Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This matter arose from the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“the Commission”) that Judge Johnell M. Matthews of Baton Rouge City Court be removed from office because she was constitutionally barred from remaining in judicial office having reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy prior to the commencement of her term. On January 8, 2020, Judge Matthews qualified for the special election to fill the vacancy of Division “C” of the Baton Rouge City Court. The primary election was scheduled for April 4, 2020 with a runoff election on May 9, 2020, if necessary. Due to the unprecedented COVID-19 global pandemic and the rising cases within the State of Louisiana, the governor declared a State of Emergency and issued two proclamations that postponed the special election twice.On June 7, 2020, Judge Matthews turned seventy years old. In the primary election, Whitney Higgenbotham Greene received 32% of the vote and Judge Matthews received 29% of the vote. Prior to the runoff election, a suit was filed against the Louisiana Secretary of State, the Louisiana Attorney General, and Judge Matthews, requesting that Judge Matthews’ name be removed from the ballot because she had attained the age of seventy before the primary election. The district court dismissed this suit on procedural grounds. Judge Matthews won the runoff election, having received 63% of the vote. Her opponent filed suit challenging the results of the election due to Judge Matthews’ age. The district court dismissed the suit. During the pendency of the appeal, Judge Matthews received her commission from the governor and took her oath of office. After considering the facts, circumstances, and applicable law, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the recommendation of the Commission and imposed no discipline. View "In re: Judge Johnell Matthews" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Calvin and Mary Landry filed a petition for damages, alleging they suffered injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Plaintiffs brought the action against defendant-driver Riyad Shaibi, his insurer Financial Indemnity Company (“Financial”), and Progressive Security Insurance Company (“Progressive”), as the insurer of the 2008 Toyota Sienna that Shaibi was driving at the time of the collision. Shaibi was bringing the 2008 Toyota Sienna to a tire shop to repair a flat tire as a favor to its owner, Aziz Ali. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to address whether the court of appeal erred in finding public policy mandated liability coverage by a defendant driver’s automobile insurance policy for an accident occurring while operating a non-owned automobile. Under the narrow facts presented, the Court found neither statutory law nor public policy considerations required automobile insurance liability coverage related to a defendant driver’s negligent operation of a non-owned vehicle. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurer. View "Landry v. Progressive Security Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether waste tire processors were prohibited from charging waste tire generators a transportation fee above the fees statutorily provided by Louisiana’s waste tire laws. Finding there were no provisions prohibiting such a transportation fee, the Court concluded that Defendants, waste tire processors, were not prohibited from charging Plaintiffs, waste tire generators, a fee for the transportation of waste tires from the waste tire generators’ location to the processing facilities. Therefore, the lower courts’ judgments were reversed. View "Winmill Tire, LLC et al. v. Colt, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In September 2015, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers played the New Orleans Saints in the New Orleans Superdome. In preparation for the game, the Buccaneers’ Director of Football Security Operations contacted the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) to request motorcycle escorts, by off-duty law enforcement for officers, for the team’s buses traveling in the New Orleans area, which were to include an escort after the game when the team buses would travel from the Superdome to the airport. NOPD agreed to provide the necessary off-duty officers, along with officers from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”), for the Buccaneer team buses. At issue on the motion for summary judgment filed in this case was whether the Buccaneers football organization was vicariously liable, as an employer, for the alleged negligence of an off-duty Jefferson Parish sheriff’s deputy, who was part of the motorcycle escort for the team’s buses, when the motorcycle the deputy was riding collided with another deputy directing traffic on foot in an intersection. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unrebutted evidence presented by defendants moving for summary judgment showed there was no employee-employer relationship between the deputy sheriff and the Buccaneers under the facts and circumstances of this case; therefore, the Court reversed the denial of the Buccaneers’ motion for summary judgment and remanded to the district court for entry of a summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Bolden v. Tisdale et al." on Justia Law

Defendant David Brown was indicted by grand jury for the first degree murder of Captain David Knapps, a correctional officer at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. Defendant was tried by jury which found defendant guilty as charged and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, recommended a sentence of death. Defendant was sentenced accordingly. Defendant raises 23 assignments of error on automatic appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending his conviction and sentence should have been reversed. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Supreme Court found no merit in any of the contentions defendant raised in his appeal. Therefore, defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Lousiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

