Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jamal Washington was indicted for racketeering; human trafficking; and conspiracy to commit human trafficking. With regard to racketeering, the indictment alleged that defendant, his codefendants, and other persons, known and unknown, engaged in conduct that furthered a criminal enterprise involved in narcotics distribution and prostitution. Defendant pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State in exchange dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to forego recidivist sentence enhancement. The district court sentenced defendant in conformity with the plea agreement to serve eight years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal affirmed. Thereafter, defendant sought clarification that the court had not designated the offense as a crime of violence. A minute entry indicated that the district court had designated the offense as a crime of violence. However, no such designation was evident in the sentencing transcript. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeal determined that racketeering was not a crime of violence because it was not enumerated as such in La. R.S. 14:2(B), and because the use (or attempted use) of physical force was not an element of racketeering, as that crime was defined by statute. Therefore, the court of appeal found that the crime was incorrectly designated as a crime of violence in the district court's minute entry. The Louisiana Supreme Court found defendant did not admit to human trafficking when he pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State dismissed the charge of human trafficking. Defendant also did not admit that he personally performed any violent acts in the factual basis for his guilty plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal, which reversed the district court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to correct the sentencing minute entry to reflect that the offense was not designated as a crime of violence, and which remanded to the district court for correction of the minute entry. View "Washington v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The testator herein executed two notarial testaments: one in 2013 and another in 2015 (which purported to revoke all prior testaments). The 2013 testament divided the testator’s property equally among his three adult children (Conway, Jeffrey, and Laura). The 2015 testament, executed under La. C.C. art. 1579 (for a testator who is unable to read regardless of whether he is able to sign his name), divided the testator’s property between only two of his children (Jeffrey and Laura), excluding the third child (Conway). After the testator’s death in 2018, Conway challenged the validity of the 2015 testament on several bases, in response to his siblings’ attempt to probate the testament. The issue raised by this case was whether the language of an attestation clause in the 2015 testament, which failed to expressly state that the testator declared or signified that he signed the testament “at the end of the testament and on each other separate page,” in accordance with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1579, rendered the testament absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 1573. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the attestation clause here stated simply that the testator "signed" the testament, which could only establish the testator signed the eight-page testament once, rather than "at the end" and "on each other separate page," as required by La. C.C. art. 1579(2). "An attestation clause that fails to state that the testament was signed at the end and on each other separate page fails to inform the testator and witnesses that the testator has a responsibility to sign every page of a multiple-page testament, and “signing one’s name on each page of the will undoubtedly offers more heightened protection from surreptitious replacement of pages." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which invalidated the 2015 testament. View "Succession of James Conway Liner, III" on Justia Law

The testator herein executed a notarial testament in 2016, naming her niece as her sole legatee. After the testator’s death in 2018, her widower challenged the testament, contending inter alia that it was rendered invalid by the failure to state in the attestation clause that the testator declared she had signed “at the end” of the testament. The issue this case presented was whether the language of an attestation clause in the 2016 notarial testament, which failed to expressly state that the testator declared or signified that she signed the testament “at the end,” even though it stated the testator signed “on each page,” violated the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577 and rendered the testament absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 1573. The district court invalidated the testament, finding “the only deviation from La.Civ.Code art. 1577(2) was the absence of the words ‘at the end’ in the attestation clause.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found the attestation clause in this case made use of the exact language set forth in the sample attestation clause in the pre-1980 version of former La. R.S. 9:2442; i.e., that the will was “[s]igned on each page” (as noted, when changed in 1980 to its current wording, the difference was denominated by its authors as a technical and/or semantic change). The question for the Supreme Court reduced to whether such a semantic departure from Article 1577’s current language could be considered substantially similar to the requisite attestation ‒ that the testator “signed at the end and on each other separate page.” The Court recognized that these phrases had slightly different connotations, as once the testator signs “at the end” of the testamentary recitations he was not required to sign after the attestation clause even if it concluded on a subsequent page; the testator was only required to sign on each of the other separate pages that precede his signature at the end of the testamentary recitations. Here, the declaration the testator signed "on each page" of a testament necessarily established that the testament had been signed on every page, including the page containing the end of the testament. The appellate and district court decisions were reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Succession of Peggy Blackwell Bruce" on Justia Law

