in the earlier litigation asserting fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer. The court of appeal granted writs and summarily reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding the plaintiff had established an exception to res judicata under La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A)(3), because he had reserved his right to bring another action based on the future diagnosis of cancer. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the punitive damages related to conduct and were separate from compensatory damages for injury. Because the plaintiff in this case specifically released all punitive and exemplary damages arising out of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, his subsequent claim for punitive damages was barred by res judicata. View "Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, Dave Peterson, while riding a motorcycle that he co-owned with Benjamin Gibson, was involved in an accident with a sport utility vehicle driven by Michael Johnson. Peterson died from the injuries he received in the accident. At the time of his death, Peterson lived with his girlfriend, Ashanti Green, and their two minor children. Green filed a wrongful death action in 2008, as tutrix for the minor children, and naming as defendants: Michael Johnson and his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance; Allstate Insurance Company, as the UM insurer of the plaintiff, who contended that coverage extended to Peterson under her policy provisions; and American Southern Home Insurance Company as the alleged insurer of the motorcycle. By a supplemental petition, Allstate was also named as a defendant in its capacity as Gibson's automobile insurer on grounds that UM coverage was provided to Peterson under that policy. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a motorcycle accident victim, ostensibly insured under the provisions of the motorcycle co-owner’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) automobile insurance policy, was entitled to UM coverage under the policy even though there was no coverage for the accident under the policy’s liability provisions. Finding the insurer failed to demonstrate a lack of UM coverage, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the UM insurer, and the appellate court erred in affirming the ruling. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Green v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This case has its roots in 2011, where, at approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, Royce Bufkin, Jr. was walking through the French Quarter from a jewelry store on Royal Street to a wine shop on Chartres Street, via Conti Street. Outside a building under renovation at 622 Conti Street, Bufkin encountered a construction barrier blocking the sidewalk, which directed pedestrians to use the sidewalk on the other side of the street. At this location, there was also a large construction dumpster placed on several adjacent on-street parking spaces by Shamrock Construction Co., Inc., in connection with renovations it had contracted to make at 622 Conti Street. While attempting to cross the street by the dumpster, Bufkin was hit by a bicyclist and injured. At the time of the accident, the bicyclist, was working in the course and scope of his employment as a deliveryman for Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC d/b/a Felipe’s Taqueria Restaurant, was traveling in the wrong direction (away from the river) on Conti Street. Bufkin had stopped before crossing Conti, next to the dumpster, to allow two cars to pass, but failed to look to his right before crossing the street, and he did not see the bicyclist approaching. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Shamrock breached any legal duty owed to a pedestrian crossing a street next to the contractor’s dumpster, who was then struck by an oncoming bicyclist. After a thorough review of the record presented, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the dumpster was obvious and apparent, and not unreasonably dangerous; thus, there was no duty to warn of the clearly visible obstruction, and the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment dismissing the contractor. View "BUFKIN, JR. v. FELIPE'S LOUISIANA, LLC, ET AL." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to answer the question of whether a one-year time period for instituting a survival action pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1, particularly as amended by Acts 1986, No. 211, section 2, was prescriptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3447, or is peremptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3458. The trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of peremption and no cause of action. The trial court found the plaintiff’s survival action was extinguished because it was perempted, having been filed more than one year from the date of the decedent’s death. The court of appeal reversed, finding the one-year period for bringing the survival action is a period of liberative prescription rather than a period of peremption. The court of appeal then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. View "Watkins v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court was whether La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to requests for medical treatment and/or disputes arising out of requests for medical treatment in cases in which the compensable accident or injury occurred prior to the effective date of the medical treatment schedule. The Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) ruled that the medical treatment schedule applied to all requests for medical treatment submitted after its effective date, regardless of the date of injury or accident. The court of appeal reversed, holding that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was substantive in nature and could not be applied retroactively to rights acquired by a claimant whose work-related accident antedated the promulgation of the medical treatment schedule. The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the court of appeal and found that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was a procedural statute and, thus, did not operate retroactively to divest a claimant of vested rights. As a result, the statute applied to all requests for medical treatment and/or all disputes emanating from requests for medical treatment after the effective date of the medical treatment schedule, regardless of the date of the work-related injury or accident. View "Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dardar" on Justia Law