Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Within days of his twenty-seventh birthday, Clyde Snider, Jr., was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. A few months later, after complaining of chest pains, he went to a second doctor and different hospital facility. He would later receive a pacemaker. Snider sustained an unrelated injury to the area of his pacemaker, when on his return home from the hospital, his two-year-old daughter ran to greet him, jumped into his arms, and struck his chest which caused an injury to the surgical site. Returning to the hospital where he was first treated for cardiac troubles, Snider's treating physician recommended that the pacemaker be removed when he found symptoms of infection at the pacemaker site. The next day the pacemaker was removed. Subsequently, Snider sued Dr. Robin Yue, the physician who recommended he receive the pacemaker. The medical review panel concluded that Dr. Yue had failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care and that his conduct was a factor in the "minor resultant damage." The case was tried before a jury, which ruled in favor of Dr. Yue, finding that Snider had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Yue breached the applicable standard of care. Snider's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for new trial was denied by the district court judge, who stated that the jury verdict was not clearly contrary to the law and evidence. The appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of Snider and against the doctor on the issue of liability and remanded the matter to the district court to allow the parties an opportunity to complete the record as to damages. The doctor contended on appeal that the appellate court erred: in failing to adhere to the proper standard of review; in substituting its judgment on the weight of evidence, evaluation of facts, and determinations of credibility for those of the jury; in reversing the jury verdict on liability; and in its interpretation and application of the Uniform Consent Law. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because the jury concluded Snider gave informed consent in this matter, Dr. Yue did not breach the standard of care. The appellate court attributed legal error to the jury's finding because Dr. Yue did not comply with Subsection (E) of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.40. However, as compliance with the requirement of informed consent was alternatively attainable under Subsection (A) or (C), the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred. The appellate court should have applied a manifest error standard of review to the jury's factual finding that informed consent was given in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision, and remanded the case back to that court with instructions to consider and rule upon Snider's assignments of error. . View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to review an appellate court reversal of a district court's ruling that defendants, a medical diagnostic monitoring company and its employee/physician, were not "qualified health care providers" under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act for purposes of alleged acts of medical malpractice. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Luther v. IOM Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

This writ application involved the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), and whether the running of the statutory ninety (90) day grace period in which prescription is suspended in a medical malpractice case begins when a plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint is dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman, or when plaintiff is notified that his complaint has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that the 90 day grace period begins to run from the date of dismissal. Because plaintiff failed to file her petition for damages within this 90 day period, her claim was dismissed. View "Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the trial court refused to qualify an expert witness for the plaintiffs, finding he did not satisfy the requirements for expert witnesses under the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict based on plaintiffs’ failure to present expert testimony to support their case. The court of appeal reversed these rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the lower court erred in its interpretation of the Act; the expert in question was not licensed to practice medicine at the time he was to be qualified as an expert. The Court reinstated the trial court's rulings. View "Benjamin v. Zeichner" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether La. Rev. Stat 40:1299.47(H) mandated the admission of a medical review panel when the panel exceeded its statutory authority and rendered an opinion based on Plaintiffs' credibility and not on a medical standard. After submitting their medical malpractice complaint to a medical review panel and the panel rendered an opinion, Plaintiffs Margie and John McGlothlin filed suit against Defendant Christus St. Patrick Hospital. Over both parties' objections, the district court admitted the medical panel's opinion, subject to its redaction of all credibility language. The appellate court reversed, finding the lower court erred in admitting an edited version of the opinion. The court concluded that Plaintiffs proved the hospital's malpractice caused the injury, and awarded Plaintiffs general and special damages. Upon consideration of the vel non of the appellate court's reversal, the Supreme Court found that the medical review panel's opinion was inadmissible, but that the admission was nevertheless harmless. Finding no manifest error in the jury's verdict, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital" on Justia Law

A jury found that Morehouse General Hospital (Morehouse) committed four acts of malpractice that caused an injury to the son of Jonathon and Belinda Johnson. The jury apportioned 80% of the fault to Morehouse, and 20% to the treating physician. The appellate court found the jury was wrong in finding Morehouse liable for three of the four acts, and reversed those figures (20% to Morehouse; 80% to the physician). The Supreme Court was asked to review whether the appellate court properly modified the jury verdict. After considering the record and the law, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court was correct in finding Morehouse was only liable for one act of negligence, but it disagreed with its apportionment of fault. The Court split the fault between the parties 50%-50%.