Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Arising under the 2006 version of La. R.S. 30:29 (referred to as Act 312), this oilfield remediation case involved the Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB”), individually and on behalf of the State of Louisiana, as petitioner, and Union Oil Company of California, Union Exploration Partners (collectively, “UNOCAL”), Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Chevron Midcontinent LP, and Carrollton Resources, LLC as defendants. Although the exact date of VPSB’s knowledge of contamination to the land was disputed, it was clear that VPSB became aware of such sometime in 2003 or 2004. In September 2004, VPSB filed a petition, urging causes of action for negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract, and violations of Louisiana environmental laws. VPSB sought damages to cover the cost of evaluating and remediating the alleged damage and contamination to the property. It also sought damages for diminution of the property value, mental anguish, inconvenience, punitive damages, and stigma damages. UNOCAL sought reversal of the lower courts’ finding that VPSB’s strict liability claim was not prescribed. UNOCAL also contested the court of appeal’s ruling that the jury verdict was inconsistent and its remand for a new trial. Finding UNOCAL failed to prove that VPSB’s strict liability cause of action was factually prescribed, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling on prescription, but on alternative grounds. Finding the jury was improperly allowed to decide issues reserved solely for the trial court, and cognizant the extraneous instructions and verdict interrogatories permeated the jury’s consideration of the verdict as a whole, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and affirmed the court of appeal’s remand for new trial. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. et al." on Justia Law

Because the Louisiana Supreme Court found in its original opinion that plaintiffs had a right of action under La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, their constitutional challenge was pretermitted and “that part of the district court judgment declaring [these code articles and La. C.C. art. 199 to be] unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” was vacated. Having found on rehearing that the codal analysis of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 foreclosed a right of action to the plaintiff children, who were given in adoption, for the death of their biological parent and half-siblings, the Supreme Court was called on to address the propriety of the district court’s declaration that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2, and 199 are “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption.” The Court found a rational basis existed for limiting the categories of eligible claimants in La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2 to those who “are likely to be most affected by the death of the deceased.” Children given in adoption “have moved into a new parental relationship, becoming children ‘by adoption,’ who are eligible claimants in the unfortunate occurrence of the tortious death of their adoptive parents. Likewise, the transfer of children into a new parental unit as children ‘by adoption’ terminates, for purposes of wrongful death and survival actions, any connection between the ‘children given in adoption’ and any biological siblings who were not ‘given in adoption.’” For these reasons, the district court legally erred in finding that the fact that Daniel Goins and David Watts were adopted did not prevent them from bringing survival and wrongful death claims for the deaths of their biological father and biological half-siblings and in overruling the defendant’s exception raising the objection of no right of action. The Supreme Court's original decree was vacated and the district court's judgment was reversed. Judgment was entered sustaining the defendant insurance company's peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, and dismissing the claims that were the subject of this exception. View "Rismiller et al. v. Gemini Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Taxpayers Kraig and Kelly Strenge appealed directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court a declaration by a district court that La. R.S. 47:1990 was unconstitutional, as applied. The district court’s ruling on partial summary judgment also held that the Louisiana Tax Commission (the “Commission”) exceeded its authority in promulgating Section 3103(Z) of Title 61, Part V of the Louisiana Administrative Code (the “Rules and Regulations”) and declared Section 3103(Z) unconstitutional. The underlying issue centered on the Taxpayers challenge to the correctness of the appraisal of their residential property in Lafayette Parish in 2016. After the Lafayette City-Parish Council (Board of Review) ruled in favor of the Assessor, Taxpayers appealed to the Commission. The Commission ruled that the fair market value of the property for tax year 2016 was $231,500, not $288,270 as determined by the Assessor, and ordered the Assessor to reduce Taxpayers’ 2016 assessment accordingly. Two days after the Commission’s oral ruling, the Assessor assessed the fair market value of Taxpayers’ property for the 2017 tax year again at $288,270. Taxpayers again appealed, and after a hearing, the Commission issued a “Rule to Show Cause” to the Assessor. That dispute went before the district court, and the court’s decision served as the grounds for this appeal. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in ruling the Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating Section 3103(Z) and declaring Section 3103(Z) unconstitutional but correctly declared La. R.S. 47:1990 unconstitutional, as applied. Accordingly, judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Comeaux v. Louisiana Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Young was charged by bill of information with simple burglary for the 2016 burglary of a B.J.’s Country Stop. The burglar entered the store by breaking the glass door with a brick. He took the cash drawer from the register and left. The store’s surveillance camera recorded the burglary. In video recorded at another Stop on the evening before the burglary, the manager of the burglarized Stop saw a male who she thought resembled the burglar, wearing a similar white t-shirt and black basketball shorts with red and white stripes just as was seen in the video of the burglary. A unanimous jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court denied defendant’s motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial, and sentenced defendant to serve 12 years imprisonment at hard labor. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that the fact that the jurors observed the videos did not justify the exclusion of additional evidence from the defense on the question of whether defendant was the person in the videos. “That evidence was clearly relevant, and the trial court erred in excluding it. Considering the importance of the video surveillance evidence in the State’s case-in-chief, and the lack of any other evidence connecting defendant to the burglary,” the Supreme Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of evidence that defendant had extensive tattoos was harmless. View "Louisiana v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant James Bourgeois, an elected member of the Lafourche Parish Council, was found guilty by a unanimous jury of filing or maintaining false public records. The charge arose from the allegation that defendant had falsely asserted in his Parish Council election qualifying form that he was domiciled in Lafourche Parish. The trial court sentenced him to a suspended sentence of three years imprisonment at hard labor with two years of probation. The court of appeal reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence because it found the evidence insufficient to prove that defendant falsely represented his domicile on his qualifying form. There was no dispute that the election qualifying form was a public record and that defendant filed it. The sole question for the Louisiana Supreme Court was whether the evidence, when viewed under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, was sufficient to prove the form contained a false statement with regard to defendant’s domicile. The Supreme Court determined the State’s case “was not so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury. The State introduced evidence from which the jury could rationally find that defendant had abandoned his domicile in Lafourche Parish and established a new domicile in Jefferson Parish by the time he filed his election qualifying form. The jury was not forced to speculate to reach this conclusion, as the court of appeal found.” Accordingly, judgment was reversed and defendant’s conviction and sentence were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Bourgeois" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Perell Fisher, Jr. was taking a bath at his girlfriend’s residence when officers of the St. Tammany Parish Narcotics Task Force accompanied by a parole officer arrived to conduct a “residence check.” The residence check pertained to two probationers who also resided there, Richard Dantin and his fiancee Kristie Smith. Dantin and Smith were on probation for operating a clandestine methamphetamine lab and numerous convictions for possession and distribution of controlled dangerous substances. In response to questioning by the parole officer, Dantin revealed that he had a small quantity of methamphetamine and a pipe on his person. Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence, and found controlled dangerous substances and paraphernalia in the common areas and bedrooms. In the bedroom belonging to Samantha Irwin, defendant’s girlfriend, officers found a single, loose prescription promethazine pill on a cluttered nightstand. In the pocket of a jacket hanging in Irvin’s closet, officers found an opaque container with less than a gram of methamphetamine inside and a bottle of Adderall prescribed to Irvin. She told officers that defendant had no knowledge of the methamphetamine or the promethazine pill in her room. No contraband was found in the bathroom where defendant was taking a bath. A jury found defendant guilty as charged of possession of methamphetamine, and possession of a legend drug without a prescription, based on the methamphetamine found in the jacket pocket and the single promethazine pill found on the nightstand. The trial court adjudicated defendant as a third-felony offender and sentenced him to consecutive terms of 10 years imprisonment at hard labor for possession of a legend drug without a prescription (then the statutory maximum for the offense and his offender class), and four years imprisonment at hard labor for possession of methamphetamine. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s convictions, and vacated them. The Court entered a judgment of acquittal on both charges in his favor. View "Louisiana v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Lousiana Supreme Court’s review was whether applicant Mark Davidson relieved of his duty to register and provide notice as a sex offender, after the district court set aside his convictions pursuant following a period of probation. The Supreme Court found that dismissal pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 893 after a probationary period did not relieve applicant of his duty to register and provide notice as a sex offender. Accordingly, the court of appeal’s ruling reversing the district court’s ruling, which had granted applicant’s motion for summary judgment on his claim for declaratory judgment, was affirmed. View "Davidson v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Bryant Walker was employed as an eighteen-wheeler tractor-trailer driver for BlueLinx Corporation (“BlueLinx”). Walker was attempting to make a left turn into the driveway of BlueLinx’s facility: he activated his left turn signal, and stopped his tractor-trailer in the left lane, approximately sixty feet from a break in the median, in order to wait for another vehicle to exit the driveway. Before Walker could make his turn, his tractor-trailer was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Kunta Hester. Hester died as a result of the accident. Hester’s survivors filed the instant suit against Walker, BlueLinx, and its insurer, alleging defendants breached their duty to Hester because Walker negligently stopped his vehicle on a public roadway in violation of La. R.S. 32:141(A). At issue in this case was whether defendants violated any duty to plaintiffs under the provisions of La. R.S. 32:141(A), which prohibited the stopping or parking of a vehicle in the travelled portion of a roadway. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to summary judgment: plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption that Hester was at fault for the accident. View "Hester v. Walker et al." on Justia Law

In 2019, two armed residents of New Orleans, Zelda and Danny Townsend, confronted a young Black male, later identified as Emanuel Pipkins, who was inside their vehicle. The Townsends blocked the suspect from leaving. As a gray Acura drove by, a male voice shouted “just shoot ’em,” and Pipkins began shooting. The Townsends returned fire. Zelda Townsend died. Danny Townsend sustained a gunshot wound in an arm. Pipkins also sustained gunshot wounds but managed to flee. Pipkins later arrived at Tulane Medical Center with injuries to his back and foot. His girlfriend, defendant Byrielle Hebert, and his aunt accompanied him. Defendant eventually admitted to police she was with Pipkins when she witnessed the shootout with the Townsends. She would later be indicted by a grand jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and other felony offenses. After she was restored to competency, defendant filed a motion to suppress her pre-arrest statements, arguing that they flowed from an illegal arrest; they were made after she invoked her right to remain silent; she did not waive her Miranda rights; and her statements were made under duress and induced by false promises. The trial court, although noting its reservations about the tactics used by the detectives, denied the motion because it found that defendant’s eventual Miranda waiver was sufficiently attenuated from defendant’s earlier invocations of her right to remain silent. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, and vacated the trial court’s ruling, both of which denied defendant’s motion to suppress her statements to police. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Hebert" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to address the specific question of whether there was a cause of action for a writ of mandamus compelling a municipality to satisfy a judgment for back wages owed to its firefighter employees. Based on the ministerial nature of the statutorily and constitutionally mandated duty of the municipality to appropriate funds to satisfy the judgment, the Court found the lower courts erred in sustaining the exception of no cause of action. View "Lowther et al. v. Town of Bastrop" on Justia Law