Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the death of Laurie Maria Brocato, her nephew submitted a 2019 olographic testament for probate, which left most of her estate to him. The district court ordered that this will be recorded, filed, and executed, and he was named executor. Later, Brocato’s surviving spouse, Lisa Vickers, contested the 2019 testament and presented a new four-page olographic testament, dated across three consecutive days in 2021 and written in a bound notebook, which revoked previous wills and left the estate primarily to Vickers.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans found that the 2021 testament met the requirements for an olographic will under Louisiana law, including being entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. The court annulled the probate of the 2019 will, removed the nephew as executor, and admitted the 2021 testament to probate. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the testament’s multiple dates and the location of the signature did not invalidate it, especially in light of legislative amendments intended to relax formal requirements and prioritize testamentary intent.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case after granting writs to address whether the 2021 testament satisfied the statutory form requirements, especially considering the 2025 amendment to La. C.C. art. 1575, which applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 testament was valid under the amended statute. The court found the document was entirely written, dated, and signed by the decedent, even though the signature was at the top of the second page and dates appeared throughout. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the 2021 testament’s probate, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SUCCESSION OF BROCATO" on Justia Law

Deputies from the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office responded to a late-night call reporting suspicious activity at a local automotive business. On arrival, they found Michael Steven White at the scene, with several vehicle doors and hoods open. White admitted to opening some of the vehicles, explaining he was either looking for parts to sell or searching for a car for his mother. He was subsequently charged with six counts of simple burglary. At trial, the jury was instructed verbally that they could find White guilty of simple burglary, guilty of attempted simple burglary, or not guilty on each count. However, the written verdict form given to the jury omitted “not guilty” as an option and instead listed only guilty-related verdicts.White was convicted on all six counts, adjudicated as a fourth-felony offender, and sentenced to twenty years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient and that the omission of a “not guilty” option on the written verdict form constituted reversible error. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found the evidence sufficient and, relying on State v. Craddock, determined the omission did not amount to reversible error, especially since the trial court gave correct oral instructions and there was no timely objection.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed whether the failure to include a “not guilty” option on the written verdict form was reversible error. The court held that this omission was a patent error touching on the fundamental right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, and that it was not harmless under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the error could have caused juror confusion, undermined the fairness of the proceedings, and was not subject to harmless error analysis. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. WHITE" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. He later filed a collateral attack on his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and claiming that his defense attorney prevented him from testifying at trial. In support of his post-conviction claims, the defendant submitted several affidavits, but did not provide testimony or an affidavit from his trial counsel to substantiate his allegations.The trial court granted the defendant’s application for post-conviction relief, finding that defense counsel’s prevention of the defendant's testimony constituted structural error, which required automatic reversal of his conviction. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed this decision, relying on State v. Hampton and concluding that such collateral attacks must be supported by testimony or an affidavit from defense counsel acknowledging they prevented the defendant from testifying. The defendant sought review by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed whether the trial court properly granted post-conviction relief. The court held that, on collateral review, a claim that defense counsel prevented a defendant from testifying is reviewed under the Strickland v. Washington standard, requiring the defendant to show both constitutionally deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court overruled Hampton to the extent it required automatic reversal for such claims on collateral review and to the extent it required substantiating evidence exclusively from defense counsel. The court found the record insufficient to determine whether the Strickland standard was met and remanded to the trial court for a hearing to make such findings. The disposition was reversed and remanded. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. TURNER" on Justia Law