In the latter part of August 2021, University Health Shreveport, LLC d/b/a Ochsner LSU Health Shreveport and LSU Health-St. Mary Medical Center, LLC (Employer) notified all employees that they were required to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 29, 2021. Employees not vaccinated within the specified time were subject to disciplinary action, including mandatory use of leave time and, ultimately, termination. Employer’s policy permitted exemptions to the vaccine requirement for valid religious and medical reasons. Thereafter, 39 plaintiffs (Employees) filed suit against Employer, challenging the employee vaccine mandate and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief, including a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Louisiana Supreme Court found the issue of a vaccine mandate implemented by a healthcare-employer was resolved by the application of Louisiana Civil Code article 2747, the employment-at-will doctrine. "an employer is at liberty to dismiss an at-will employee and, reciprocally, the employee is at liberty to leave the employment to seek other opportunities. However, these rights are tempered by federal and state provisions, both statutory and constitutional, but no such exceptions apply here. Employees have no statutory claim under La. R.S. 40:1159.7 because there is no healthcare provider-patient relationship alleged here. Employees likewise have no constitutional claim under La. Const. art. I, sec. 5 because the employer is a private actor, and this constitutional provision only limits governmental actors. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated." View "Hayes, et al. v. Univ. Health Shreveport, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2015, applicant Elizabeth Trahan was involved in a tragic automobile accident, which resulted in a fatality. Applicant and her boyfriend were in a Dodge Charger, which was traveling north at 72 mph in the left lane on Highway 167 between Maurice and Abbeville, Lousiana. Motorcyclist Carl Johnson passed them on the right, switched into the left lane in front of them, and then braked, apparently intending to turn left across the highway median. Skid marks showed that the driver of the Charger attempted to stop. The Charger collided with the motorcycle and Johnson was killed. A jury found applicant guilty of vehicular homicide, for which the trial court sentenced her to 15 years imprisonment at hard labor, with all but six years of the sentence suspended, and with three years of active supervised probation. Regarding whether the State proved that applicant’s impairment was a contributing factor, the court of appeal acknowledged that metabolites detected in applicant’s blood and urine, standing alone, did “not allow the jury to assume the defendant was impaired or that the presence of those substances was a contributing factor in the accident.” However, the court of appeal found that the jury could consider additional circumstances, such as the fact that applicant exceeded the speed limit and was unable to stop in time to avoid the accident, to conclude that drugs impaired her driving and thus contributed to the accident. The dissent observed that expert testimony in conjunction with evidence of behavioral manifestations of intoxication was ordinarily used to establish that a driver was impaired, and no such evidence was offered by the State in this case. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' dissent that a jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence presented at trial that applicant was impaired or that her impairment was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, and therefore the conviction could not survive appellate review under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Because a rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude, without speculating, that applicant’s ingestion of controlled dangerous substances was a contributing factor to the fatal accident, the Supreme Court concluded applicant was entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40(1981). Accordingly, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal, vacated applicant’s conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide, and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Louisiana v. Trahan" on Justia Law

Respondent Noe Aguliar-Benitez was convicted by jury of attempted aggravated rape and sexual battery. The evidence presented at trial established that respondent, while a guest in the home, sexually abused an 8-year-old child who resided there. As part of that abuse, he raped or attempted to rape her. Respondent claimed the offenses occurred during a single incident; the victim described repeated abuse. The trial court sentenced respondent to serve the statutory maximum sentences of 50 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted aggravated rape and 99 years imprisonment at hard labor for sexual battery, to run concurrently and without parole eligibility. The court of appeal vacated the sentences, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to rule on respondent’s motion for new trial before resentencing. On remand, the trial court denied respondent’s motion for new trial and resentenced him to the same terms of imprisonment. