Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frederick Meiners, III was employed as Assistant Fire Chief with the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 (“District”). In early 2016, Meiners agreed to retrieve a repaired ambulance unit from Hattiesburg, but informed his supervisor, provisional fire chief Kenneth Moore, that he first had to attend a speaking engagement with a ladies’ group that would last approximately thirty minutes. At 1:08 p.m. that day, Jennifer Glorioso, the wife of Fire Equipment Operator Glorioso (hereinafter referred to as “FEO Glorioso”), photographed Meiners sitting at a table at the La Madeleine restaurant with his wife and his lawyer. She later sent a text message containing this photograph to her husband. At 2:30 p.m., District Fire Chief Brady Anderson advised Chief Moore that Meiners was not yet back from his meeting and offered to pick up the ambulance himself. Chief Moore declined Anderson’s offer. After being reassured by Meiners he was on his way back to the District, Chief Moore received a text from an unknown phone number that contained a photograph of Meiners taken at the restaurant. Chief Moore then provided a written notice of investigation to Meiners, stating that he was “initiating an investigation into an incident involving you in a matter which occurred on February 19, 2016, specifically, conflicting details regarding a speaking engagement while on duty.” The notice of investigation also stated the “persons conducting this investigation will be Corianne Green and a PMI representative.” Chief Moore then placed Meiners on administrative leave with pay. After a hearing, Meiners was terminated from his employment with the district based on his conduct on the date of the ambulance pickup. The termination was affirmed by the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 Civil Service Board (“Board”). Upon review, a district court reversed and remanded, finding that untruthfulness alone, did not mandate termination, where the misconduct did not result in a detrimental effect on the efficient and orderly operation of the fire department. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to impose discipline other than termination. The Court reversed judgment and reinstated the Board's decision. View "Meiners v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection Dist. No. 4 et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Margaret Stockstill killed Cody Couch during an alcohol-fueled argument and physical fight in the home of Kristin Copeland on April 14, 2017, in Folsom, Louisiana. Couch and Copeland had a five-month-old daughter together, who was present in the home during the conflict along with Copeland’s six-year-old son. The conflict began when Couch, who had a pending DWI charge, borrowed defendant’s car to go out drinking with friends rather than spend the evening at home with Copeland. After Couch left, Copeland drank, complained to defendant about him, and angrily called and texted him at the bar repeatedly. Copeland set some clothing on fire in the yard and sent him a picture of it. Copeland told Couch not to return that night, piled some of his belongings on the porch, and locked him out. Couch eventually returned, entering through the back door. He refused to leave and the conflict escalated. Couch and the two women argued and fought. They fought throughout the home and broke furniture, including a crib with the youngest child still in it. The fight ended when defendant shot Couch once at close range. Defendant was indicted for second degree murder; she claimed self-defense. Defendant was ultimately convicted as charged, for which she was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without being eligible for parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found there was a "reasonable possibility" that erroneously admitted evidence could have contributed to the jury’s decision to reject defendant’s claim that she acted in defense of herself or another, and to the jury’s decision to return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder rather than a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The appellate court's ruling was reversed and the sentence vacated. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Stockstill" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Revish was found guilty of the second degree murder of Latrell Davis and the attempted second degree murder of Jamond Rougeau. All three were in Rougeau’s parked vehicle on March 26, 2012, in Baton Rouge when violence erupted from a dispute over cocaine. Rougeau’s weapon was used to shoot Rougeau and Davis. Rougeau identified defendant as the shooter. Defendant, however, turned himself in to police, admitted he shot Rougeau and Davis, but claimed he did so in self-defense. The district court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility for second degree murder and 25 years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted second degree murder. The court of appeal vacated the convictions and sentences because it found trial counsel provided ineffective assistance sufficient to deprive defendant of a fair trial by failing to object to a defective jury instruction on self-defense. The court of appeal remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial and after several delays, defendant moved to quash the indictment in which he contended the State failed to timely commence the new trial. In opposing this motion, the State argued that when the court of appeal’s order of a new trial became final, the slate was wiped clean, the clock restarted, and the State had a new two-year period to commence trial. The parties also disputed whether the time to commence trial was interrupted by the filing of various motions, and, if so, when the interruptions ceased. The district court rejected the State’s interpretation of Articles 578 and 582 and granted defendant’s motion to quash. The State appealed. Finding that the State miscalculated the time afforded by statute to retry a defendant following mistrial, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Revish" on Justia Law

