Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned Defendants’ entitlement to trial by jury. Specifically, whether the Court’s holding in "Beauclaire v. Greenhouse" mandated that a resolution in accordance with La. R.S. 13:5015, waiving the prohibition against jury trials in suits against a political subdivision, must be passed by the political subdivision prior to a plaintiff filing suit for the political subdivision to be entitled to a trial by jury. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court found that Defendants were entitled to trial by jury, and therefore reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Marcille v. Dauzat" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant could be guilty of second degree murder for leaving her two small children home alone in the middle of the night, during which time a fire broke out and one of her children died in the fire. After reviewing the facts and the applicable law, the Court found that a conviction for second degree murder could not be supported where defendant’s criminally negligent act of leaving her young children alone in the middle of the night was not a "direct act" of killing, but was instead a criminally negligent act of lack of supervision which resulted in death. For that reason, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide. View "Louisiana v. Small" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of the City of Bossier City to determine the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 33:2501(C)(1); specifically, whether the statutory authority of the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board to modify discipline was conditioned upon a finding that the appointing authority acted in bad faith or without cause. After review, the Court found that a municipal fire and police civil service board has the statutory authority to review and modify the discipline imposed, even when the appointing authority acts in good faith for cause. View "City of Bossier City v. Vernon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in overturning Defendant’s conviction for aggravated burglary. Jerome Bryant, Jr. argued that the State failed to prove that he actually entered the victim's home. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the trial judge’s finding that Defendant entered the victim’s home, the Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Louisiana v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant James C. Magee was indicted by a grand jury for the first degree murder of Adrienne Magee, the first degree murder of Ashton Zachary Magee, the attempted first degree murder of S.M., and the attempted first degree murder of L.M. Following the close of evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all counts and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, recommended two sentences of death. In accordance with that recommendation, the district court sentenced the defendant to death by lethal injection for the murders of Adrienne and Zack Magee and to two consecutive terms of 50 years of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the attempted first degree murders of S.M. and L.M. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, raising seventeen assignments of error. "After a thorough review of the law and the evidence," the Supreme Court found no merit to any of Defendant's assignments of error, and affirmed his sentences and convictions. View "Louisiana v. Magee" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Ricky Cure by bill of information with possession of heroin in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, Defendant entered a plea of guilty as charged, reserving his right to seek review of the trial court's adverse ruling on the suppression issue. The trial court sentenced him to four years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended, with four years of active probation. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court granted the state's application to review the decision below and reversed: "even assuming that [one of the responding officers] did not act reasonably when she opened the door of the Defendant's car, the lawful recovery of all of the evidence in the vehicle would have inevitably occurred once Defendant opened his hand at the officer's order and dropped the two papers of heroin onto the dashboard of the car." View "Louisiana v. Cure" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Courtney Savoy by bill of information with simple escape from the Winn Correctional Center in January of 2007. After trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the maximum term for the offense of five years' imprisonment at hard labor, to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving at the time of the escape. At sentencing, the trial court specifically took into account Defendant's rap sheet which revealed 13 prior felony convictions. The court also considered as an aggravating factor that Defendant had (in the court's opinion) lied in his testimony at trial in which he denied any complicity in the escape. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the trial court improperly precluded the defense from impeaching state witnesses with their prior inconsistent statements. On remand of the case, the state filed an amended bill of information charging Defendant with the more serious crime of aggravated escape. Defendant filed a pro se motion to quash the amended bill on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the substitution of a more serious charge for the original to punish him for success on appeal. The state rendered the motion moot by filing a third bill of information recharging Defendant with simple escape. After trial by jury in 2010, Defendant was again found guilty as charged and the trial court resentenced him. The state thereafter filed an habitual offender bill charging Defendant as a third offender on the basis of two sets of prior convictions entered on January 25, 2000, and on January 31, 2005. Defendant filed another pro se motion to quash, alleging selective prosecution and prosecutorial vindictiveness. The trial court denied the motion summarily and after a contradictory hearing, adjudicated Defendant a third felony offender. The court sentenced Defendant to ten years. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction but reversed his sentence as excessive and remanded for resentencing. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision below: the Court concluded Defendant's sentence was excessive. The Court concluded resentencing Defendant as a habitual offender to a term of imprisonment twice as long as originally imposed did "not comport with due process of law." View "Louisiana v. Savoy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash his indictment. In 2009, police found the victim, Ramon House, lying on the sidewalk, shot in the chest and ankle. He would later die from blood loss at the hospital shortly afterward. An eyewitness reported that Defendant Joshua Dion Williams, then age 19, and Defendant's friend, a juvenile, both shot the victim during a dispute over narcotics. In 2009, a grand jury indicted Defendant for second degree murder. In early 2010, Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, in which he contended that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), (which provides that the judicial administrator of the 19th JDC shall perform the function of jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish), is a special or local law prohibited by La. Const. art. III, sec. 12. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the manner of selection of the grand jury was not "illegal. . . .In fact, the selection process comported exactly with La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), which is presumed to be constitutional. Defendant's complaint, then, [was] not that the manner of selection of the grand jury was illegal in that it violated Article 404(B), it [was] that Article 404(B), itself, [was] unconstitutional. . . . a person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his rights, and, here, the Defendant has not made, or attempted to make, any showing that the Article does so." View "Louisiana v. Williams" on Justia Law

In February of 2009, a vehicle driven by Antoine Ellis ran a stop sign and struck a vehicle owned and operated by Ann Bernard. Norell Bernard and Andrea Bernard were guest passengers in Ann Bernard's vehicle at the time of the accident. Mr. Ellis was uninsured, and Ann, Norell and Andrea Bernard all filed suit against Imperial (Ann Bernard's insurer) for UM coverage. While Imperial did not dispute its named insured Ann Bernard was entitled to UM coverage, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Norell and Andrea Bernard's claims on the basis that the guest passengers were not residents of Ann Bernard's household, and therefore did not meet the definition of "insured person" under the terms of the insurance policy for UM coverage. Imperial challenged the court rulings that denied the insurer summary judgment on that issue. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were liability insureds under the Imperial policy and therefore entitled to UM coverage. Thus, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, denying Imperial's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Bernard v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law