Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a matter of first impression, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review on whether a suit against the state, in which plaintiff fails to request service within 90 days and which was dismissed for insufficient service of process, interrupts prescription on the second suit filed before dismissal of the first. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(3) made clear that plaintiff’s second suit was untimely and the first suit did not interrupt or suspend prescription as to the state defendants. Accordingly, because the state defendants’ exception of prescription should have been granted, the trial court’s ruling denying the exception of prescription was reversed. View "Davis v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review in this case centered on whether an award of attorney fees and other litigation costs to defendant landowners in an expropriation proceeding could be upheld under current law. The underlying matter arose from the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline. As part of the project, Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC (“BBP”), sought to acquire servitudes on the property of various landowners. The specific piece of property at the center of this litigation is approximately 38 acres of land (“the property”). Prior to reaching servitude agreements with all individuals with an ownership interest in this particular parcel of land, BBP began pipeline construction. Peter Aaslestad, one of the property owners, filed suit against BBP in order to enjoin BBP from further construction. BBP later stipulated that it would remain off the property as of September 10, 2018. However, the pipeline construction was more than 90% complete at that time. Meanwhile, in late July 2018, after it had begun construction on the property, BBP filed expropriation litigation against hundreds of property owners with whom servitude agreements could not be reached, including Mr. Aaslestad, Katherine Aaslestad, and Theda Larson Wright (collectively referred to as “defendants”). In response, defendants filed a reconventional demand against BBP, alleging BPP trespassed on their property and violated due process by proceeding with construction of the pipeline prior to a judgment of expropriation. The matter proceeded to a trial wherein the trial court granted BBP’s petition for expropriation, finding the expropriation served a public and necessary purpose. The trial court also granted defendants’ reconventional demand, finding that BBP trespassed on defendants’ property prior to obtaining permission or legal authority. The trial court ultimately awarded each defendant $75.00 for the expropriation and another $75.00 in trespass damages. The court of appeal reversed in part: upholding the constitutionality of the expropriation process, but finding that BBP violated defendants’ due process rights and awarded $10,000.00 to each defendant for trespass, and granted attorney fees. The Supreme Court determined the award of fees was constitutional, and upheld the Court of Appeal. View "Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC v. 38.00 Acres, More or Less, Located in St. Martin Parish et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a defamation claim brought by the executive director of a public agency against the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Legislative Auditor arising out of statements appearing in two audit reports and the summaries which accompanied the release of those audit reports. Plaintiff claimed the audits cast his conduct in connection with his duties at the agency in a defamatory light. The defendants moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion, finding the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The court of appeal denied writs. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to determine whether the lower courts erred in concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Finding there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that the questions presented were all questions of law, the Supreme Court further found that the statements were not actionable as a matter of law, but rather statements of opinion relating to matters of public concern that did not carry a provably false factual connotation. As such, the statements were entitled to full constitutional protection. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Johnson v. Purpera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against two defendants: a property owner and her alleged liability insurer. The insurer was served with the petition, but plaintiff withheld service on the property owner. The insurer filed an answer on its own behalf within three years of suit being filed, but no action was taken in the suit by any party relative to the property owner within that three years. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether plaintiff’s action against the property owner was abandoned pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(1). The court of appeal found the filing of an answer by the insurer within the three-year abandonment period was effective to interrupt the abandonment period as to the property owner. The Supreme Court held the filing of the insurer’s answer did not serve to interrupt the abandonment period as to the property owner; therefore the appellate court was reversed because plaintiff’s original action against the property owner was abandoned by operation of law. However, the Court found plaintiff’s underlying claims against the property owner, that were subsequently reasserted by amended petition, were not necessarily prescribed due to the potential interruption of prescription resulting from the pending suit against an alleged solidary obligor. Because a determination regarding prescription could not be made based on the existing record, the court of appeal’s ruling on the property owner’s exception of prescription was affirmed, and the matter remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on that exception. View "Williams v. Foremost Ins. Co. et al." on Justia Law

In October 2012, plaintiff Donna Brown filed a complaint with the Louisiana Division of Administration against Dr. Ralph Chesson. Subsequently, she was notified of Dr. Chesson’s status as a qualified state health care provider and a medical review panel was convened. After the medical review panel rendered its opinion in favor of Dr. Chesson, Brown filed a petition for damages solely against Dr. Chesson in 2015. In the petition she alleged medical malpractice during a 2011 surgical procedure and requested service on Dr. Chesson at his office. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine whether it was sufficient to request service solely on a qualified state health care provider when that individual was the only named defendant in a medical malpractice suit. Specifically, whether plaintiff’s request for service and citation within ninety days from the commencement of this suit on only the defendant physician satisfied the statutory requirements for service on a state employee. The Supreme Court found that the service was sufficient and the court of appeal erred in sustaining the exceptions of insufficiency of citation and service of process. View "Brown v. Chesson" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether the court of appeal properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), where Farm Bureau argued that the “regular use” exclusion in its automobile insurance policy issued to plaintiff precluded uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, because plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff in this matter, Charles Higgins, was injured in an automobile accident while operating a truck owned by his employer, AT&T. The other driver in the accident was underinsured, and AT&T did not carry UM coverage on the truck. Higgins subsequently filed the instant suit against his personal UM insurer, Farm Bureau. Because the Supreme Court found the policy’s “regular use” exclusion impermissibly derogated from the requirements of the Louisiana uninsured motorist statute (the “UM statute”), La. R.S. 22:1295, the Court found this exclusion inapplicable and reversed the decision of the court of appeal. View "Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2016, a tugboat pushing a barge through the coastal waters of St. Bernard Parish entered an area known as Christmas Lake. Christmas Lake was productive oyster grounds and contained several oyster leases marked by poles extending above the waterline. Down to one engine due to mechanical problems, the captain tried to navigate the tugboat to Hopedale for repairs. An oyster fisherman stopped the tugboat and instructed the captain to turn around, emphasizing the presence of oyster beds and explaining the water was too shallow to travel any further. The captain reversed course and turned southwest, entering oyster-lease grounds held by plaintiff, Marty Melerine. The tugboat crossed the middle of Melerine’s 140-acre lease until grounding on an oyster reef in the southwest corner of the lease. At high tide the next day, the captain freed the tugboat from the reef with the assistance of Melerine. Following directions from Melerine and another area oysterman, the captain piloted the tugboat along the southern boundary of the lease and exited the area. Shortly after the grounding, Melerine retained Dr. Edwin Cake Jr., an oyster biologist, to inspect the oyster beds and determine the extent of any damages caused by the incident. Based on samples and poling data, Dr. Cake concluded Melerine’s damages totaled $7,235,993.27: the cost to repair the damaged reefs ($997,314.77); and lost profits from oysters killed by the grounding incident ($6,238,678.50). Melerine and OFI sued the tugboat captain’s employer, Tom’s Marine & Salvage, LLC, and its insurer, AGCS Marine Insurance Company, seeking damages caused by the grounding. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in (1) allowing evidence of a regulatory method for determining oyster-lease damages applicable only when a pre-project biological survey was performed; and (2) admitting opinion testimony from an expert witness that is beyond his expertise and not supported by reliable methodology. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for new trial. View "Melerine v. Tom's Marine & Salvage, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on whether an employee who suffers from noise-induced hearing loss was entitled to indemnity benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which conferred such benefits to employees who sustained “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident.” James Hartman, Jr. was employed by the St. Bernard Parish Fire Department. During the course of his employment, Hartman was exposed to injurious levels of noise, which resulted in permanent hearing loss. Testing from 2006 to 2017 showed a gradual increase in hearing loss. The Fire Department opposed Hartman's claim for compensation, asserting, among other things, that his claim for work-related hearing loss was not covered by La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which applied only where the permanent hearing loss was “solely due to a single traumatic accident.” Finding that cumulative hearing loss incurred as a result of repeated exposure to high noise levels on the job did not constitute “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident” as required for the award of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments below. View "Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year old Donasty Cohen was charged with second-degree murder for the death of her 27-day-old infant son. After trial, a jury found her guilty of manslaughter. The district court sentenced her to serve 17 years imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed after deleting the restriction on eligibility for parole. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, defendant argued only that the district court erred in denying her challenge for cause of one prospective juror. In the course of reviewing the record, it became apparent that the verdict in this case was non-unanimous. The sealed jury polling slips contained in the record showed defendant was found guilty of manslaughter by vote of 11-1. The State conceded the verdict was not unanimous. The Court held defendant was entitled to a new trial. The appellate court's judgment was reversed, the conviction and sentence vacated, and the matter remanded fur further proceedings. View "Lousiana v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Judge F. Stanton Hardee, III was elected judge for the Kaplan City Court in Vermillion Parish, Louisiana, and took office in 2015. In January 2017, Judge Hardee attended a bachelor party in Park City, Utah celebrating his upcoming wedding. He visited a local bar and consumed excessive amounts of alcohol, becoming extremely intoxicated. It was undisputed that he grabbed the buttocks of a waitress without her consent. Park City Police were called, he did not immediately produce identification, and he failed to cooperate with police at the scene. Judge Hardee was charged with multiple misdemeanors under Utah law: (1) Sexual Battery; (2) Failure to Disclose Identity; (3) Interference with Arresting Officer; and (4) Intoxication. He pled no contest to these charges and fully satisfied all terms and conditions of the plea. As a part-time city court judge, Judge Hardee was allowed to practice law. Consequently, he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), which regulated attorneys. In November 2018, a joint petition for consent discipline was filed by Judge Hardee and the ODC. The court approved the requested consent discipline, which included a five-year JLAP monitoring agreement that began December 5, 2017. The consent discipline resulted in Judge Hardee being suspended from the practice of law for one year with all but six months deferred, followed by probation coinciding with the remainder of his JLAP monitoring agreement. If successfully completed, JLAP monitoring would end December 5, 2022. The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s recommendation, except for the length of monitoring by the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP): the Court required Judge Hardee to successfully complete the five-year JLAP monitoring agreement executed on December 5, 2017. View "In re: F. Stanton Hardee, III" on Justia Law