Two attorneys verbally agreed to jointly propose providing legal services to a public entity for Hurricane Katrina-related insurance claims on a contingency fee basis. After a meeting with the entity’s officials, they submitted several joint proposals, all based on a contingency fee arrangement. The entity, however, offered only an hourly fee contract, which one attorney accepted and the other declined to participate in. Subsequently, the accepting attorney was retained alone and performed all legal work. Over a year later, the entity entered a contingency fee agreement with the accepting attorney and another law firm. The attorney who had declined the hourly arrangement was not included in this contract and performed no work for the entity.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans held a bench trial and found that a valid oral joint venture existed between the two attorneys when the contingency fee contract was executed. It concluded that the accepting attorney breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the other of the opportunity to participate, awarding damages equal to half the contingency fee. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the contract breach—not attorney fee rules—was controlling, and upheld the damages award.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found clear legal errors in the lower courts’ analysis. The Court held that the initial joint venture terminated when the entity refused the proposed contingency fee arrangement, and no enforceable joint venture or other contractual relationship existed thereafter. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct govern such relationships and preclude fee-sharing without written client consent and meaningful legal services by all lawyers involved. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any portion of the contingency fee. View "SPEARS VS. HALL" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree rape and aggravated crime against nature, with allegations that he sexually abused his eight-year-old son while giving him a bath. The child was taken to the hospital on the night of the alleged incident, but no physical evidence of abuse was found. About a month later, the child was evaluated by a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner at a children’s hospital, who subsequently diagnosed the child with “child sexual abuse.” The State gave notice of its intent to offer the nurse practitioner as an expert witness at trial.After a Daubert hearing, the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans found the nurse practitioner qualified as an expert in pediatric child abuse medicine and ruled that she could testify about her diagnosis at trial. The defendant sought supervisory review, but the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied the writ. The appellate court cited prior precedent permitting such expert testimony, reasoning that a nurse practitioner’s diagnosis did not usurp the jury’s role in determining the defendant’s guilt.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify regarding her diagnosis of child sexual abuse. The court found the methodology underlying the diagnosis insufficiently reliable under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A), particularly because the diagnosis was based almost entirely on the child’s statements, which the jury would be able to hear and assess directly. The Supreme Court also determined that such expert testimony would improperly bolster the credibility of the complaining witness, potentially prejudicing the defendant. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that under these circumstances, the expert’s diagnosis was inadmissible. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. CLOUDIE" on Justia Law

Koch Methanol St. James, LLC sought approval from St. James Parish for a land use permit to upgrade its methanol production facility, including the installation of a connecting pipeline that would traverse a wetlands area. The Parish’s Land Use Plan includes specific provisions for allowable uses in wetlands, stating that such areas should remain unoccupied except for unique situations requiring a location in the water. The Parish Planning Commission interpreted this language as permitting Koch’s project under Tier 2 review, since the pipeline was considered a unique situation due to its necessity in connecting to an existing pipeline already located in the wetlands.After the Planning Commission approved the application, plaintiffs appealed to the Parish Council, which unanimously rejected the appeal. Plaintiffs then sought judicial review in the District Court for St. James Parish. The district court upheld the Council’s decision, finding that the Parish’s interpretation of the Plan was reasonable, the process was not arbitrary or capricious, and that Tier 2 review was appropriate for the project. The court also noted that the procedures followed were adequate and left room for reasonable differences of opinion.On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, reversed the district court’s ruling, applying what it termed “de novo review.” The appellate court determined that the Plan required Tier 3 review for any use in wetlands unless specifically listed as allowable, and concluded that the Parish had failed to follow its own ordinance by applying Tier 2 review. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the appellate court erred by applying a de novo standard rather than the proper arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s ruling and reinstated the district court’s judgment, emphasizing deference to the Parish’s interpretation and decision-making authority in land use matters. View "ALEXANDER VS. ST. JAMES PARISH" on Justia Law

