Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Carmen Nicholas and Terry L. Bonnie, an attorney who negligently prepared the will of Carmen's mother. The will, which was not notarized and lacked an attestation clause, was denied probate, resulting in Carmen losing full ownership of a property she was supposed to inherit. Carmen filed a lawsuit against Bonnie, alleging that his negligence caused her loss. Bonnie, in a letter, admitted his mistake and expressed willingness to make financial amends. A consent judgment was signed, establishing Bonnie's liability for all damages caused by his negligence.The trial court denied Bonnie's exception of peremption, arguing that the matter was a legal malpractice suit and was perempted after three years from the act of malpractice under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5605. Carmen opposed this, arguing that the matter was not a legal malpractice action and that Bonnie had renounced prescription by voluntarily entering a consent judgment that acknowledged liability for all damages caused by his negligence. The trial court denied both the exception of peremption and the motion for summary judgment, leaving quantum as the only issue.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding Carmen’s petition was filed after the three-year peremptive period for a legal malpractice action. It held that the consent judgment could not revive the extinguished claim and dismissed Carmen’s claims with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's decision. It held that the consent judgment formed a bilateral contract between the parties, with Bonnie conceding fault or liability and contractually assuming an obligation to pay damages. The court ruled that the action to enforce the consent judgment was based in contract, not legal malpractice, and was therefore enforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nicholas v. Bonnie" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an accident where the plaintiff, Daniel Bennett, was injured when his vehicle abruptly stopped after driving over a downed telecommunications line owned by Cox Communications of Louisiana (“Cox”). Bennett filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including Cox and Cable Man, Inc., a company contracted by Cox to maintain the line. Bennett alleged that both Cox and Cable Man were negligent in their handling of the line and their failure to properly train their employees.Cox, in response, invoked an indemnification agreement under their contract with Cable Man, requiring Cable Man to indemnify and defend Cox against any claims related to Cable Man's work. Cable Man refused the tender and filed an Exception of Prematurity, arguing that without a finding of liability or a judgment, the claim for indemnity was premature. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the trial court's ruling, finding Cox’s claim for indemnity to be premature.The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. The court held that a claim for indemnity raised during the pendency of the litigation and before a finding of liability is not premature. The court reasoned that this finding aligns with principles of judicial economy and efficiency, and the relevant Code of Civil Procedure articles pertaining to third party practice. The court clarified that while the right to collect on an indemnity agreement is determined upon judgment or finding of liability or loss, there is no prohibition on asserting a claim for indemnity in the same proceeding. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kathleen Mouton, was arrested on a charge of attempted second degree murder in Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana, on August 1, 2018. Before formal charges were filed, her defense counsel filed a motion for a preliminary examination. The State filed a bill of information charging Mouton with attempted manslaughter on June 13, 2019. The trial was scheduled six times but was continued each time. On August 17, 2022, Mouton filed a motion to quash based on untimely prosecution. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the motion for preliminary examination did not suspend the time limit to commence trial because it was filed before prosecution was formally initiated.The State appealed, and the court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court did not address whether the motion for preliminary examination suspended the limitation period. Instead, it found that the two-year limitation period was interrupted by the court closure in Jefferson Davis Parish due to the impact of Hurricane Laura. The court explained that the limitation period began running anew on August 27, 2020, and thus the State had two years from that date in which to commence trial. As such, the motion to quash filed on August 17, 2022, was premature and should have been denied.The Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with both the trial court and the court of appeal. It held that a motion for preliminary examination filed prior to the institution of prosecution does not suspend the time limitation to commence trial once charges are formally filed unless the defendant re-urges the motion after the State files the bill of information. The court also held that the limitation period was suspended, but not interrupted, when courts were closed due to Hurricane Laura. Based on these conclusions, the court found that the State failed to timely commence trial and reinstated the trial court’s grant of Mouton's motion to quash. View "State v. Mouton" on Justia Law

This case involves a three-car consecutive rear-end collision. The plaintiffs, Scott Eastman and his wife, filed a lawsuit against Jillian Peterson and her insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, alleging that Peterson was solely liable for the accident because she negligently rear-ended Eastman's vehicle. Peterson and State Farm denied the allegations, contending that Eastman was comparatively at fault for the accident because he impacted the vehicle in front of him prior to being rear-ended by Peterson. They also disputed the severity of Eastman's injuries caused by the accident and argued that a majority of his alleged injuries and damages were due to a pre-existing condition.The case was tried before a jury, which found both Peterson and Eastman comparatively liable for the accident, assigning fifty-percent fault to each. The jury also found that Eastman had been injured in the accident and awarded him damages. Eastman then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing that the jury erred as the evidence strongly and overwhelmingly favored a finding of sole liability on the part of Peterson. The trial court granted the JNOV, finding Peterson solely liable for the accident and increasing the damages awarded to Eastman. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to review the lower courts' judgments. The court found that the trial court erred in granting the JNOV as to both liability and damages. The court noted that there was conflicting, credible testimony as to whether Eastman collided with the vehicle ahead of him prior to being impacted from behind by Peterson. The court also found that the evidence did not so strongly and overwhelmingly favor Eastman that reasonable jurors could not reach different conclusions. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeal, vacated the judgment of the trial court, and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "EASTMAN VS. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a wrongful death suit filed by Catherine Evans, the mother of Tommy Wiley's children, against Abubaker, Inc., the owner of a convenience store where Wiley was shot and killed. The incident occurred in the store's parking lot during a verbal altercation between Wiley and Cedric Daniels. Wiley struck Daniels in the face, and Daniels retaliated by shooting and killing Wiley. Evans alleged that the store owner had a duty to provide heightened security measures due to the store's location in a high crime area and its history of criminal activity. She claimed that Abubaker's failure to implement such measures made it liable for Wiley's death.The district court denied Abubaker's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the shooting was not foreseeable and that Wiley was not an innocent bystander but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the shooting. The court found that there were questions of fact regarding the foreseeability of the crime and whether Abubaker had a duty to provide additional security. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Wiley was not acting as a store patron but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the incident. Therefore, Abubaker had no duty to protect Wiley from the consequences of his own actions. The court held that Abubaker should have been granted summary judgment as it had no duty to protect Wiley under the circumstances of the case. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "EVANS VS. ABUBAKER, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the incorporation of the proposed City of St. George in Louisiana. The petition for incorporation was filed in 2018 and was approved by the governor, leading to a special election in which 54% of voters approved the incorporation. However, a legal challenge was filed by Baton Rouge’s Mayor-President and a Metropolitan Councilman, arguing that the petition for incorporation was deficient and that the proposed city would be unable to provide public services within a reasonable period of time. They also contended that the incorporation would have an adverse impact on Baton Rouge.The trial court denied the incorporation, finding that the petition minimally satisfied the statutory requirements and that the incorporation was unreasonable. The court found that St. George would operate at a deficit, affecting the timely provision of public services, and that lost tax revenue would significantly impact Baton Rouge. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of incorporation, finding the petition deficient as it failed to include a plan for the provision of services.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lower courts erred in their calculations of St. George's operating costs and potential revenues. The court also found that the lower courts failed to consider the cost savings that would result from Baton Rouge no longer having to provide services to St. George. The court concluded that St. George could provide public services within a reasonable period of time and that the incorporation was reasonable. The court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the proponents of incorporation. View "BROOME VS. RIALS" on Justia Law

The case in question concerns the defendant, Sharrieff M. Kent, who was convicted by a Plaquemines Parish jury of two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, and one count of illegal discharge of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Kent fired several shots at a pickup truck containing law enforcement officers as they were fleeing his property during an investigation. Kent claimed he was protecting his family from unknown intruders on his property.The Court of Appeal had reversed Kent's convictions, determining that the State violated Kent's right to due process by introducing evidence of other crimes and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Court of Appeal also found that the State violated Kent’s right to remain silent by referencing his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the Court of Appeal's determinations. It concluded that the references made to the officers conducting the trash pull as part of a narcotics investigation do not constitute impermissible references to other crimes or misconduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the State did not violate the Fifth Amendment as the circumstances presented align more with the exceptions and non-application of Doyle than with Doyle itself.While the Supreme Court agreed that the State introduced the facts underlying Kent's prior conviction without first satisfying necessary prerequisites to their admission, it did not believe this error warranted a reversal of Kent's conviction. Considering the overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence showing Kent fired his weapon at a fleeing vehicle in the street, the Supreme Court concluded that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and reinstated Kent's convictions and sentences. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. KENT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether an architect and contract administrator had duty of care towards an employee of a subcontractor under the terms of a construction contract. The employee, Gustavo Bonilla, had been injured during a demolition job and filed a suit alleging negligence against Verges Rome Architects (VRA) and Morphy Makofsky, Inc. (MMI). VRA had been hired as a consultant for design and contract administration services. The trial court ruled in favor of VRA, but the court of appeal reversed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the contract terms were clear and unambiguous, and did not impose a duty on VRA to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site or Mr. Bonilla’s safety. VRA was required to make weekly site visits to ensure work was progressing according to specifications. However, the contract specifically stated that these visits should not be construed as supervision of actual construction. Responsibility for site safety and construction methods was allocated to the contractor.The Court concluded that VRA could not be held liable for failing to perform duties it was not contractually obligated to undertake. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of VRA. View "BONILLA VS. VERGES ROME ARCHITECTS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to decide if the Council of the City of New Orleans ("Council") had the legal standing to institute a lawsuit against various parties, including the Mayor of New Orleans, relating to the assets of the Edward Wisner Trust. The Council had challenged a 2020 agreement, which it alleged illegally disposed of public property and modified the trust without its oversight or input. The issue arose when the defendants filed an exception of lack of procedural capacity, arguing that the Council did not have the authority to institute the lawsuit. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the Council did have the procedural capacity to bring the lawsuit. The court based its decision on its interpretation of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans ("HRC"), which indicated that the Council, as an independent entity distinct from the executive branch, had the legal capacity to function independently and to institute suits as necessary for the protection of the city's rights and interests. The court also considered the longstanding custom of the Council participating in litigation both as plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Council had the legal standing to bring the lawsuit, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. View "THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS VS. EDWARD WISNER DONATION" on Justia Law