Ronald Sewell, a 20-year-old Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree robbery and pleaded guilty as charged to possession of a stolen firearm. The district court sentenced him to serve three years imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility for each first degree robbery, and one year imprisonment at hard labor for possession of a stolen firearm, with the sentences to run concurrently. After he served his sentences, the federal Government commenced removal proceedings based on these felony guilty pleas. Sewell filed an application for post-conviction relief in which he contended the guilty pleas had to be set aside because counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that they would result in his removal from the United States. Sewell’s former counsel testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing stating she was unaware that Sewell was not a United States citizen, and that she would have advised him of the possibility of removal if she had known his status as a noncitizen. Former counsel also testified that Sewell spoke English fluently and without an accent, and that he never informed her that he was born outside of the United States. The judge who presided over the post-conviction evidentiary hearing also accepted the guilty pleas. The judge indicated that she recalled the case and agreed that nothing about Sewell would have prompted anyone to question whether he was a United States citizen. Nonetheless, the district court granted Sewell’s application for post-conviction relief and ordered that his guilty pleas be withdrawn. The court noted that no one had advised defendant of the strong likelihood he would be removed from the United States based on his guilty pleas, the plea form did not contain any place to indicate citizenship, and therefore the court found it incumbent upon it to grant the relief requested. The State appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that under the circumstances here, Sewell failed to carry his burden post-conviction that his attorney’s failure to inquire into his citizenship fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, the district court erred in granting Sewell’s application for post-conviction relief and in ordering that Sewell’s guilty pleas be withdrawn. Accordingly, the State’s application was granted and the rulings of the courts below reversed. Sewell’s guilty pleas were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Sewell" on Justia Law

Defendant Tyrone Johnson pled guilty as charged to distribution of methamphetamine, for which he received a 23 year sentence of imprisonment at hard labor in exchange for the State promising not to file a habitual offender bill of information and seek a life sentence. The court of appeal vacated the plea and sentence because it found defendant was denied his right to counsel of choice when the district court refused on Friday to continue the Monday trial date to allow defendant additional time in which to hire a new attorney. Under the circumstances of this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the court of appeal erred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reinstated the guilty plea and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant Gemini Insurance Company appealed a district court's holding La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” and overruling the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of no right of action. At issue was whether plaintiffs Daniel Goins and David Watts, two adult children who were given in adoption as minors, had a right to bring wrongful death and survival actions stemming from the deaths of their biological father and his two minor children, who were not given in adoption, and were plaintiffs’ biological half-siblings. After a de novo review, based on the clear and unambiguous wording of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded Goins and Watts were “children of the deceased” and “brothers of the deceased” who were permitted to bring wrongful death and survival actions arising from the death of their biological father and half-siblings. In view of the Court's holding that plaintiffs had a right to assert survival and wrongful death actions, the Court declined to address their argument that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption. View "Rismiller v. Gemini Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sherome Hankton, an officer with the New Orleans Police Department, filed this personal injury suit for damages resulting from an attack upon her by a prisoner, Conrad Jackson, while Officer Hankton was guarding Jackson during a hospital stay. Following a bench trial, the trial court apportioned 50% fault to Jackson, 40% fault to the hospital, and 10% fault to Officer Hankton; it then awarded damages totaling $1,134,287.44. The court of appeal affirmed in part, amended in part, and affirmed as amended. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the trial court’s allocation of fault. After review, the Supreme Court reallocated the percentages of fault: Jackson 50%, Officer Hankton 10%, University Hospital 25%, and NOPD 15%. As amended, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Hankton v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, Michael Mitchell, Chief Indigent Defender for the Office of Public Defender for East Baton Rouge Parish, filed a “Motion to Withdraw from Current Appointments and to Decline Future Appointments” in 2018 in each of these Nineteenth Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”), Section VI cases. Mitchell alleged that long term chronic underfunding of the public defender’s office had necessitated the implementation of “service restriction protocols,” pursuant to La. Administrative Code, Title 22, Section 1701 et seq., and led to the elimination of a number of attorney and support staff positions. Mitchell asserted that the consequent increase in the workloads of the remaining attorneys could potentially create conflicts of interest, as counsel might have to allot more time to one case over another, and could potentially cause ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. In response (which were confined to 19th JDC, Section VI cases), the State filed motions for dismissal of the motions for withdrawal and Daubert objections to expert testimony relative to the La. Project since it was based on the “Delphi Method,” contending, inter alia, that the Delphi Method produced unreliable generalized conclusions about the Louisiana public defender system and, further, that Louisiana v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993), required individualized findings as to whether there has been ineffective assistance of counsel in each specific case. The district court ruled in favor of the State, implicitly finding that any remedy related to chronic underfunding of the public defender system was within the exclusive purview of the Louisiana Legislature and was outside the parameters of what the court had the authority to fashion; however, the court stated that it would consider any individual motions to withdraw from, or to decline, representation on a case-by-case basis. Thereafter, the appellate court granted the district public defender’s writ application, in part, to reverse the district court’s denial of the motions to withdraw, to vacate the district court orders appointing the public defender in the remaining ongoing consolidated cases, and to grant the request to allow the named public defenders to withdraw from future representation of indigent defendants “until the caseloads are no greater than 100% of his or her annual capacity.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found the appellate court's conclusion was reached without evidence of the specific factual details surrounding the work performance of the individual assistant public defenders: "the question of whether assistance of counsel has been constitutionally ineffective cannot be answered without a detailed examination of the specific facts and circumstances of the representation provided by counsel to the individual defendant. Therefore, the appellate court erred in reversing the district court and ruling in favor of Mr. Mitchell." The district court's rulings were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Covington" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana filed a disciplinary proceeding against respondent, Justice of the Peace Cody King on one count that alleged respondent violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(1), 3A(7), and 3B(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (1996) and La. Const. Art. V, section 25(C). In 2018, the Attorney General's Office filed the first of three complaints against Respondent with the Office of Special Counsel of the Commission, asserting that Respondent failed to respond to constituents in his district, and likewise failed to respond to letters or calls from the Attorney General's office. In 2019, Hannah Zaunbrecher filed a complaint, asserting: (1) Respondent was difficult to reach; (2) he overcharged Ms. Zaunbrecher for an eviction she filed; (3) he did not set a court date in the eviction matter despite repeated requests from Ms. Zaunbrecher after the eviction was filed; and (4) Respondent failed to refund the unearned filing fee. The OSC sent letters to Respondent notifying him of each complaint. Respondent did not reply despite later acknowledging that he received them. After a hearing on these charges, the Commission filed a recommendation with the Louisiana Supreme Court concluding that the above violations had been proven. To this, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission’s recommendation, and ordered the removal of Respondent from office, that he reimburse the Commission the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the case, and further, that he pay restitution for an unearned filing fee he failed to return to Parish Leasing Company, LLC. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Cody King, Ward 6, Morehouse Parish" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether “collectibility” was a relevant consideration in a legal malpractice action. Specifically, the issue presented was whether plaintiff’s damages in this legal malpractice action were limited to the amount she could have actually collected on a judgment against the tortfeasor in the underlying lawsuit. Elaine Ewing was injured in an automobile accident in 2015, when her vehicle was hit by a vehicle driven by Marc Melancon. Her counsel failed to forward the original petition for damages within seven days as required by La. R.S. 13:850. The original petition was filed on April 22, 2016, after the one-year prescriptive period had passed. Ms. Ewing’s suit was dismissed on an exception of prescription. Ms. Ewing subsequently filed a legal malpractice action against her attorney and Westport Insurance Corporation, counsel's malpractice insurer. Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the court should apply the “collectibility rule.” Defendants alleged Ms. Ewing’s recovery could be no greater than her potential recovery in the underlying personal injury lawsuit, and recovery in this case should have been capped at Mr. Melancon’s insurance policy limits. The Supreme Court held that proof of collectibility of an underlying judgment was not an element necessary for a plaintiff to establish a claim for legal malpractice, nor could collectibility be asserted by an attorney as an affirmative defense in a legal malpractice action. View "Ewing v. Westport Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law