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences as unconstitutionally excessive, and remanded for resentencing a second time. On remand, the trial court resentenced respondent to serve 40 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted aggravated rape and 75 years imprisonment at hard labor for sexual battery, to run concurrently and without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the 40-year sentence for attempted aggravated rape, but vacated the 75-year sentence for sexual battery as unconstitutionally excessive, and remanded for resentencing a third time. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s application to determine whether the trial court, after the second remand, abused its discretion in imposing a sentence for sexual battery that, while it was 24 years less than the sentence originally imposed, was still 20 years greater than the maximum recommended by the court of appeal. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing following the second remand. Furthermore, the Court respectfully disagreed with the court of appeal’s emphasis on whether the trial court articulated a sufficient justification for departing from the court of appeal’s recommended sentencing range. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in part and reinstated the 75-year sentence imposed by the trial court for sexual battery. View "Louisiana v. Aguliar-Benitez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cindy Planchard, filed suit against defendant, the New Hotel Monteleone, LLC. Plaintiff alleged that as she crossed the lobby of defendant’s hotel, she slipped on a foreign substance on the marble floor and fell, sustaining an injury. After discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on a surveillance video of the accident. The video showed a hotel employee dry mopping the lobby area at 8:36 p.m., approximately three minutes before plaintiff’s accident. Two “wet floor” signs are in place in the area. At 8:37 p.m., approximately one minute before plaintiff’s fall, two more “wet floor” signs were added to the area, and an employee continued to dry mop the area. Plaintiff was then seen to fall at 8:38 p.m. Defendant also submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged seeing the signs. Plaintiff also testified she “had to walk around” the signs because there “was no other path to the front door.” As a result, plaintiff stated she “walked to the side of the signs to get to the front door.” Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Relying on her deposition testimony, plaintiff did not dispute that she saw the signs, but asserted that she thought they were “chalkboard” and did not read them. Plaintiff introduced pictures of the signs showing they did not have the traditional bright orange or yellow appearance, but were made of wood and brass. The district court denied the hotel's motion, concluding there were questions of fact concerning the “reasonableness on the part of the defendant” based on the visibility of the signs. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that the undisputed evidence established plaintiff saw the warning signs in the area prior to her fall. "Any failure of plaintiff to read these signs was a product of her own inattentiveness and not a result of the defendant’s failure to take reasonable precautions." View "Blanchard v. New Hotel Monteleone, LLC." on Justia Law

In 2015, Dr. Robert Easton performed a left total hip arthroplasty on Mrs. Cheryl Mitchell, who had dislocated her hip. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mitchell re-dislocated her hip and Dr. Easton performed a revision surgery. While Mrs. Mitchell was in the recovery room, Dr. Easton observed that she had "foot drop;" Dr. Easton performed a second surgery that same day. During the surgery, he discovered that Mrs. Mitchell’s sciatic nerve had been lacerated. Dr. Easton advised Mrs. Mitchell’s family of the situation and consulted with Dr. Rasheed Ahmad, a hand surgeon who handled nerve repairs for Dr. Easton’s medical group. Dr. Easton further advised Mrs. Mitchell that “time would tell how much, if any, function and sensory perception she would get back.” Unfortunately, Mrs. Mitchell’s foot drop never improved and she was left with sciatic nerve palsy. In 2017, Mrs. Mitchell and her husband Michael, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Easton, his employer, the Baton Rouge Orthopaedic Clinic, L.L.C., and their insurers, Physician Assurance SPC. Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription, which the trial court granted, dismissing the action. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that, although Mrs. Mitchell continued to treat with Dr. Easton for more than a year after the alleged act of malpractice, that treatment was unrelated to the alleged act of malpractice. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no question the Mitchells, knew of the alleged act of malpractice within a day of its occurrence. "It is equally certain that suit was not filed against the treating physician, Dr. Robert Easton, within a year of the alleged malpractice. ... The sole issue, therefore, is whether prescription was suspended during this time period pursuant to the continuing treatment rule." The Court determined the record supported the lower courts' determinations that Mrs. Mitchell did not receive any specific care from Dr. Easton designed to correct or otherwise treat the injury related to the alleged act of malpractice. Even had Mrs. Mitchell received continuing treatment of her injury, the Court did not find Dr. Easton’s statements regarding her questionable prognosis to fall within the scope of the continuing treatment rule. Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found the continuing treatment exception of contra non valentem did not apply to suspend prescription in this case, and affirmed the judgments below. View "Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, LLC et al." on Justia Law