Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue central to this case arose from Plaintiff Ginger Durio's claims for property damage to her home following Hurricane Rita and for damages and penalties against her homeowner's insurer. The Court granted review of Plaintiff's case primarily to review the correctness of the rulings of the lower courts that applied the penalty provision of La. R.S. 22:1220 (C) to contractual damages, and awarding attorney fees pursuant to the amended La. R.S. 22:658. In September 2005, Plaintiff owned a home in Lake Charles, which was covered by a policy issued by Defendant Horace Mann Insurance Company (Horace Mann). The home was damaged by the hurricane. The extent of damage to the rest of the structure and to the interior of the home was disputed. Plaintiff filed suit against the insurer alleging her home and everything in it were destroyed, but Horace Mann "consistently arbitrarily and capriciously refused to classify [the] home as a total loss." Following a bench trial, the court ruled in Plaintiff's favor. The court ordered payment of policy limits on Plaintiff's homeowner policies. Horace Mann filed a motion for new trial. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the court found it erred in awarding penalties under both La. R.S. 22:658 and La. R.S. 22:1220, and vacated those awards. Otherwise, the court denied Horace Mann’s motion for new trial. On its own motion, the court also granted a new trial relative to the attorney fees issue. Noting that newly discovered damages could trigger the amended version of La. R.S. 22:658, the court found there were newly discovered damages as established by the proofs of claim submitted, and those newly discovered damages were subsequent to the amendment. After review, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in calculating 22:1220 penalties based on contractual amounts due under the insurance contract: "[s]uch penalties are properly calculated by doubling the amount of damages sustained as a result of the insurer’s breach of its duties under the statute." Applying the proper statutory interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court amended the trial court’s judgment to reflect the correct award of penalties. Furthermore, the Court held the lower courts erred in applying the amended version of La. R.S. 22:658 allowing attorney fees to be awarded. Thus, the Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings on this issue, and vacated the award of attorney fees. In all other respects, the rulings of the lower courts were affirmed. View "Durio v. Horace Mann Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a legal malpractice claim brought by Plaintiff MB Industries, LLC (MBI) against attorneys Steven Durio and John Weinstein. The attorneys represented MBI in an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit against former MBI employees. Rather than appeal the unfavorable judgment, MBI chose to sue its former attorneys. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether a party's failure to appeal an underlying judgment waived any right to bring a legal malpractice claim based on that judgment; and (2) whether summary judgment was properly granted in light of MBI's failure to introduce expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care which would have demonstrated the attorneys' actions fell below that standard. After careful review, the Court found that Louisiana law does not impose a "per se" rule requiring an appeal before a client can sue his former attorney. Furthermore, the Court found that a party alleging legal malpractice must introduce expert testimony to establish a standard of care "except in those rare cases involving malpractice so egregious that a lay jury could infer the defendant's actions fell below any reasonable standard." The Court found that under the particular facts of this case, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that MBI failed to establish it could satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. The attorneys were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's original judgment in favor of the attorneys. View " MB Industries, LLC v. CNA Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Silver Dollar Liquor, L.L.C. ("Silver Dollar") owns the Silver Dollar Liquor Store located within District 6 of Red River Parish. Silver Dollar filed a declaratory judgment action against Defendant Red River Parish Police Jury ("Police Jury"), seeking to have Section 3-18 declared invalid because there has never been a local option election in District 6 pursuant to La. R.S. 51:191. The Police Jury answered that it had authority under La. R.S. 26:493 to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. Relying on La. R.S. 26:493, the appellate court found in favor of the Police Jury, holding Section 3-18 to be valid. Finding the appellate court's decision created a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted Silver Dollar's certiorari application to resolve the split. Upon review, the Court surmised the heart of this case involved the interpretation and applicability of La. R.S. 51:191, which requires a local-option election in order to authorize a Sunday-closing law; and La. R.S. 26:493, which delegates to political subdivisions the power to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. After review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Silver Dollar Liquor, LLC. v. Red River Parish Police Jury" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant Felton Dorsey and Randy Wilson were indicted by a Caddo Parish grand jury for the first degree murder of Joe Prock and attempted first degree murder of Bobbie Prock. The state subsequently dismissed the latter charge against both by amendment. A few months later, the State gave notice of its intention to seek the death penalty at Defendant's trial, alleging five aggravating factors. In 2009, the State filed an amended notice of intent to seek the death penalty, reducing the alleged aggravating factors to: (1) Defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery or simple robbery; (2) Defendant knowingly created a risk of death or bodily harm to more than one person; and (3) Defendant offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the commission of the offense. In his appeal, Defendant asserted twenty-six assignments of error from trial. After a thorough review of the law and evidence, the Supreme Court found none of the assignments of error constituted reversible error and therefore, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Defendant Todd Jones made a graphic sexual request of a teenage boy. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to constitute attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found that in the specific context of this crime, the request was an "act" committed "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object" such that the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, is satisfied. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile. View "Louisiana v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1999, four employees of a Domino Sugar refinery sued parent company Tate & Lyle North America Sugars, Inc. (T&L) for damages from noise exposure during their employment with T&L between 1947 and 1994. Continental Casualty Insurance Company insured T&L with eight general liability policies. Each of the policies contained exclusions for bodily injury to employees arising out of the course and scope of their employees. In one of the eight policies, the exclusion was deleted by a special endorsement effective in 1975. After T&L notified Continental of the lawsuit, Continental retained defense counsel to defend T&L. In 2001, 125 new plaintiffs were added to the suit, and the complaint was amended to allege noise exposure from 1947 to 2001. At some point, trial was continued to allow for settlement. In 2003, without Continental's consent, T&L settled with 1 of 15 "flights" of plaintiffs for $35,000 per plaintiff. After that settlement, Continental was notified. One month later, Continental withdrew from the defense, disclaiming its liability based on a mistaken belief that all of its policies contained the exclusions for injuries to employees. In the subsequent years following the first settlement, additional plaintiffs were added. In 2004, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to T&L, finding that Continental had waived its right to rely on its policy exclusion defenses for "first flight" plaintiffs. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on Continental's exclusions and its disclaiming liability for subsequent plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Court held that an insurer's breach of the duty to defend does not result in a waiver of all coverage defenses when the insured seeks indemnity under the policy. In this case, Continental had disclaimed coverage at the time more plaintiffs were added to the lawsuit, and did not provide a defense to those claims. Therefore, waiver principles did not apply. Continental was only liable to T&L in indemnity on a pro rata basis for the exposures that took place during the coverage period. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether twelve remaining plaintiff-flights met the settlement criteria. View "Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. " on Justia Law

