Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Louisiana charged D.T. with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, and sought to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction and to prosecute D.T. as an adult pursuant to Louisiana Children’s Code Article 305(B)(2)(j). In response, D.T. filed a motion with the juvenile court to declare La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) unconstitutional. The juvenile court granted D.T.’s motion. On the state's application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) was indeed unconstitutional, concluding the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in creating an exception allowing divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction for a child charged with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, where that charge is not among the crimes enumerated in La. Const. art. V, sec. 19. View "Louisiana in the interest of D.T." on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiff George Blair filed a petition for damages in which he alleged that a 2011 Ford Escape driven by Lori Brewer struck his 2008 Honda Civic in 2013. According to Plaintiff, at the time of the collision he was at a complete stop at a traffic signal when his vehicle was suddenly struck from the rear by Brewer’s vehicle, propelling him into the intersection. At the time of the accident, Ms. Brewer was in the course and scope of her work and was driving a company vehicle owned by AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation (“Amerisource”), which, according to the Petition, had a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance with ACE American Insurance Company Inc. (“ACE”) insuring against the negligent acts of Ms. Brewer (together with Amerisource and ACE, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleged that the collision caused injuries to his neck and back for which he sought damages from Defendants related to, inter alia, his physical pain and suffering, mental pain, anguish, and distress, medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life. In an apparent effort to disprove a causal connection between Plaintiff’s injuries and the collision, Defendants sought to introduce at trial the expert opinion of Dr. Charles E. “Ted” Bain. Dr. Bain west forth his calculation of a low impact collision and the likely preexisting nature of Plaintiff's injuries, thus concluding that plaintiff was not subject to forces and acceleration that would have caused serious or long-lasting injuries. Plaintiff moved to exclude the expert's report, and the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal would reverse that order, and the issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the appellate court was correct in summarily reversing the trial court's exclusion. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that Dr. Bain's testimony was not based on sufficient facts or data, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Blair v. Coney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jacob and his minor son Logan, claimed they were injured in an automobile accident on December 13, 2016. On December 13, 2017, plaintiffs’ counsel prepared a petition for damages and attempted to fax file the petition with the Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court at approximately 4:47 p.m. Fax machine receipts from counsel’s office indicated a “BUSY/NO SIGNAL” message and demonstrated that several attempts to fax file the petition on December 13, 2017, failed. The Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court’s policy at the time was to turn off the fax machines at the close of business hours, 4:30 p.m. Plaintiffs’ suit was filed the following day, December 14, 2017. Defendants filed an exception of prescription which was sustained by the district court and the court of appeal affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to fax file a petition on the last day of the prescriptive period after the clerk of court’s business hours, but before midnight, interrupted prescription where the clerk of court’s policy was to turn off the fax machines when the office closed. Based on the facts of this case, plaintiffs’ attempts to fax file their petition prior to midnight on the last day of the prescriptive period served to interrupt prescription. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Stevenson v. Progressive Security Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In consolidated actions, the common issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a writ of mandamus should issue to the clerk of an appellate court for the purpose of directing the clerk to comply with certain rules for the random assignment of panels and cases at that court. In a three-page per curiam, the First Circuit explained its allotment procedures were changed in 2019 after the 2018 amendment to La. R.S. 13:319. The First Circuit stated it adopted rules requiring a procedure for random allotment by the Clerk’s office of both appeals (Internal Rule 2.3(d)(l)(c)) and writ applications (Internal Rules 3.9(a)),4 with consideration for recusals and emergencies. In a supplemental per curiam, the First Circuit discussed composition of judicial panels, each regular panel comprising of one member randomly chosen through mechanical means from the four members of each of the Court's three election districts. The random composition of the initial three-judge panels was adopted pursuant to a five-year plan of rotation of members among the panels. To further ensure random composition of the panels, panel members of particular panels did not sit as an intact panel in the following year. The four randomly drawn regular panels also sat on writ duty throughout the Court's six appeal cycles. Petitioner Texas Brine’s petition alleged the First Circuit’s composition of judicial panels “dramatically limits the number of unique panels that