Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

In October 2003, insurance agency Plaintiff Kennedy, Lewis, Renton & Associates, Inc. ("KLR"), secured a property insurance policy with Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") for Plaintiff Kirk Prest on property located in Boothville, Plaquemines Parish. Hurricane Ivan damaged Plaintiffs' buildings in 2004. Plaintiffs subsequently made repairs and undertook new construction on the property insured by Citizens. Because they were penalized for being underinsured for their losses in Hurricane Ivan, Plaintiffs wanted to ensure their property was properly covered by sufficient amounts of insurance in the future. The total amount of insurance coverage on the property was $350,000. As each phase of reconstruction and expansion was completed, Plaintiffs requested increased coverage on their buildings. There was a mistake on the form sent requesting increased coverage, in that the words "renew policy" were typed in rather than "increasing coverage." However, the comments immediately below correctly described the increased amounts of coverage on the buildings requested by the policy holder. Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, eleven days after an August 2005 policy change request. At that time, Plaintiffs believed they had a total of $540,000 in insurance coverage on their property. The KMR insurance agent assisting Plaintiffs in requesting the coverage increases also believed Plaintiffs had coverage in that amount. In May 2006, Citizens sent a letter to Plaintiffs, advising them the policy had been reviewed and the requested increases in the policy limits would not be honored. According to Citizens, Plaintiffs only had the original $350,000 worth of coverage on their property. Plaintiffs filed suit against Citizens, seeking payment of the full policy amounts, including the amount of the requested coverage increases, attorney fees and penalties. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also sought recovery from KLR. After engaging in pretrial discovery, Plaintiffs and Citizens entered into a settlement agreement in late 2008. Without admitting liability, Citizens settled the claims against it for a total of $540,000 from Citizens. After trial on the merits against KLR, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding KLR was negligent in its handling of its clients' requests for coverage increases. KLR appealed both the finding of liability and the award of damages. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence in part, holding there was manifest error in the trial court's finding the insurance agency failed to exercise reasonable diligence with regard to a July 2005 request for increased coverage. The Supreme Court granted KLR's writ, primarily to determine the correctness of the trial court's award of general damages. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages and reversed that portion of the damage award. View "Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (specifically La. R.S. 23:1036) as the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter in claims for personal injury against the "fire company," similarly applies to claims for personal injury against fellow volunteer members. After reviewing the record and the law, the Court found the defendant failed to establish that the Workers’ Compensation Law granted immunity to fellow volunteer members of a volunteer fire company from suits in tort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Champagne v. American Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a member of a putative class was entitled to the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 when an independent, individual lawsuit is filed prior to a ruling on the class certification issue. The respective district courts in each of these cases sustained exceptions of prescription, dismissing plaintiffs' individual lawsuits filed prior to a resolution of the class certification issue in class action proceedings in which the plaintiffs were putative members. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissals, finding that the filing of an individual lawsuit by a member of a putative class prior to a ruling on the class certification issue operates as an "opt out" of the class action and a forfeiture of the suspension provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court found that because plaintiffs were members of a class asserted in a class action petition, they were entitled to the benefits of the suspension of prescription provided under La. C.C.P. art. 596, notwithstanding that they also filed individual actions prior to a resolution of the class certification issue. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts sustaining exceptions of prescription to the petitions of the plaintiffs and remanded these matters to the respective district courts for further proceedings. View "Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider two separate, but related issues: (1) whether the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 extended to a putative class member who filed an individual claim after a ruling on the class certification issue and, if so, (2) whether La. C.C.P. art. 596 suspended prescription when the putative class action is filed in another jurisdiction. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Court found that the filing of an individual lawsuit after a ruling on class certification does not operate as an "opt out" of a class action proceeding and a forfeiture of the benefits of suspension provided in La. C.C.P. art. 596, but that the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596 do not extend to suspend prescription on claims asserted in a putative class action filed in a federal court. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's judgment denying the defendant's exception of prescription, sustain the exception, and remanded this case to the district court to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the petition, if they could, to allege facts to show their claims were not prescribed. View "Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether a written settlement agreement compromising a contested property insurance claim constituted a "proof of loss" under La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(A)(1) sufficient to trigger the penalties set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(B) for the insurer's arbitrary and capricious failure to timely pay the settlement funds. Plaintiff, Katie Realty, Ltd., filed suit against defendant, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), for its untimely handling of plaintiff's Hurricane Gustav property damage claim. The matter was settled through mediation. When Citizens failed to timely pay the settlement funds, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce settlement and assess penalties pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892 and 1973. In accordance with La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(B)(1), the District Court awarded plaintiff $125,000 in penalties. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the settlement agreement constituted sufficient "proof of loss" under the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(A)(1) and Citizens' misconduct warranted the imposition of penalties under La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(B)(1). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the written settlement agreement did not constitute satisfactory proof of loss under the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(A)(1) sufficient to trigger the penalties set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 22:1892(B)(1). Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and rendered judgment awarding plaintiff $5,000 in statutory penalties for Citizens' failure to timely pay the settlement funds in accordance with the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 22:1973(B)(2) and (C). View "Katie Realty, Ltd. v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiffs' dismissal with prejudice of a lawsuit filed in federal court after the defendant has made a general appearance of record was a "voluntary dismissal" for purposes of La. C.C. art. 3463, which provides "[i]nterruption [of prescription] is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff abandons, voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter . . ." After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and the reinstated the trial court's dismissing plaintiffs' suit. View "Sims v. American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In February of 2009, a vehicle driven by Antoine Ellis ran a stop sign and struck a vehicle owned and operated by Ann Bernard. Norell Bernard and Andrea Bernard were guest passengers in Ann Bernard's vehicle at the time of the accident. Mr. Ellis was uninsured, and Ann, Norell and Andrea Bernard all filed suit against Imperial (Ann Bernard's insurer) for UM coverage. While Imperial did not dispute its named insured Ann Bernard was entitled to UM coverage, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Norell and Andrea Bernard's claims on the basis that the guest passengers were not residents of Ann Bernard's household, and therefore did not meet the definition of "insured person" under the terms of the insurance policy for UM coverage. Imperial challenged the court rulings that denied the insurer summary judgment on that issue. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were liability insureds under the Imperial policy and therefore entitled to UM coverage. Thus, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, denying Imperial's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Bernard v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Claimant Henry Marange filed a disputed claim for compensation against his employer, Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc. asserting he injured his back in a work-related accident. Custom Metal answered the petition, and denied Claimant's allegation. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a workplace accident occurred. Upon review of the facts in record, the Court concluded that the court of appeal erred in reversing the OWC's judgment. View "Marange v. Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc." on Justia Law

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits. View "Clay v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law