This dispute involved ad valorem taxes for the tax years 2013 through 2016. In October 2012, D90 Energy, LLC, purchased two gas wells and one saltwater disposal well. The wells were subject to ad valorem property taxation in Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana. Relying on a Commission regulation applicable to oil and gas wells, D90 argued that a purchase price in a valid sale is fair market value; therefore, the wells should be valued at $100,000.00 for each of these tax years. For each tax year, the Assessor rejected D90’s documentation of the sale, explaining, in part, that his office never uses the sales price as fair market value for oil and gas wells. Rather, the Assessor used valuation tables provided by the Commission, which take into account age, depth, type, and production of the wells. D90 appealed each assessment to the Commission, presenting documentary evidence and live testimony to establish the $100,000.00 purchase price for the wells and the arms-length nature of the sale. It presented additional evidence to establish that the condition and value of the wells were virtually identical for each tax year. The district court affirmed the Commission’s valuations for all four tax years. Reviewing only what was presented to the Assessor, the court of appeal reversed the district court and reinstated the Assessor’s valuation. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted D90’s writ application to determine the correctness of the assessments, the proper scope and standard of review, and the legal effect of D90’s failure to pay taxes under protest. After review, the Court determined the district court was correct in affirming the Commission, thus reversing the appellate court's judgment. View "D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Parish Board of Review" on Justia Law

In 2017, Louisiana filed a bill of information charging defendant, Tazin Ardell Hill, with altering an official identification card to conceal his designation as a registered sex offender. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review involved the constitutionality of the statutory requirement that persons convicted of sex offenses carry an identification card branded with the words “SEX OFFENDER.” Other states (and the federal government) have enacted similar collections of laws. However, the specific requirement to carry a branded identification card distinguished Louisiana from the rest of the country. The Court found this requirement constituted compelled speech and did not survive a First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis. Thus, the Court upheld the trial court’s ruling striking this specific requirement as unconstitutional and quashing the prosecution of defendant for altering his identification card to conceal the “SEX OFFENDER” designation. View "Louisiana v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant Dennis Bartie stabbed his former girlfriend more than 20 times in front of eyewitnesses in Baton Rouge and then stole her friend’s car, which he drove to Lake Charles and abandoned. He was found guilty of attempted second degree murder, and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment at hard labor. He was serving that sentence at Allen Correctional Center in 2016 when DNA testing connected him to the victim of an unsolved murder committed in 1998. In 1998, Rose Born was murdered at her donut shop in Lake Charles. She was stabbed more than 30 times. Her car was stolen and then abandoned about 4 miles away. Defendant was 17 years old at the time and lived in Lake Charles. Defendant was interviewed at the correctional center for the 1998 murder; he would have been categorically exempt from capital punishment because he was 17 years old at the time of that crime. Investigators informed defendant the law had changed and a special sentencing hearing was required before a person who commits second degree murder as a juvenile can be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility. Defendant thereafter confessed to the 1998 murder. When charged with the murder, defendant sought to suppress his statements to investigators. In its brief, the State characterized falsely informing defendant he would receive the death penalty if he did not satisfactorily confess as permissible tactical deception, and argued that, regardless of whether the deception was permissible, it did not render defendant’s confession involuntary because he was hardened, experienced in the legal system, and "unaffected by the toothless threats." The district court denied defendant's motion, finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated defendant’s statements during the recorded interview were free and voluntary. The court of appeal determined defendant repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent, but that police ignored the invocation. The Louisiana Supreme Court found defendant’s statements during the police interview from roughly the 48-minute mark onward were made in violation of Miranda, were not free and voluntary, and therefore not admissible for any purpose including impeachment at the trial. The Court reinstated the district court’s ruling that the first 48 minutes were admissible to the extent authorized by the rules of evidence. The matter was remanded to the district court for further consideration of whether defendant's statements during the police interview following the 48-minute mark were not free and voluntary. View "Lousiana v. Bartie" on Justia Law

In 2015, fishermen in Cocodrie, Louisiana noticed a large Rubbermaid tote floating near a dock. The next day, they called the police after they spotted clothing and a human arm sticking out of it. Inside the tote, police found a decomposing body, which was later identified as Robbie Coulon, the victim and a lifelong friend of defendant Simon Quinn. The victim lived in defendant’s Houma apartment, in apparent violation of the rental agreement. Friction between the two developed as the victim repeatedly ignored defendant’s instructions to refrain from doing anything that could draw the attention of the property manager to the victim’s unauthorized presence. In addition, the victim pawned some of defendant’s belongings, including an Xbox belonging to defendant’s son. Defendant would ultimately be indicted for the second degree murder of Coulon, and for obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence of Coulon’s murder. A jury found defendant guilty as charged; he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without eligibility for parole (for murder), and a consecutive term to 50 years imprisonment for second-felony offender obstruction of justice. A divided court of appeal reversed the conviction for second degree murder and affirmed the conviction for obstruction. Defendant appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the court of appeal, which reversed defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, and affirmed defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice, his habitual offender adjudication, and his sentence for obstruction. View "Louisiana v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Defendant Keddrick Kennon was convicted by jury of distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine. The district court sentenced defendant to serve two terms of imprisonment at hard labor: 30 years and five years, to run consecutively. