Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason and Christy Gray were divorced in 2005, and pursuant to a consent judgment, the parties were awarded joint custody of their son Jayden. Mr. Gray was designated as the domiciliary parent. Mr. Gray gave notice of his intent to relocate with Jayden to Alabama to join his fiancée. Mrs. Gray objected to the relocation and sought to become the domiciliary parent. The trial court approved of Mr. Gray's relocation and denied Mrs. Gray's motion to modify custody. In Spring 2009, Mrs. Gray eventually moved to dismiss her appeal the Alabama move. Mr. Gray petitioned the court again for another move, this time to Kansas. Mrs. Gray objected to this second move. A new judge presided over the second relocation hearing and prohibited Mr. Gray from relocating Jayden to Kansas. The trial court determined that Mr. Gray did not meet his burden of proving the proposed relocation would have been in the best interest of the child. The court further found that Mrs. Gray had established a material change in circumstances warranting modification of custody based on the father's violation of an ex parte order by moving the child to Kansas without court approval. Alternatively, the court found that Mrs. Gray had satisfied her burden of proof to merit a change in domiciliary custody. The appellate court reversed these decisions, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the relocation and modifying custody. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. The Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the domiciliary parent's request to relocate. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Gray v. Gray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff B.W. Greemon was a paramedic with the Bossier City Fire Department. In 2007, he responded to a call to assist an apparently intoxicated Eric Holloway who was in police custody. At the scene, Plaintiff was informed that the Mr. Holloway had consumed as many as 18 beers and was possibly a diabetic. Plaintiff evaluated Mr. Holloway and authorized his transport to jail. Mr. Holloway was transported and booked into jail where he was found dead the next morning. A complaint was filed against Plaintiff for clearing Mr. Holloway's transport to jail rather than to a medical facility. After an investigation, Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Bossier City. Plaintiff subsequently filed a civil service appeal, which was then submitted to the Civil Service Board. One Board member moved to enter into executive session, and another member "seconded" the motion. No formal vote on the motion to enter executive session was reflected in the hearing transcript, but the presiding board member clearly directed that the Civil Service Board enter the executive session, which was then closed to the public. After the session, the Board returned to an open session. The Board then publicly voted 3 to 2 to uphold Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff then appealed the Board's decision to district court, alleging that the closed executive session was a violation of the State Open Meetings Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff failed to bring a timely claim under the Open Meetings Law, and that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment under that law. The Court reversed the lower court's voiding of the Civil Service Board's action, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Greemon v. City of Bossier City " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the district court erred in declaring La. R.S. 15:560 et seq. unconstitutional. Defendants Bryan Golston, Paul Baker, Calvin Watson, Lloyd Dell and Reginald Jackson were soon-to-be-released sex offenders who had undergone the Sex Offender Assessment Panel (SOAP) process pursuant to La. R.S. 15:560 et seq. The district court found that the law was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendants. Upon careful consideration of the legislative history of the SOAP process, the Supreme Court found the law to be a regulatory rather than criminal statutory scheme, and not subject to a void-for-vagueness analysis. Furthermore, even after applying a due process analysis, the Court found no violations. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court in each of the Defendants' cases and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Golston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether La. Rev. Stat 40:1299.47(H) mandated the admission of a medical review panel when the panel exceeded its statutory authority and rendered an opinion based on Plaintiffs' credibility and not on a medical standard. After submitting their medical malpractice complaint to a medical review panel and the panel rendered an opinion, Plaintiffs Margie and John McGlothlin filed suit against Defendant Christus St. Patrick Hospital. Over both parties' objections, the district court admitted the medical panel's opinion, subject to its redaction of all credibility language. The appellate court reversed, finding the lower court erred in admitting an edited version of the opinion. The court concluded that Plaintiffs proved the hospital's malpractice caused the injury, and awarded Plaintiffs general and special damages. Upon consideration of the vel non of the appellate court's reversal, the Supreme Court found that the medical review panel's opinion was inadmissible, but that the admission was nevertheless harmless. Finding no manifest error in the jury's verdict, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital" on Justia Law

Central to this case was the issue of whether it is sufficient to serve only the head of a state agency or to also serve the attorney general and the office of risk management when a tort action is brought against the agency. In May 2003, Plaintiff Regina Whitley was five months pregnant when she was in an automobile accident. In July 2003, she delivered a stillborn infant. She filed a medical malpractice suit against the state hospital that treated her immediately following the accident. At the time of filing, Plaintiff requested service of process only on the hospital's chairman. Two and a half years later, the attorney general and the office of risk management received faxed-copies of the complaint. The hospital moved to dismiss, citing insufficiency of service of process. After a hearing, the trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initial service on only the hospital was sufficient and that the subsequent service on the attorney general and office of risk management cured the hospital's exception of insufficiency of service. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Whitley v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant John Mathieu with second degree kidnapping after an incident which Defendant, armed with a gun, confronted his ex-wife in a parking lot at her place of employment, forced her into her car and made her drive out of state. After a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty as charged. Defendant conducted portions of the trial in his own right, including the cross-examination of his ex-wife and other State witnesses, which his court-appointed attorney conducted jury selection and other portions of the trial. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years without probation or parole. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit conditionally affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, but remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Defendant made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself and whether the judge made sufficient inquiries into Defendant's competency to waive counsel and represent himself. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the record suggested that Defendant was not capable of choosing his "hybrid" representation knowingly and voluntarily. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Mathieu" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Mervin White with driving while intoxicated. After a trial by jury in 2008, he was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment at hard labor without opportunity for probation or parole. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's conviction, but vacated his sentence as excessive and reduced it to a term of ten years. The State appealed, arguing that the evidence supported Defendant's 20-year sentence. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that though Defendant's sentence fell within the upper range of sentences, it did not suggest an arbitrary departure "from a sentencing norm that might indicate disproportionate punishment." Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated Defendant's 20-year sentence. View "Louisiana v. White" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) recommended that Judge Reginald Badeaux, III be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his case. This matter stems from a 2006 divorce petition. Mary Sinclair sought to divorce her husband Cayman Sinclair. The case was randomly allotted to Judge Badeaux, who was a personal friend of the parties. Nevertheless, Judge Badeaux did not recuse himself from hearing the case. Moreover, during the sixteen months Judge Badeaux presided over the Sinclair case, he continued to socialize with Mr. Sinclair. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s findings and ordered that Judge Badeaux be publicly censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, he was ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs. View "In re Judge Reginald Badeaux, III " on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Flaherty to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Flaherty be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Flaherty to pay a penalty. View "In re Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Kevin Hoffman failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Hoffman to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Hoffman be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Hoffman to pay a penalty. View "In re Justice of the Peace Kevin Hoffman " on Justia Law