Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Randy Thomas, Jr. failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Thomas to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Thomas to pay a penalty. View "In re Justice of the Peace Randy Thomas, Jr. " on Justia Law

Robert Gathen filed for divorce from his wife Vanessa in 2005. At the time, the couple had two children, one of which had been born in the State of Louisiana. The couple was granted joint custody, but Mrs. Gathen was the domiciliary parent. Over the course of three years, Mrs. Gathen requested for leave to move to Washington State with the children, and each time, the court denied her requests. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mrs. Gathen argued that the trial court did not perform a thorough analysis of the family's circumstances to make its determinations. The Court found that while state law mandated that the trial court consider all factors listed in the code to make its determination for relocation, it is not an error of law that warrants appellate court review. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny Mrs. Gathen's relocation requests.

In September 2007, Petitioner Mitchell Glasgow was severely burned from a fire at an oil well at which he worked. At the time, Therral Story Well Service (TSWS) directly employed Mr. Glasgow. The mineral owners contracted with another company, PAR Minerals, Inc., to produce oil and gas. In turn, PAR Minerals contracted with TSWS to drill a well. The well penetrated into formations that were pressurized with hydrocarbons. Mr. Glasgow was circulating water trough the well while waiting for heavier drilling mud to be pumped into the well to control the pressure. A TSWS employee told Mr. Glasgow to stand away from the well because the pressure was dangerous, but a PAR Minerals "on-site supervisor" ordered Mr. Glasgow to get on his station at the pump, and jump away only if gas escaped from the well. Gas escaped, ignited, and severely burned Mr. Glasgow. Mr. Glasgow filed suit against PAR Minerals and its insurer. PAR Minerals would receive service of process one year later. PAR Minerals moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was Mr. Glasgow's "statutory employer" and therefore immune to lawsuits like his. The district court granted PAR Minerals' motion, holding that because of the year delay in getting PAR Minerals notice of the lawsuit, Mr. Glasgow's suit was prescribed and untimely. A split appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal, and Mr. Glasgow appealed. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts erred in dismissing Mr. Glasgow's claims as prescribed. The Court reversed the lower courts' holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

To provide relief in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress appropriated funds to Louisiana which distributed some of those funds through the "Road Home" program. The State required more than 150,000 Road Home grant recipients to execute a "Limited Subrogation/Assignment Agreement." The Road Home program created "perverse incentives" for insurance companies and their insured homeowners: some insurers inadequately adjusted and paid grant-eligible claims, and some grant-eligible homeowners had little motivation for file insurance claims. As a result, Road Home applications skyrocketed and created a $1 billion shortfall in the program. The State filed suit against more than 200 insurance companies, seeking to recover the funds spent and yet to be spent on claims under the Road Home program. The Insurance Companies successfully removed the case to the federal district court. The Insurance Companies then sought to dismiss the State's case, arguing that as a matter of law, anti-assignment clauses in the homeowners' policies invalidated the subrogation/assignment to the State. The federal district court denied the Companies' motion to dismiss. The Companies appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Because interpretation of the policy provisions at issue was a matter of State law, the Court certified interpretation to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that there is no public policy in Louisiana that precludes anti-assignment claims from applying to post-loss assignments. The Court commented that the language of the anti-assignment clause must clearly and unambiguously express that it applies to post-loss assignments, and as such must be evaluated on a policy-by-policy basis.

A jury found that Morehouse General Hospital (Morehouse) committed four acts of malpractice that caused an injury to the son of Jonathon and Belinda Johnson. The jury apportioned 80% of the fault to Morehouse, and 20% to the treating physician. The appellate court found the jury was wrong in finding Morehouse liable for three of the four acts, and reversed those figures (20% to Morehouse; 80% to the physician). The Supreme Court was asked to review whether the appellate court properly modified the jury verdict. After considering the record and the law, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court was correct in finding Morehouse was only liable for one act of negligence, but it disagreed with its apportionment of fault. The Court split the fault between the parties 50%-50%.

The State, through its Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning & Control, (State), issued a project manual to solicit bids for the removal and replacement of cabins at Bayou Segnette State Park. The manual included a bid form that set the procedure and conditions for submitting bids for the project. A joint venture of several companies submitted the lowest bid. Respondent Infinity Surety Agency (Infinity) wrote the bid-bond to the joint venture's winning bid. The State would later discover that Infinity was not qualified to write surety bonds on public works projects. The State notified the joint venture and Infinity that its bid was forfeited, and it rebid the entire project at a higher price. The State subsequently sued the joint venture and Infinity for the difference between its bid and the total of the rebid. The joint venture and Infinity filed peremptory exceptions of "no cause of action," alleging that the State's petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Respondents argued that the State should have rejected their bid, rather than incur damages when it found the surety bond was deficient. The trial court found that the bid was "non-responsive" and should not have been accepted by the State. The appellate court agreed, holding that the State should have been more careful when reviewing bids. The Supreme Court found that Respondents' exceptions should have been overruled. "Rather than focusing on the allegations in the petition, both courts below apparently made a factual determination that [the joint venture's] bid was non-responsive... and then based their rulings sustaining the exceptions on that determination." The Court concluded that using the exceptions to dismiss the State's claims was improper. Accordingly it reversed the holdings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A New Orleans bank robbery in 1984 ended with the death of a Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's deputy. A unanimous jury found Defendant Thomas Sparks, Jr. guilty of first-degree murder in the deputy's death. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously returned a death sentence. Defendant raised twenty-three assignments of error on appeal. After a thorough review of the law and evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's murder conviction, and conditionally affirmed the imposition of the death sentence. The Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether Defendant received effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.

A tract of land had been in the Roberts family for decades. A fence ran east to west in the middle of the property, and had been undisturbed for over thirty years. The amount of land north of the fence was approximately fifteen acres. The owners of the adjacent property, The Morgans, adversely possessed these fifteen acres for more than thirty years. In 2002, the Succession of Marie Morgan ("the Succession") sold its land to the Loutre Land and Timber Company (Loutre) through a full-warranty deed, which was recorded later that year. Edward Roberts conducted a survey of the land he inherited from his parents. His share included the fifteen acres adversely possessed by the Succession. He sought a quitclaim deed from the Succession to recognize his right to those fifteen acres. Despite the Succession's attorney informing Mr. Roberts that the land had been sold, the Succession executed a quitclaim to Mr. Roberts in 2003, which Mr. Roberts subsequently recorded. Later that year, Mr. Roberts destroyed pine seedlings within the fifteen acres along the fence. Loutre filed suit asserting its ownership of land and sought damages for the destruction to the trees. The trial court entered judgment on behalf of Loutre, and Mr. Roberts appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that Loutre was the proper owner of the fifteen acres, and reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.