can hear writs, appeals, and contested motions before the First Circuit from 220 unique combinations to 64 unique combinations - a reduction of approximately 70.9%.” It concluded this policy was an “affront to the requirement of randomness.” The Solomon plaintiffs’ mandamus petition was premised on the First Circuit’s practice, used between 2006-2018, of assigning subsequent appeals or applications for writs to a panel which included a judge who sat on the original panel and may have taken the lead or authored the first opinion/ruling in the case. The Supreme Court determined the First Circuit’s assignment system was reasonably designed “to select judges for panels in a random fashion which does not permit intentional manipulation by either the judges or the litigants.” The Court therefore denied Texas Brine’s mandamus petition, and dismissed the Solomon plaintiffs’ application as moot. View "Texas Brine Co., LLC v. Naquin" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of whether the State’s circumstantial case against defendant Charles Mayeux was sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. In the early morning hours of March 21, 2015, defendant called 911 to report a fire at his home in Evergreen. When the fire was extinguished, the charred body of defendant’s wife, Shelly Mayeux, was discovered. It was undisputed that Shelly died before the fire, as neither carbon monoxide nor soot were found in her lungs or airway. But no expert could determine the cause of her death. A fire investigator opined that the fire was intentionally set. Defendant and his wife were the only two people in the home when the fire started. The State indicted defendant for second degree murder, alleging that he killed his wife and set his house on fire to conceal evidence of the crime. A jury found defendant guilty as charged by a 10-2 verdict. The Supreme Court determined the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally conclude that defendant killed his wife when he had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, therefore, affirming conviction. View "Louisiana v. Mayeux" on Justia Law

In 1962, the United States began constructing various structures in and around the Catahoula Basin pursuant to a congressionally-approved navigation project under the River and Harbor Act of 1960 to promote navigation on the Ouachita and Black Rivers. In conjunction with that project, the State of Louisiana signed an “Act of Assurances,” which obligated the State to provide the federal government with all lands and property interests necessary to the project free of charge, and to indemnify the federal government from any damages resulting from the project. In 2006, plaintiffs Steve Crooks and Era Lea Crooks filed a “Class Action Petition to Fix Boundary, For Damages and For Declaration [sic] Judgment.” The Crookses alleged they represented a class of landowners in the Catahoula Basin whose property was affected by increased water levels from the project. Ultimately, the trial court certified the plaintiffs as one class, but subdivided that class into two groups – the “Lake Plaintiffs” and the “Swamp Plaintiffs” – depending on the location of the properties affected. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims for compensation against the State were prescribed under La. R.S. 13:5111 and/or 28 U.S.C. 2501. The lower courts relied on the decision in Cooper v. Louisiana Department of Public Works, 870 So. 2d 315 (2004), to conclude the one-year prescriptive period for damage to immovable property found in La. C.C. art. 3493 governed, and the continuing tort doctrine applied to prevent the running of prescription on the plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in relying on Cooper and held that the three-year prescriptive period for actions for compensation for property taken by the state set forth in La. R. S. 13:5111 governed and the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims were prescribed. View "Crooks v. Dept. of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by defendant Grand Palais Riverboat L.L.C. as a technician on the Grand Palais riverboat casino, and was injured when the gangway attached to the boat malfunctioned and collapsed. Plaintiff filed a petition for damages, alleging that the Grand Palais was a vessel under general maritime law, 1 U.S.C. 3, and that he was a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., at the time of the accident. The Grand Palais was built as a riverboat casino in conformity with the requirements of Louisiana law which authorize gaming activities to be conducted on riverboat casinos that sail on designated waterways. In 2001, the Grand Palais was moored to its current location by nylon mooring lines and steel wire cables, pursuant to La. R. S. 27:65(B)(1)(c), which allowed riverboat casinos to conduct gaming activities while docked if the owner obtained the required license and paid the required franchise fees. The Grand Palais had not moved since March 24, 2001. Necessary services for the Grand Palais’s operation as a casino were provided via shore-side utility lines, which supply electricity, water, sewage, cable television, telephone and internet services. These utility lines have not been disconnected since 2001. Additionally, the casino computer systems, including the slot machines, are located on land. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an appellate court's decision granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and holding the Grand Palais Casino was indeed a “vessel” for purposes of general maritime law. The Court determined this decision contradicted the court’s earlier decision in Benoit v. St. Charles Gaming Company, LLC, 233 So. 3d 615, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 104, 202 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2018), which held the Grand Palais was not a vessel. After a de novo review of the record, the Louisiana Court concluded the Grand Palais was a not vessel under general maritime law. Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s suit. View "Caldwell v. St. Charles Gaming Co d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino-Lake Charles" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in consolidated matters to consider whether allegations of negligent credentialing against two healthcare providers were claims that fell within the purview of Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice Act or, alternatively, sounded in general negligence. Mariah Charles was born prematurely in October 2014 at Lafayette General Medical Center (LGMC) and hospitalized there until March 2015, when she was transferred to Women’s and Children’s Hospital of Lafayette (W&C) until her release a month later. Dr. Geeta Dalal, a pediatric cardiologist with clinical privileges at both hospitals, contributed to Mariah’s care during and after Mariah’s hospitalization. While Mariah remained at LGMC, Dr. Dalal ordered and interpreted eight echocardiograms that, according to the petition, revealed abnormal findings that could cause pulmonary artery hypertension, yet, the petition alleged Dr. Dalal took no action other than ordering additional echocardiograms. After Mariah’s transfer to W&C, Dr. Dalal interpreted more echocardiograms, again noted abnormalities, and allegedly failed to properly diagnose or treat Mariah. Mariah’s mother initiated Medical Review Panel proceedings with the Patient’s Compensation Fund against Dr. Dalal and the hospital defendants alleging medical malpractice and seeking damages for their alleged failure to properly diagnose and treat Mariah. In addition to the Medical Review Panel proceedings, Mariah's mother filed suit against the hospitals, The Regional Health System of Acadiana, LLC, Women’s & Children’s Hospital, Inc., HCA Holdings, Inc., and Health Care Indemnity, Inc. (W&C), as well as Lafayette General Medical Center, Inc. and/or Lafayette General Health System, Inc. (LGMC), for damages related to Mariah’s care. The petition for damages asserted a single cause of action that LGMC and W&C were liable under general tort law because they “negligently credentialed Dr. Dalal and negligently provided her with privileges to practice” in their facilities “even though [they] knew or should have known she was not board certified in the field of pediatric cardiology.” LGMC and W&C filed dilatory exceptions of prematurity to this suit, asserting that they were qualified healthcare providers under the MMA and were entitled to have Thomas’s negligent credentialing claims presented first to a medical review panel pursuant to R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i). Based on the allegations presented by the petition, the provisions of the LMMA, and application of the "Coleman" factors, the Supreme Court found the trial court correctly sustained the exceptions of prematurity raised by LGMC and W&C, therefore reversing the court of appeal's judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Thomas v. Regional Health System of Acadiana, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, a grand jury indicated defendant Dacarius Holliday for the first-degree murder of two-year-old Darian Coon. In 2010, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. In March 2010, the jury unanimously determined that defendant be sentenced to death, finding the following aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second-degree cruelty to juveniles; and (2) the victim was under the age of twelve (12) years. Appeal was made directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reviewed defendant's 52 assignments of error, variously combined into 29 arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Holliday" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court judgment that granted defendant Donovan Alexander's motion to suppress an uncounseled statement. Defendant was charged by bill of information with possession with intent to distribute heroin, and possessing a firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance. He pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress statement. A DEA Special Agent testified that defendant was read his rights and waived them at the scene of his arrest and also prior to being interviewed at Police Headquarters. Specifically, defendant signed a DEA advice of rights form. While defendant was detained at Police Headquarters, police informed him of the search and recovery from an Orleans Parish residence. Defendant told officers that the drugs and gun were his and that he did not want the woman who lived there to be charged. This was the statement sought to be suppressed. At some point during the search of the residence, attorney Dwayne Burrell arrived on the scene, identifying himself to officers as defendant’s attorney and attempted to stop further search of the home. Burrell was told by officers that drugs had been found and that the defendant was being detained. Burrell told the officers that he wanted to speak with defendant and that defendant was not going to make any statements. The trial court ultimately granted the motion to suppress, reasoning that where there are allegations of police misconduct in connection to statements given by an accused, the State had to specifically rebut these allegations, and the State failed to specifically rebut the serious allegations made by the defense attorney. After reviewing federal and state authorities, the Supreme Court determined that when the police failed to inform defendant his attorney sought to speak with him and failed to allow his attorney access to defendant when the attorney was on the scene of the arrest and asked to see his client, the statement was inadmissible. Accordingly, the court of appeal was reversed and the district court’s judgment reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Alexander" on Justia Law