In 2005, Jesse Brooks, Jr. an operating engineer for the Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) Industrial Plant and Maintenance was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of a highway to deliver the backhoe to another company. He made a sharp turn into a driveway and the backhoe tipped over, falling on top and killing him. His family filed a wrongful death suit against DOTD, alleging that a depression in the asphalt on the shoulder where the highway met the driveway caused the backhoe to flip over. After trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Brooks' family and awarded them damages. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed. The specific issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether DOTD's duty to maintain the shoulder encompassed the risk that a driver of a backhoe would make a sharp turn, hit the depression in the road, tip over and be crushed by the backhoe. After a review of the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that DOTD's duty did not encompass that risk. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment in favor of DOTD. View "Brooks v. Louisiana " on Justia Law

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the attorney general or whether it is necessary to also serve other entities/individuals when a tort action is brought against the State Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Plaintiff Shawn Burnett fax-filed a suit seeking damages from an automobile accident against several defendants, including the State through the DOTD. DOTD filed a motion for involuntary dismissal and exception of insufficiency of service of process because Plaintiff had not also requested service on the secretary of DOTD. After a hearing, the trial court denied DOTD's motion to dismiss and overruled its exception of insufficiency of service of process, stating, "it would be absurd that you have to serve two people with the State of Louisiana." The appellate court granted DOTD's application for supervisory writs from that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that service of citation only on the attorney general was sufficient. Consequently, the Court found that the trial court's judgment that denied DOTD's motion to dismiss was correct, and that the appellate court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's suit. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Burnett v. James Construction Group" on Justia Law

In 1995, Charles and Charlene Ebinger contracted with Venus Construction Corporation to build a home. The couple moved into their new residence in 1997. In 2003, the Ebingers filed suit against Venus alleging defects in the home's foundation. Venus sought indemnification from one of its subcontractors. At issue in this case is whether the construction company's third-party demand against its subcontractor was time-barred by state law that established a peremptive period for actions against residential building contractors. The peremptive period was established originally at ten years, but subsequent amendments shortened its duration. A 1999 amendment reduced the period to seven years; a 2003 amendment reduced it to five years. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the latest version of the statute applied in this case (2003). Consequently, the court held that the construction company's right to indemnity from its subcontractor was extinguished and its third party demand was perempted. View "Ebinger v. Venus Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Desi Fulmer was an employee with the State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Central to the case was whether an injured, state-employed seaman could sue under the State's "Jones Act" in state court or whether provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act applied. Upon consideration of the trial record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that under the Jones Act, the State waived its sovereign immunity from suits for injury. View "Fulmer v. Louisiana" on Justia Law