Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, plaintiff Ronald Hicks was a passenger in a heavy-duty flatbed truck when it was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Robert Harger, Jr., who was traveling at approximately 60-65 mph and did not brake before impact. Plaintiff was treated on 79 occasions with several orthopedic and pain management specialists and surgeons and underwent 13 separate procedures. Relevant here, plaintiff was initially examined by Dr. Jason Smith, an orthopedic spine surgeon, to whom he was referred in conjunction with his worker’s compensation plan. Dr. Smith examined plaintiff and found no evidence of obvious trauma resulting from the accident. Instead, he determined the condition of plaintiff’s lower back was indicative of preexisting degenerative disc disease that was aggravated by the accident. While Dr. Smith did not believe plaintiff exaggerated his pain, he also did not believe plaintiff was a candidate for surgery. Plaintiff ceased treatment with Dr. Smith on January 6, 2017. Plaintiff was thereafter referred by his attorney to Dr. Jorge Isaza, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in spine surgery. At the time of his 2017 deposition, Dr. Isaza recommended cervical surgery but had difficulty identifying the primary source of plaintiff’s lumbar pain and did not definitively suggest lumbar surgery. Dr. Isaza linked the collision to plaintiff’s injuries. In November 2017, defendants moved to compel an additional medical examination (“AME”) under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ in this case to examine the meaning of the requirement of “good cause” in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. The Court held that a showing of “good cause” under article 1464 required the moving party establish a reasonable nexus between the requested examination and the condition in controversy. The Court found the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to compel an additional medical examination in this case. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dejaun Kendrick, individually and on behalf of her minor son, sued the estate of the deceased, Anthony Michael Barre, seeking filiation and child support. The estate filed exceptions of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action. The trial court granted the exceptions, but the court of appeal reversed. Finding an initial child support claim cannot be brought after the father’s death, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s ruling granting the exception of no cause of action. View "Kendrick v. Estate of Michael Barre, et al." on Justia Law

This summary judgment matter arose from a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration (amongst other things) that defendant First Guaranty Bank (the “Bank”) applied an incorrect interest rate and thus miscalculated the principal owed on a Promissory Note executed by borrower-petitioner Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. (“Leisure”) in favor of the Bank in December 1991 (the “Note”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Leisure’s writ application to determine whether the court of appeal erred in applying the “voluntary payment doctrine” to hold that Leisure was estopped from recovering payments voluntarily made, regardless of whether owed. In addition, the Court reviewed whether the court of appeal erred in determining the Note presented an alternative obligation as to the Prime Rate interest structure for years 11 through 30 of its repayment, whether it erred in imposing its own interest rate structure during that period, and whether the Bank’s prescription arguments preclude Leisure’s recovery of any interest paid and not due between 2001 and 2013. Finding the “voluntary payment doctrine” contravened the Louisiana Civil Code, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the portion of the district court’s judgment denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the Bank as to the voluntary payment affirmative defense; (2) dismissed Leisure’s claim for declaratory relief as to the interest it voluntary paid the Bank between 2001 and 2013; and (3) rendered judgment ordering the Bank to repay Leisure “any overcharge of interest in excess of the prime rate that Leisure paid on the [Note] since the filing of its suit on October 7, 2013, together with interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid.” Finding that the Note set forth an “alternative obligation,” the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the district court decree that Leisure was entitled to select the Prime Rate structure pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1810; and (2) reversed the district court’s declaration that Leisure paid all indebtedness owed to the Bank on the Note as of June 28, 2015, and was owed return of all amounts paid thereafter. The case was remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the Bank’s arguments on appeal that were pretermitted by the court of appeal opinion and were not in conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First Guaranty Bank" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“the Commission”) recommended to discipline Judge Jerry L. Denton, Jr., City Court Judge of Denham Springs, Louisiana. A complaint against Judge Denton was filed by attorney Maria Finley to the Office of Special Counsel (the “OSC”). Finley was retained by Stephanie Bardeau-Marse to file a petition to intervene in a Child in Need of Care proceeding (“CINC proceeding”) in which Judge Denton presided. While the case was pending before Judge Denton, he responded and initiated improper ex parte communications with Bardeau-Marse. These improper ex parte communications precipitated other misconduct, which led to the complaint, a Notice of Hearing from the OSC to Judge Denton, and an investigation by OSC. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Judge Denton violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(6), and specified portions of 3A(4) and 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct (1996), and specified portions of La. Const. art. V, section 25(C)(1974). The Court found a suspension from office without pay for four months and payment of costs incurred by the Commission for $4,676.25 was an appropriate sanction. View "In re Judge Jerry Denton, Jr." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to determine whether the State carried its heavy burden of showing that the two-year limitations period to commence trial on defendant Joseph Schmidt's non-capital felony charges was interrupted by defendant’s failure “to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears in the record.” After careful review, the Supreme Court found the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the statute of limitations was tolled. Specifically, the Court found no proof in the record that defendant failed to appear at a proceeding in 1995 pursuant to actual notice. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeal and the district court that this non-capital felony prosecution had to be quashed because the State failed to timely commence the trial. View "Louisiana v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

This matter arose from the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“the Commission”) that Judge Johnell M. Matthews of Baton Rouge City Court be removed from office because she was constitutionally barred from remaining in judicial office having reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy prior to the commencement of her term. On January 8, 2020, Judge Matthews qualified for the special election to fill the vacancy of Division “C” of the Baton Rouge City Court. The primary election was scheduled for April 4, 2020 with a runoff election on May 9, 2020, if necessary. Due to the unprecedented COVID-19 global pandemic and the rising cases within the State of Louisiana, the governor declared a State of Emergency and issued two proclamations that postponed the special election twice.On June 7, 2020, Judge Matthews turned seventy years old. In the primary election, Whitney Higgenbotham Greene received 32% of the vote and Judge Matthews received 29% of the vote. Prior to the runoff election, a suit was filed against the Louisiana Secretary of State, the Louisiana Attorney General, and Judge Matthews, requesting that Judge Matthews’ name be removed from the ballot because she had attained the age of seventy before the primary election. The district court dismissed this suit on procedural grounds. Judge Matthews won the runoff election, having received 63% of the vote. Her opponent filed suit challenging the results of the election due to Judge Matthews’ age. The district court dismissed the suit. During the pendency of the appeal, Judge Matthews received her commission from the governor and took her oath of office. After considering the facts, circumstances, and applicable law, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the recommendation of the Commission and imposed no discipline. View "In re: Judge Johnell Matthews" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Calvin and Mary Landry filed a petition for damages, alleging they suffered injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Plaintiffs brought the action against defendant-driver Riyad Shaibi, his insurer Financial Indemnity Company (“Financial”), and Progressive Security Insurance Company (“Progressive”), as the insurer of the 2008 Toyota Sienna that Shaibi was driving at the time of the collision. Shaibi was bringing the 2008 Toyota Sienna to a tire shop to repair a flat tire as a favor to its owner, Aziz Ali. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to address whether the court of appeal erred in finding public policy mandated liability coverage by a defendant driver’s automobile insurance policy for an accident occurring while operating a non-owned automobile. Under the narrow facts presented, the Court found neither statutory law nor public policy considerations required automobile insurance liability coverage related to a defendant driver’s negligent operation of a non-owned vehicle. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurer. View "Landry v. Progressive Security Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether waste tire processors were prohibited from charging waste tire generators a transportation fee above the fees statutorily provided by Louisiana’s waste tire laws. Finding there were no provisions prohibiting such a transportation fee, the Court concluded that Defendants, waste tire processors, were not prohibited from charging Plaintiffs, waste tire generators, a fee for the transportation of waste tires from the waste tire generators’ location to the processing facilities. Therefore, the lower courts’ judgments were reversed. View "Winmill Tire, LLC et al. v. Colt, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In September 2015, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers played the New Orleans Saints in the New Orleans Superdome. In preparation for the game, the Buccaneers’ Director of Football Security Operations contacted the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) to request motorcycle escorts, by off-duty law enforcement for officers, for the team’s buses traveling in the New Orleans area, which were to include an escort after the game when the team buses would travel from the Superdome to the airport. NOPD agreed to provide the necessary off-duty officers, along with officers from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”), for the Buccaneer team buses. At issue on the motion for summary judgment filed in this case was whether the Buccaneers football organization was vicariously liable, as an employer, for the alleged negligence of an off-duty Jefferson Parish sheriff’s deputy, who was part of the motorcycle escort for the team’s buses, when the motorcycle the deputy was riding collided with another deputy directing traffic on foot in an intersection. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unrebutted evidence presented by defendants moving for summary judgment showed there was no employee-employer relationship between the deputy sheriff and the Buccaneers under the facts and circumstances of this case; therefore, the Court reversed the denial of the Buccaneers’ motion for summary judgment and remanded to the district court for entry of a summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Bolden v. Tisdale et al." on Justia Law