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences (as amended to reflect that the first two years of the 30-year sentence for distribution of cocaine were to be served without parole eligibility). Thereafter, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging that defendant was a fourth-felony offender with predicate felony convictions for distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine, and attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant admitted he was a second-felony offender (based on the attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute predicate) and received an agreed-upon sentence of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor. The district court, however, had vacated both sentences before it imposed the 60-year sentence. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which the district court denied. Because defendant received a single 60-year sentence despite being convicted of two crimes, the court of appeal granted defendant’s application for supervisory writs. The court of appeal then vacated the habitual offender sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court reimposed the originally agreed-upon sentence of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor as a second-felony offender for distribution of cocaine. The district court also sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of five years imprisonment at hard labor for the possession of cocaine conviction. The court of appeal affirmed the sentences. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, defendant argued his 60-year habitual offender sentence was reviewable despite it being imposed originally pursuant to a plea agreement, and that it was excessive in violation of the prohibition against cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment contained in La. Const. Art. 1, section 20. The Supreme Court found the 60-year sentence was both reviewable and excessive, and therefore set it aside. However, because the sentence was negotiated as part of a plea agreement in which defendant admitted his status as a second-felony offender, the Court also set aside the habitual offender adjudication, restored the parties to the status quo ante by reinstating the unenhanced sentences (30 years and 5 years, to run consecutively) that were affirmed as amended in Kennon-1, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Kennon" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Ricard, Jr. was indicted on two counts of the aggravated rape of his niece, K.M., then aged 12. Defendant regularly babysat K.M. and her siblings in exchange for lodging in the home of his sister’s family. At trial, defendant’s younger sister (who was not the mother of K.M.), age 25, testified that defendant had raped her several times when she was 10 years old but that she did not reveal the abuse to her older sister, K.M.’s mother, until she heard the allegations that defendant raped K.M. The jury acquitted defendant of one count of aggravated rape, and found him guilty of the lesser offense of molestation of a juvenile, in response to the second count of aggravated rape. The charged offenses carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility. The jury was instructed that 10 of 12 jurors must agree to reach a verdict. Upon the jury’s return to the courtroom, however, the judge misspoke and asked whether nine jurors concurred in the responsive verdict, but the jury was not polled. Despite being instructed that sentencing is not the function of the jury but rather is the duty and responsibility of the judge, the jury was also informed of the sentencing range for each lesser responsive crime. Unfortunately, the court misinformed the jury that the sentencing range for molestation of a juvenile is five to 20 years imprisonment, when in fact the correct sentence for that crime is much greater because of the victim's age. Defendant did not object to the jury instructions and did not bring the error to the district court’s attention until sentencing when the State objected to the leniency of the 20-year sentence that the court initially imposed. The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant was a third-felony habitual offender. After negotiations, however, defendant accepted the State’s offer to waive the mandatory minimum sentence of 66 years. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence. Defendant’s timely application for post-conviction relief was denied by the district court. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief on collateral review. View "Louisiana v. Ricard" on Justia Law

In June 2016, defendant Jason Michael drove his truck into a smaller vehicle on Louisiana Highway 44 in Ascension Parish and then fled the scene of the accident. He was found by police a few miles away. His vehicle was heavily damaged, and its debris was found at the scene of the crash. In addition to defendant, two other people were injured in the crash: Bree Lavigne and her minor son Lucas. The State charged defendant with two counts of first degree vehicular negligent injury, one count of hit-and-run driving, and one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the BAC results, alleging that the trooper misinformed him that under La. R.S. 32:666 he could not refuse the blood test because serious injury resulted from the crash and that defendant’s consent was therefore coerced. The district court denied the motion to suppress after a hearing. Defendant unsuccessfully sought supervisory review from the court of appeal. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending the BAD blood draw had to be suppressed because he consented only after being threatened with criminal consequences if he refused. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless BAC blood test. View "Louisiana v. Michael" on Justia Law