An employee working as a mechanic suffered a back injury at work in June 2020 but did not initially lose wages because his employer moved him to a light-duty position with full salary. After more than two years, the employer eliminated the light-duty position and stopped paying his salary. At that point, the employer began paying the employee temporary total disability benefits for approximately two years. When those benefits stopped in March 2024, the employee filed a disputed claim for compensation in July 2024, more than four years after the original injury.The employer responded before the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), District 2, by raising an exception of prescription, arguing the claim was filed outside the one-year period allowed by Louisiana law. The OWC judge denied the exception, finding that the employer’s initiation and continuation of disability benefit payments well after the prescriptive period had run was a clear renunciation of prescription. The employer sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Court of Appeal, which denied relief. The employer then applied for a writ to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that, under Louisiana’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the prescriptive period for filing a claim is not tolled merely because the employee initially continues to earn full wages. However, the Court further held that when an employer initiates and continues regular workers’ compensation payments after the prescriptive period has run, such conduct constitutes a tacit renunciation of prescription. This means the employer waives the right to assert prescription as a defense. Therefore, the Court affirmed the OWC’s denial of the employer’s exception of prescription and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. AECOM Amentum Government Services" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after an individual was convicted of a crime in Louisiana, served part of his sentence, and later had his conviction reversed or vacated. Claiming factual innocence, he sought compensation under Louisiana’s wrongful conviction statute, which provides monetary awards to qualifying persons. Prior to filing this petition in state court, he had also initiated a separate federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from the same prosecution and conviction.In the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, the State requested a stay of the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings, citing Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 532. This provision allows a court to stay proceedings when there is a related action in another jurisdiction involving the same parties and occurrence. The State argued that the federal suit should proceed first. The district court denied the motion to stay in open court on March 27, 2025. The State then sought supervisory review from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which also denied relief on April 30, 2025.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the district court’s denial of the stay. The court examined the statutory differences between the state law compensation claim, which requires proof of factual innocence, and the federal civil rights action, which focuses on constitutional violations by individual actors. Concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the state court proceedings—especially in light of the legislative instruction to decide wrongful conviction claims expeditiously—the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that denial of the State’s motion to stay the wrongful conviction compensation proceedings was proper under the circumstances. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who sustained injuries after her vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant, whose insurer was also named as a defendant. The plaintiff filed a petition for damages on December 22, 2020. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and on November 17, 2023, the jury found the defendant 100% at fault and awarded the plaintiff both special and general damages, totaling $736,871.62. The judgment, subsequently prepared and signed, awarded judicial interest “from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid.” However, November 17, 2023, was actually the date of the jury verdict, not the date of judicial demand.The defendants issued payment including judicial interest calculated only from the November 2023 verdict date. The plaintiff then moved to enforce the judgment, asserting that interest should accrue from the date of judicial demand—December 22, 2020. The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans granted this motion, finding the full amount of interest had not been paid. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, holding that judicial interest in tort cases accrues automatically from the date of judicial demand by operation of law, regardless of any drafting error in the judgment’s language.Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the presence of the November 17, 2023 date in the judgment did not deprive the plaintiff of the statutory right to interest from the date of judicial demand. The Court concluded that enforcing the judgment to provide interest from the date the petition was filed did not constitute a substantive amendment and simply applied the mandatory provisions of Louisiana law. The rulings of both the district court and the appellate court were affirmed. View "Bilalis v. Drennan" on Justia Law

A driver, Ngoc Troung, was rear-ended by Marcus Sanders, whose vehicle was insured by Old American Indemnity Company. The impact rendered Troung’s vehicle inoperable, requiring repairs that included a new tire, exhaust system components, and other parts. The insurer initially paid for some repairs but later deducted $313.79 for “betterment”—a reduction based on the idea that new parts improved the vehicle beyond its pre-accident state. Troung had to pay this balance to retrieve his car and subsequently sued, arguing that Louisiana law does not allow for such deductions in third-party tort claims and seeking penalties for the insurer’s actions.The First Judicial District Court (trial court) held that betterment deductions were permissible because they were not expressly prohibited by Louisiana law or jurisprudence, and therefore did not consider Troung’s bad faith claims. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, reversed, finding that neither the law nor public policy allows a tortfeasor or insurer to reduce a not-at-fault party’s recovery for betterment in third-party tort claims. The appellate court also found the insurer acted in bad faith by imposing the betterment deduction and awarded statutory penalties.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case on writ of certiorari. It affirmed the appellate court’s holding that Louisiana law does not permit a tortfeasor or their insurer to reduce a third-party tort victim’s property damage recovery by a betterment deduction. However, the Supreme Court reversed the award of penalties, concluding that the insurer’s conduct did not constitute a misrepresentation of pertinent facts and that penalties were not warranted because the legal issue was one of first impression. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Troung v. Sanders" on Justia Law